Where the question of PC was a close call and could have gone either way, the affidavit was “not so lacking” in probable cause that it could not be still relied on in good faith under Leon. Therefore, the product of the search warrant would not be suppressed. United States v. Anderson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114528 (W.D. N.Y. April 19, 2012)*:

During oral argument, the Government acknowledged that had the same facts been presented to this Court it would be a reasonable judicial response to say "there's not enough here" to connect the 2978 Upton Road residence to the murders being investigated. That I might agree with the Government is not the litmus test in my analysis. For I also conclude that in the present case there is no evidence that the issuing judge abandoned his independent role as a neutral and detached finder of probable cause or that the judge issued the warrant in reliance on a deliberately or recklessly false affidavit. Nor do I find that the warrant was based on an affidavit so lacking in facts amounting to "probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. It would be easy for this Court to second guess whether these facts amounted to only "mere suspicion" that evidence of the Rochester murders would be present in Anderson's residence in Columbus or whether these facts rose to the level of probable cause. But the bottom line is that such an inquiry is not necessary. The court's "good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal in light of 'all of the circumstances.'" Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 129 S. Ct. 695, 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23) (internal quotation mark omitted). Based on the totality of the record before me, I conclude that neither the affiant or the officers executing the search would have any objective reason to question the issuing judge's determination that probable cause existed. Accordingly, I find that the "good faith" exception applies to this case.

Defendant’s prompt offer to be frisked was voluntary consent. United States v. Lopez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115074 (D. Conn. August 6, 2012):

Here, it could be logically argued that defendant lacked knowledge of his right to refuse the frisk because consent to a pat-down was extremely likely to result in his arrest. In other words, no rational gun-toting-felon would consent to a search if they understood their consent to be optional. However, this argument is called into question by the fact that defendant, absent any prompt or direction, offered himself up to be frisked immediately upon exiting his vehicle. That is to say, no rational gun-toting-felon would offer himself up for search without prompt – but defendant did so.

Civil forfeiture is governed by a specific statutory scheme and the state’s Rule 41 on criminal search warrants does not apply to return of the property. Harmon v. Jones, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 560 (August 14, 2012).

Having to tell the defendant repeatedly to keep his hands visible is reasonable suspicion for a patdown for weapons. United States v. George, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114940 (E.D. N.C. August 15, 2012)*:

In applying the totality of the circumstances test, courts look to numerous factors including the time, place and purpose of the encounter, United States v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 310 (4th Cir. 2002); the overall context of the traffic stop, United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 514 (4th Cir. 2011); Defendant's nervous, evasive demeanor, Branch, 537 F.3d at 338; Defendant's delay in complying with the Officer's command to place his hands in plain view, United States v. Mayo, 361 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 2004) and contradictory and inconsistent statements obtained from the driver of the vehicle, Powell, 666 F.3d at 188.

The defendant failed to show that the U.S. government was not so involved with this Colombian wiretap that it was a U.S. operation or would “shock the conscience,” and the motion to suppress it is denied. United States v. Larrahondo, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114640 (D. D.C. August 15, 2012).*

ACLU: ACLU Sues FBI for New GPS Tracking Memos by Adrienne Lucas:

Today the ACLU filed a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act to force the FBI to release two memos guiding the bureau’s policy on GPS tracking. The memos were written in the wake of the Supreme Court’s January decision in U.S. v. Jones, which held that the Fourth Amendment applies when the government secretly attaches a GPS device to a car and tracks its movements. (See today’s legal complaint, our original FOIA request (made July 18), and a blog post we wrote about that request).

NewAmerican.com: The Fourth Amendment and the Drones: How Will it Apply? by Joe Wolverton, II:

On a near daily basis, The New American chronicles the approach of the day when squadrons of drones will fill the skies of the United States. Scores of these unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) will be deployed by state and local law enforcement, adding to the many already deployed by the federal government.

With the rise of the drones comes the rise of several critical questions of Constitutionality of their potential uses. ...