Defendant was stopped, and the officer called for backup indicating that he wanted to search the car. When he talked to the defendant, the officer asked for and obtained consent within ten seconds of handing back the DL. This was found to be an independent act of free will. United States v. Ansourian, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 17879 (5th Cir. August 23, 2012)*:

We consider three factors to determine whether the consent was an independent act of free will: "(1) the temporal proximity of the illegal conduct and the consent; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the initial misconduct." Jenson, 462 F.3d at 407 (citations omitted).

The first factor weighs in favor of Ansourian. Officer Averette asked for Ansourian's consent just ten seconds after telling Ansourian that he was free to leave and returning his paperwork. Thus, the district court properly concluded that "the first factor supports a finding that defendant's consent was not an independent act of free will."

The second factor of intervening circumstances indicates the consent was an independent act of free will. Prior to asking for consent, Officer Averette communicated to Ansourian that "You're free to go." At this point, Officer Averette also returned Ansourian's license and registration. We have previously identified both of these facts as intervening circumstances. ... The knowledge that one is free to leave, accompanied by the return of the license and registration, cuts the causal chain between the unconstitutional detention and the consent. ...

Finally, although there is some support for both sides, the third factor of flagrancy and purpose of police misconduct leans in favor of the government. On the one hand, Officer Averette said that he wanted to search a vehicle when he radioed for backup, and we have held that if the clear purpose of the detention was to obtain consent to search the vehicles, then that factor weighs against the government. ... However, following an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that the unlawful detention spanned only seven minutes, and the officers did not purposefully use that period of illegal detention to procure the defendant's consent to search the vehicles. In addition, the video clearly shows that the consent was not obtained by any misrepresentations made to the defendants as Officer Averette told Ansourian that he was looking for "anything illegal." Moreover, once the search began, Ansourian never tried to stop it, revoke his consent, or complain about the length of the search. To the contrary, Ansourian offered to remove the trailer fenders to allow the officers to access the car.

We conclude that the district court's determination that Ansourian's consent was voluntary and an independent act of free will was not error. ...

Just because the citizen-informant had a prior conviction did not make him part of the “criminal milieu” subject to a higher standard of evaluation. He could still be a citizen informant. Defendant’s arrest without a warrant in his doorway was not a violation of Payton. He resisted and turned back after realizing he was being arrested, but that did not make the arrest violate Payton. Stout v. State, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 657 (August 23, 2012):

We note that, although no evidence was presented about the Petitioner's exact location in relation to the doorway, the Petitioner has the burden to present facts establishing a violation of Payton. See Keven Scott v. State of Tennessee, No. W2010-02515-CCA-R3-PC, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Nov. 22, 2011), Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application denied (Tenn. Apr. 12, 2012) (holding that the petitioner bears the burden of proving the alleged prejudice, so it is incumbent on the petitioner to establish an adequate record at his post-conviction hearing upon which this Court could determine the likelihood of success of a motion to suppress). We believe "it unwise to become preoccupied with the exact location of the individual in relation to the doorway. ... [T]he crucial issues involve the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the individual came to the doorway voluntarily." Ducan v. Storie, 869 F.2d 110, 1102 (8th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). The Petitioner has failed to present facts establishing that he did not come to the door voluntarily and that he had an expectation of privacy where he was arrested. Rather, the police officers arrested the Petitioner in a public place, and no warrant was required. See e.g., McKinnon v. Carr, 103 F.3d 934 (10th Cir. 1996) (concluding a warrantless arrest was valid when officers knocked on the door and identified themselves; the defendant opened the door; and the officers told him that he was under arrest).

The police officers in this case did not enter the residence until after the Petitioner was seized. The Petitioner slightly resisted the arrest, and the police officers entered the residence to apprehend him. However, "a suspect may not defeat an arrest which has been set in motion in a public place, and is therefore proper under Watson, by the expedient of escaping to a private place." Santana, 427 U.S. at 43. Therefore, the police officers' actions in entering the residence to apprehend the Petitioner after he resisted an arrest in a public place did not violate Payton.