In a big drug and stolen property raid in Guam, the search scene turned into a real clusterf, and it was admittedly almost completely mismanaged with the press camped out in front of the house and victims of the thefts coming by to claim their property. Ultimately, the press was invited to the back of the property onto the curtilage to look at a marijuana patch. Assuming a Wilson v. Layne violation occurred by inviting the press back there, the court decides that suppression was not the remedy. United States v. Duenas, 691 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2012):

Assuming that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred, we, like the district court, reject the Duenases' contention that suppression is the appropriate remedy. Because Wilson was a Bivens action, the Supreme Court was not required to address the application of the exclusionary rule. 526 U.S. at 608. The Court expressly declined to decide "whether the exclusionary rule would apply to any evidence discovered or developed by the media representatives." Id. at 614 n.2. We, similarly, have not previously decided whether the exclusionary rule applies to evidence obtained by police who have violated the Fourth Amendment by allowing the media to intrude into the location of the search.

A Fourth Amendment violation does not automatically trigger the exclusionary rule. Rather, the rule applies only where the benefit of deterrence outweighs the rule's "'substantial social costs.'" Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984)). Application of the exclusionary rule is a fact-intensive inquiry. See United States v. $186,416.00 in U.S. Currency, 590 F.3d 942, 950 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). "To apply the exclusionary rule to [a] unique set of facts ... we must consider the rule's dual purposes: to deter similar police misconduct in the future and to preserve the integrity of the courts." Id. (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 217-18 (1979)).

The Eleventh Circuit has weighed the benefits and costs of applying the exclusionary rule in an analogous context. See United States v. Hendrixson, 234 F.3d 494, 496-97 (11th Cir. 2000). In Hendrixson, police were accompanied by a television reporter while searching a defendant's residence for methamphetamine. Id. at 496. The reporter "arrived after the search was in progress and did not move, touch or handle anything in the residence." Id. Although the Eleventh Circuit found that the media's presence violated the Fourth Amendment, it declined to suppress the evidence found during the search. Id. The court emphasized that the purpose of the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment is to prevent the police from conducting "general searches" that go beyond the scope of the warrant. Id. at 497 (citing Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987)). In Hendrixson, the police did not exceed the parameters of the warrant, because the "media presence did not expand the scope of the search," the search was "actually carried out by the police themselves," and there was "no allegation that the reporter aided the search; he did not touch, move, or handle anything in the residence." Id. at 497. The court suggested that the deterrence goals of the exclusionary rule in such circumstances could be better served through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens actions. Id. at 497 n.4.

We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that where the media were present, but did not discover or develop any of the evidence later used at trial, the evidence need not be excluded. Here, the media did not expand the scope of the search beyond the warrant's dictates; nor did the media assist the police, or touch, move, handle or taint the admitted evidence in any way. Because the GPD complied with the terms of the warrant and the media did not disturb any evidence later admitted, the more appropriate remedy here, as the Eleventh Circuit concluded in Hendrixson, is a Bivens or a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.

Well, if Hudson doesn't permit exclusion for a knock-and-announce violation, why should this? Yes, the Fourth Amendment was violated, but how did it aid the police in the search beyond good PR? Bad form, clearly. Fourth Amendment violated, clearly. Yet no suppression required. Thank you SCOTUS.

Consent after an illegal entry was a consequence of the entry and would be suppressed. One of the critical officers involved and the defendant didn’t testify at the suppression hearing, and the court will give the parties an opportunity to say what else they would do and how it would change the outcome [“Given the serious consequences of the Court's findings and analysis, the Court will provide the parties an opportunity to request a further hearing before this Order shall be deemed final.”] United States v. Roberts, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115642 (N.D. Ga. August 15, 2012).*

A protective sweep on serving an arrest warrant was justified by officers knowing that there was a car foreign to the premises there, someone other than defendant and his wife was getting mail there, and the defendant was known for violence because of his prior arrests. United States v. Crail, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115540 (S.D. Ohio August 16, 2012).*

NYTimes.com: Pockets of City See Higher Use of Force During Police Stops by Ray Rivera:

The crowded neighborhoods of the West Bronx come alive at night. Residents, young and old, cluster around door stoops. Teenagers fill playground basketball courts. Police officers from the nearby 44th and 46th Precincts patrol the streets, from time to time stopping and frisking young men, mostly black and Latino. And when they do, statistics show, they use physical force far more often than the police do anywhere else in the city.

The DEA merely watching an arrest in Colombia is not "directly effect[ing] an arrest" in violation of 22 U.S.C. § 2291(c)(1). United States v. Larrahondo, 885 F. Supp. 2d 209 (D. D.C. 2012):

The Court is likewise not persuaded by the argument that the Mansfield Amendment supports suppression of this evidence. Anturi has presented no persuasive argument as to how an agent's participation in an arrest actually made by Colombian law enforcement falls under the statute's prohibition on U.S. officers' "directly effect[ing] an arrest," 22 U.S.C. § 2291(c)(1). Anturi's interpretation would read the word "directly" out of the statute. See United States v. Bourdet, 477 F. Supp. 2d 164, 174-76 (D.D.C. 2007) (Bates, J.) ("A United States agent providing assistance to a foreign official or merely being present as a foreign official makes an arrest is more accurately described, at most, as indirectly effecting the arrest ...."). Furthermore, even if the Court were to agree that the DEA's behavior here violated the Mansfield Amendment, it is far from clear that suppression of evidence would be the appropriate remedy. See id. ("[T]he Mansfield Amendment is far removed from the concerns of a defendant's Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights."). But in any event, no violation has been shown.

A protective sweep of premises in anticipation of a search warrant being sought was unreasonable where there were no facts supporting even an inference that there was another person inside after officers surveilled the premises watching its comings and goings. Observations in the protective sweep were included in the search warrant. The government, however, satisfied its burden of showing probable cause in the remaining information in the affidavit on informant hearsay. United States v. Glover, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115461 (E.D. La. August 16, 2012).*

Walking in the street in a high crime area where there are sidewalks is a traffic offense in Missouri, and a search incident was permitted. This is the same as United States v. Pratt, 355 F.3d 1119 (8th Cir. 2004). United States v. Moore, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114645 (W.D. Mo. July 24, 2012).*

Officers were investigating a drug trafficking organization and they had at least reasonable suspicion to stop defendant when he was leaving a suspected warehouse of the drugs, but defendant committed a traffic offense. He was removed to the back of a police car, and a dog alerted within 1½ minutes. The stop was reasonable. United States v. Braden, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115275 (W.D. Tenn. August 16, 2012).*

An affidavit for an arrest warrant that merely tracked the statutory language without alleging any facts was insufficient as a matter of law. An assistant DA helped prepare it, but there still were no facts. State v. Mendell, 2012 Ohio 3178, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3250 (2d Dist. July 13, 2012):

[*P12] ... And the affidavit attached to the complaint states:

Detective W.N. Ring, being first duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that the probable cause that defendant committed the offense set forth in the Complaint is as follows: Defendant was identified as the perpetrator of the offense by Amanda A. Mendell who was an eyewitness to the offense.

[*P13] The complaint describes the offense in the statutory language and does not allege any specific facts about what Mendell did. Because the information in the complaint amounts to an unsupported conclusion that Mendell committed domestic violence, it is insufficient to support the issuance of the arrest warrant.

. . .

[*P18] Here, the complaint and affidavit are so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. As we explained above, the complaint and affidavit are totally devoid of facts to demonstrate how Mendell committed a domestic violence offense. A reasonably well-trained officer would have known that these documents could not establish probable cause. See State v. Jones, 72 Ohio App.3d 522, 528, 595 N.E.2d 485 (6th Dist.1991).

[*P19] We recognize that to a certain extent, Detective Ring enlisted the assistance of the prosecutor's office prior to seeking the arrest warrant. Ring testified that he met with an assistant prosecutor, he gave her information from his investigation, and the prosecutor's office approved a charge. Ring testified that once the charges are approved, normally he goes to the intake office at the prosecutor's office. An employee there prepares the complaint and warrant for the issuing official's approval. However, Ring testified that he also completes a "statement of facts," i.e., an affidavit, to give to the issuing official. Ring testified that he filled out the affidavit in this case. Ring did not testify that the prosecutor's office assisted or advised him on how to prepare this affidavit. ...