Defendant was lawfully ordered out of the car, and it matters not that it was early into the stop or when the papers were returned because the stop is not over until the officer says he can go. Some continuation of stops are minimal intrusions. State v. Donaldson, 380 S.W.3d 86 (Tenn. 2012):

After being stopped for a traffic violation, however, a driver should expect "to spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely will be allowed to continue on his way." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984); cf. Muehler, 544 U.S. at 101 (finding that because questioning of the defendant did not prolong the stop, no independent Fourth Amendment justification was needed for the questioning based upon the legitimacy of the initial stop). "[T]he permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654. Mimms and its progeny permit the intrusion if the officer merely removes a defendant from his vehicle absent undue delay. The question, however, of where a de minimis intrusion ends and an undue delay begins is necessarily a fact-specific inquiry. See United States v. Everett, 601 F.3d 484, 493-94 (6th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that "a fact-bound, context-dependent inquiry" must be conducted in each case to determine whether the duration of the stop was unreasonable). It is impossible to select "an arbitrary quantity of time and proclaim that any prolongation less than that amount is categorically 'de minimis' — as convenient as such a rule might be." Everett, 601 F.3d at 493. A number of cases, including our Berrios opinion, however, illuminate the distinction. There, the officer not only stopped the defendant for speeding and frisked him for weapons but also placed the defendant in the back seat of a locked patrol car before checking his driver's license and vehicle registration. Because the evidence established that the officer had done so to test the anxiety level of the defendant as an investigative technique, we held that the extended detention, under those particular circumstances, did not qualify as "de minimis." Berrios, 235 S.W.3d at 107. The case before us is distinguishable on the facts. Officer Baker described the stop of the Defendant as "normal." Nothing in the record indicates that it lasted more than five minutes. Unlike the circumstances in Berrios, the intrusion was minimal.

The marijuana residue on defendant’s shirt when he was ordered out of the car during a stop was in plain view. The court requires exigent circumstances, too, to search the car, and it found it from the stop being at 2:30 am. State v. Willette, 2012 Ohio 3836, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3386 (4th Dist. August 22, 2012).*

When the car was stopped, the defendant’s movements in the car justified a frisk of him and the car for weapons. This was not a Gant search incident. City of Euclid v. Hull, 2012 Ohio 3801, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3359 (8th Dist. August 23, 2012).*

Officers investigating a home invasion went to the basement to find a cage for a small dog that would be left behind when they left the house. They found marijuana. The entry to the basement was reasonable and not a pretext for further search. State v. Rivera, 2012 Ohio 3755, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3313 (12th Dist. August 20, 2012).*

A motion to suppress a search warrant tolls speedy trial. State v. Hoang, 2012 Ohio 3741, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3308 (9th Dist. August 20, 2012).*

Crossing the centerline is reason for a traffic stop. State v. McCandlish, 2012 Ohio 3765, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3337 (10th Dist. August 21, 2012).*

Defendant was stopped for matching the clothing description after an aggravated burglary, and it was reasonable. State v. Garrison, 2012 Ohio 3846, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3397 (2d Dist. August 24, 2012).*

While defendant might have been misled concerning the fact he was waiving his suppression issue in a guilty plea, he wouldn’t have won the appeal anyway, so there was no prejudice. Martin v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119416 (S.D. W.Va. August 23, 2012).*

The officers lacked reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in any crime when they stopped him. It was just a generalized suspicion. The gun found on him was suppressed. United States v. Dapolito, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119810 (D. Me. August 21, 2012).*

There was no reasonable expectation of privacy in jail calls, and a wiretap warrant was not required. United States v. Anderson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120074 (W.D. N.Y. May 29, 2012),* adopted 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119853 (W.D. N.Y. August 23, 2012).*

Reasonable suspicion defendant was armed came from his stopping at a drug house, being nervous, sweating like he was on drugs, being on federal supervised release from a gun charge (which he later admitted), and being a known gang member. United States v. Amaya, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120160 (D. Utah August 23, 2012).*

Probable cause for a federal child pornography warrant was established during state proceedings. The search protocol was sufficient. Failure to apprise the U.S. Magistrate Judge that a state child pornography case had venue problems was not a Franks issue for federal court. Federal court had jurisdiction over child pornography too. United States v. Storm, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119480 (D. Ore. August 23, 2012)*:

Probable cause for the federal search warrants was established by the state investigation conducted before the state search warrant was issued, by the execution of the state search warrant, and by examination of the seized digital storage media. The search protocol in the federal warrants is almost identical to that approved in Adjani. Compare 452 F.3d 1140, 1144 (9th Cir. 2006) ("In searching the data, the computer personnel will examine all of the data contained in the computer equipment and storage devices to view their precise contents and determine whether the data falls within the items to be seized as set forth herein." (quoting the search warrant)) with Def.'s Ex. 9 at 7 (containing identical language). Finally, the federal search warrants expressly state both the criminal conduct suspected and the relevant statutes, and the federal search warrants were sufficiently particular. Accordingly, the federal search was lawful, and Defendant's motion to suppress is denied.

Salt Lake Trib: Snoop-wary Texans rebel against new ‘smart meters’ by Sarah Kuta of AP:

Thelma Taormina keeps a pistol at her Houston-area home to protect against intruders. But one of the last times she used it, she said, was to run off a persistent utility company worker who was trying to replace her old electricity meter with a new digital unit.

"This is Texas." she declared at a recent public hearing on the new meters. "We have rights to choose what appliances we want in our home."

A nationwide effort to upgrade local power systems with modern equipment has run into growing resistance in Texas, where suspicion of government and fear of electronic snooping have made a humble household device the center of a politically charged showdown over personal liberty.

Some angry residents are building steel cages around their electric meters, threatening installers who show up with new ones and brandishing Texas flags at boisterous hearings about the utility conversion. At a recent hearing at the state Capitol in Austin, protesters insisted everyone present recite the Pledge of Allegiance before the meeting could begin.

h/t: PogoWasRight.org

Monitoring usage won't even require a home visit anymore.