Under Jones, defendant had no standing to challenge placement of a GPS device on his employer’s vehicle to track him. Failure to argue below a Jones trespass on installation of a GPS transmitter on defendant’s employer’s van was waiver for appeal. State v. Estrella, 286 P.3d 150 (Ariz. App. September 6, 2012).*

There was reasonable suspicion for a defendant’s stop for showing up at a house at 3 am and yelling for somebody unknown to come out, and the homeowner came out and the defendant left “like a bat out of hell,” and defendant had done this before. State v. Rissley, 2012 WI App 112, 344 Wis. 2d 422, 824 N.W.2d 853 (Ct. App. 2012).*

Defendant was neither a tenant nor an overnight guest, so he did not have standing in the apartment searched. Windom v. State, 379 S.W.3d 463 (Tex. App. – Beaumont 2012).*

Defendant admitted in his motion to suppress that the officers had probable cause when he was stopped after a dog alert, and that was binding on appeal. The preserved issue is whether probable cause dissipated with the failure of the dog to alert, and the court finds that it did not. That is only a factor in the totality of circumstances. State v. Anderson, 2012 Ida. LEXIS 191 (September 14, 2012):

Other courts addressing the question have generally held that a drug dog's failure to alert is only one factor to be considered in the probable cause analysis. For example, in United States v. Jodoin, the First Circuit held that a "dog's failure to react does not ... destroy the 'probable cause' that would otherwise exist. It is just another element to be considered by the magistrate." 672 F.2d 232, 234-36 (1st Cir. 1982) (holding that police did not violate the Fourth Amendment by holding defendant's suitcase for several days, even though a drug dog sniffed the suitcase but did not signal the presence of narcotics), abrogated on other grounds by Bloate v. United States, 130 S.Ct. 1345 (2010). See also United States v. Ramirez, 342 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir. 2003) ("We will not require investigators to cease an otherwise reasonable investigation solely because a dog fails to alert, particularly when we have refused to require that a dog sniff test be conducted at all."); United States v. Gill, 280 F.3d 923, 926 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002) (denying defendant's suppression motion although a drug dog failed to alert and noting that drug dogs "are not trained to detect PCP or methamphetamine due to the risk these substances pose to the dogs"); United States v. Frost, 999 F.2d 737, 744 (3rd Cir. 1993) ("When one includes both the fact that the drug sniffing dog did not alert to the suitcase and the fact that drug couriers often mask the scent of drugs in suitcases so that a drug sniffing dog will not alert, the failure to alert to the suitcase is not inconsistent with the substantial probative thrust of information which [the officer] did include [in the warrant].").

Defendant’s patdown was justified, and something was shoved into defendant’s boot which justified the officer feeling it, too, and it was drugs by plain feel. State v. Hall, 2012 Ohio 4155, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3658 (8th Cir. September 13, 2012).*

Defendant matched the description of a person flashing a gun. When officers saw defendant, they didn’t see a gun. When finally stopped, defendant had no gun, but they retraced his steps finding the gun. Defendant’s unprovoked flight was a factor. Commonwealth v. Walls, 2012 PA Super 197, 53 A.3d 889 (2012).* [Opinion mentions but doesn’t rely on the fact the gun was discarded in flight and not during a stop.]

Defendant’s patdown was justified by his matching the description of one of two men trying to break into apartments in the 911 caller victim’s building. Commonwealth v. Guess, 2012 PA Super 196, 53 A.3d 895 (2012).*

Odor of marijuana and defendant’s chewing when the car door was opened was probable cause for a warrantless search because he might be destroying drugs. Gaines v. State, 973 N.E.2d 1239 (Ind. App. 2012).*

Defendant was a police officer who had an accident in a patrol car killing two motorcyclists. Drawing his blood under the implied consent statute by medical personnel at the hospital was not contrary to protocol or unreliable. State v. Bisard, 973 N.E.2d 1229 (Ind. App. 2012).*

Defendant’s car was searched with probable cause for threats on the Governor when it was found near the Governor’s Mansion. Text messages sent by the defendant were incriminating. Once the car was found nearby, there was a reasonable probability the car contained evidence of crime. United States v. Baker, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130108 (D. Utah September 11, 2012).*

Access to defendant’s cell phone records by subpoena duces tecum was not a search under Smith v. Maryland. As to the Stored Communications Act, suppression is not a statutory remedy, even if it was violated. State v. Bone, 107 So. 3d 49 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2012).*

The informant’s credibility issues were adequately explained to the magistrate. State v. Clement, 101 So. 3d 460 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2012).*

Defendant was walking in the street, and the officer stopped to tell him to walk on the sidewalk, and defendant ran, so he gave chase. Defendant abandoned a baseball size baggie of cocaine. Barber v. State, 317 Ga. App. 600, 732 S.E.2d 125 (2012).*

Defendant’s nervousness and signs of bruxism (grinding of teeth) that he was a methamphetamine user was not justification for a search of the car for evidence he was in possession at that time. State v. Farrar, 2012 Ore. App. LEXIS 1126 (September 12, 2012).*

The fact that defendant's roommate had displayed suicidal behavior before being handcuffed outside did not justify an emergency aid entry into the apartment under the Oregon Constitution because the officer had no specific information that the roommate had hurt someone or that defendant was injured or in some kind of danger. The illegal entry into defendant's apartment by reaching in and knocking on his bedroom door was causally connected to defendant's consent to search because the officer was able to contact defendant and seek consent only by effecting the warrantless entry. State v. Lorenzo, 252 Ore. App. 256, 287 P.3d 1124 (2012).*

The lack of a video goes to the officer’s credibility, but here there wasn’t enough to undermine his credibility. The length of the stop was reasonable. “In sum, the court finds that the troopers' actions demonstrated a ‘graduated response to emerging facts, [which] were reasonable under the totality of the circumstances, and did not unconstitutionally extend [Platt's] detention.’” United States v. Platt, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130141 (W.D. La. August 6, 2012).*

“The court finds that the inventory search in this case was conducted according to standardized procedures that sufficiently limited Aikens' discretion in order to prevent the search from becoming a general investigatory search for incriminating evidence.” This is even though the officer started off asking for consent, which was denied, and he said he was going to search the car for anything illegal, and then he corrected himself and said for things of value. United States v. Carroll, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131000 (W.D. Va. September 12, 2012).*