Defendant was talking to somebody in an SUV who fled when the police appeared. Defendant got on a bicycle and rode away. He was stopped by the officers and was told to assume the position with his hands on the car. There was no justification for a pat down, and the officers really acted like they don’t know what the constitution requires. State v. Butler, 101 So. 3d 121 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2012)*:

Thus, according to the explicit testimony of the police officers, they exited their police car, ordered the defendant to stop and put his hands on the police vehicle to be patted down. There is no evidence that the defendant was involved in any suspicious or illegal activity prior to the pat-down. In fact, the police officers specifically testified that they had a clear view of the defendant from a short distance and saw no interchange between the defendant and the occupants of the vehicle. Thus, the record before us bears no indicia of any particularized suspicion that this defendant was involved with drugs or drug transactions except for the rationale underlying the proactive patrol, i.e. the area around Danneel and Seventh Streets is considered (like many areas of New Orleans) a high crime area.

Thus, this case appears to exemplify the concern expressed by the Justice Department (and ultimately conceded by the city in the Consent Decree) pertaining to inadequate training of NOPD officers with regard to the constitutional [Pg 10] parameters of search and seizure. See United States Department of Justice, Investigation of the New Orleans Police Department (3/16/2011), pp. 30-31 (NOPD's lack of adequate policy and training regarding search and seizure have left officers without basic foundation to perform their duties within constitutional boundaries).

. . .

Conclusion

The police actions and testimony in this case exemplify concerns expressed by the Justice Department, and conceded by the City, as to whether officers of the New Orleans Police Department have been adequately trained regarding the constitutional boundaries of search and seizure. See United States Department Of Justice, Investigation of the New Orleans Police Department (3/16/2011), pp. 30-31; see also United States of America v. The City of New Orleans, 2:12-01924 (E.D. La. 7/24/12), pp. 12, 38-44. Thus, the trial court clearly erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence and statement. Accordingly, the defendant's conviction is vacated and the matter is remanded back to the trial court. Although our review of the record reveals two errors patent pertaining to the defendant's sentencing, because we reverse the judgment of the trial court and vacate the defendant's conviction, we pretermit discussion of those errors.

NYTimes: Student IDs That Track the Students by Maurice Chammah and Nick Swartsell

SAN ANTONIO — For Tira Starr, an eighth grader at Anson Jones Middle School, the plastic nametag hanging around her neck that she has decorated with a smiley face and a purple bat sticker offers a way to reflect her personal flair. For administrators, it is something else entirely: a device that lets them use radio frequency technology — with scanners tucked behind walls and ceilings — to track her whereabouts.

When is a knock-and-talk not consensual? This one was because it was in the daytime and the officers were not overbearing. United States v. Barrios, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144047 (D. Kan. October 4, 2012)*:

Circumstances which may be pertinent include the time of day when the officers knock on the door, the manner in which the officers try to get the occupant's attention (e.g. whether the officers knock, pound or yell; whether they do so for an extended period of time), whether one or more officers is/are present, whether officers display their authority (e.g. by carrying a weapon or touching the person at the door), the behavior of the officers (e.g. whether officers shine a flashlight into the home, whether officers are persistent in the face of no response) and the language or tone of voice used (whether it conveys that compliance with the officers' request is compelled). Id. at 1168; see also United States v. Flowers, 336 F.2d 1222 (10th Cir. 2003). If the occupant is compelled to open the door, an encounter on the threshold of a person's home amounts to a seizure of the occupant. Such seizure requires a warrant unless officers have probable cause to arrest and exigent circumstances exist. Reeves, 524 F.3d at 1169.

“The question in this case is whether a warrant authorizing the search of a residence also authorizes the search of an independently occupied guesthouse located in the backyard of that residence. Agreeing with the district court that the warrant did not state with sufficient particularity that the separate residence of Defendant was a place to be searched, we affirm.” The officers did not know that the described residence also had the guesthouse. It was a separate dwelling with its own curtilage. State v. Hamilton, 2012 NMCA 115, 290 P.3d 271 (App. 2012).

A search warrant for a computer case in defendant’s car produced 23 fictitious driver's licenses, 12 counterfeit checks, and a laptop computer which were properly seized and admissible at trial. Six cell phones, however, were suppressed. United States v. Shabazz, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144453 (M.D. Fla. October 5, 2012).*

The District of Arizona at Tucson’s 10:30 am notification rule, not well publicized and not subject to judicial notice, was invalid where the defendant was arrested at 7:30 am ten miles from the courthouse but a Spanish speaking agent could not be located before 10:30. The delay in his arraignment until the next day was unreasonable under McNabb-Malloy. United States v. Valenzuela-Espinoza, 697 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2012):

Here, Valenzuela-Espinoza was arrested just ten miles from the courthouse almost three hours before the scheduled arraignment calendar. The delay here was not reasonable "given the means of transportation and the distance to be traveled to the nearest available magistrate." Corley, 129 S. Ct. at 1571. The 10:30 a.m. notification policy cannot by itself create a reasonable delay. To hold otherwise would stand the McNabb-Mallory rule on its head. It is not the longstanding principle embodied in McNabb-Mallory that must give way to local paperwork needs, but the local paperwork policy that must be tailored to the requirements of McNabb-Mallory, its implementing statute, and rule.

Anticipatory search warrant with controlled buy as a triggering condition is valid. Commonwealth v. Mora, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 575, 976 N.E.2d 196 (2012).

Defendant was involved in a three year identity theft operation and he was arrested with seven cell phones. They were searched for everything with a warrant. “Bell argues that the search warrant was overbroad because there was no justification in the affidavits supporting the warrant application to permit the government to search photos, videos, or the internet browsing history stored on the seven mobile phones found in his automobile.” He didn’t raise this argument in the district court and offers no explanation for the waiver. Affirmed. United States v. Bell, 500 Fed. Appx. 133 (3d Cir. 2012).*