Defendant was twice stopped for blocking the street. On the second one, a month or so later, the officer conducted a patdown and felt a baggy of crack in his groin. The manipulation of his genitals arguably violated a state statute on strip searches, even though there was no strip search per se because the baggy was retrieved without pulling down his pants. A violation of the strip search statute has no exclusionary remedy, and the court declines to impose one. State v. Purley, 2012 Ohio 3734, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3304 (6th Dist. August 17, 2012):

[*P27] The strip search statute includes a manual inspection of the proscribed areas, so there is an arguable violation. This is not, however, dispositive of the issue before us. The exclusionary rule articulated in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), mandates the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights. In Ohio, the rule has not been applied to violations of statutory rights that fall short of constitutional violations unless there is a legislative mandate requiring application of the exclusionary rule. Kettering v. Hollen, 64 Ohio St.2d 232, 234, 416 N.E.2d 598 (1980). No such mandate exists with respect to a violation of R.C. 2933.32. As a result the exclusionary rule will not be applied. State v. Wesley, 5th Dist. No. 1999CA00226, 2000 WL 329938 (Mar. 27, 2000). Accordingly, appellant's first assignment of error is not well-taken.

The officers had articulable facts that others might be present when they were executing an arrest warrant for defendant justifying a protective sweep. United States v. Crail, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115540 (S.D. Ohio August 16, 2012).*

In a federal civil rights criminal prosecution of a police officer, it was well established that a strip search of a female arrestee on the side of the road would violate the Fourth Amendment despite the lack of a specific case in point. Something would be required, and here there was nothing. United States v. Morris, 494 Fed. Appx. 574 (6th Cir. 2012).*

Defendant’s request for shoes after he was arrested and removed from his hotel room was implied consent for the officer to return to the room to get them. Plain view on that entry sustained. United States v. Chapman, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116074 (D. Utah August 16, 2012).*

Defendant’s motion to suppress is granted. His consent was shortly after, and came as result of, a prior illegal entry by the police and cannot be distinguished from it in time or context. Indeed, the officers involved in the consent thought they were part of the same operation. United States v. Roberts, 888 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (N.D. Ga. 2012),* rejecting R&R 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115638 (N.D. Ga. June 28, 2012).*

Defendant hiding behind a pillar and his hands to avoid the police in a high crime area was reasonable suspicion. State v. Allen, 2012 Ohio 3709, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3282 (2d Dist. August 17, 2012).*

Inference (here, "clear possibility") there was a co-conspirator inside capable of destruction of evidence is not exigent circumstances for a warrantless entry. It is established that actual knowledge is required. United States v. Glover, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115461 (E.D. La. August 16, 2012)*:

Based on these observations alone, the Government contends that there was a "clear possibility" that a co-conspirator was inside the residence and capable of destroying the evidence absent immediate action from the agents. But in order to demonstrate exigent circumstances, the Government must point to more than a mere possibility of the presence of persons in a residence. Id. at 295-96 ("A finding of exigent circumstances ... must be based on an officer's reasonable belief that the delay necessary to obtain a warrant will facilitate the destruction or removal of evidence or put officers or bystanders in danger."). Rather, the Fifth Circuit finds exigent circumstances present when the Government demonstrates that agents had actual knowledge of other persons inside a residence. See Mata, 517 F.3d at 289 (before warrantless entry, agents "knew with absolute certainty" that contraband was in the building and witnessed several people running in different directions around the building); Riley, 968 F.2d at 425 (warrantless entry was reasonable when accomplice told agents that "there was a large sum of money, a handgun and another individual at the residence he had just left"); United States v. Maldonado, 472 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2006) (agents observed "someone open the trailer door, peek out, and then quickly close the door" before they initiated the protective sweep). Or, in the absence of actual knowledge, the Government may demonstrate the exigency by showing that agents heard or saw movement suggesting the presence of other persons in the residence.