State law permitted safety check roadblocks until the court wised up and declared them unconstitutional. Defendant was stopped under the influence in the interim, and his DUI was dismissed. His driver’s license was administratively suspended, however, and the exclusionary rule does not apply to civil proceedings [even where the state is a party]. Miller v. Toler, 2012 W. Va. LEXIS 340 (June 6, 2012) (dissent):

This Court agrees that if the exclusionary rule is extended to civil license revocation or suspension proceedings there would be minimal likelihood of deterring police misconduct because the real punishment to law enforcement for misconduct is derived by excluding unlawfully seized evidence in the criminal proceeding. When this minimal deterrent benefit is compared to the societal cost of applying the exclusionary rule in a civil, administrative driver's license revocation or suspension proceeding that was designed to protect innocent persons, the cost to society outweighs any benefit of extending the exclusionary rule to the civil proceeding.

Furthermore, at the time the safety equipment checkpoint occurred in this case, the state troopers were acting lawfully under the decision of this Court in State v. Davis, 195 W. Va. 79, 464 S.E.2d 598 (1995), overruled by State v. Sigler, 224 W. Va. 608, 687 S.E.2d 391 (2009). ...

“In a case of mistaken identity, Michael Dwayne Durham was charged and jailed in southwest Virginia for more than three months before the prosecutor realized and rectified the error. As a result, Durham initiated this civil action in the Western District of Virginia against, inter alia, officer David L. Horner, alleging a Fourth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plus a state law claim for malicious prosecution. The district court awarded summary judgment to Horner on the basis of qualified immunity, and Durham appeals. See Durham v. Horner, No. 2:09-cv-00012 (W.D. Va. Dec. 7, 2010) (the ‘Opinion’). As explained below, we affirm.” Here, there was no showing of malice or ill-will against the plaintiff. Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2012), affg Durham v. Horner, 759 F. Supp. 2d 810 (W.D. Va. 2010). [Note: Try explaining this to a citizen. It can't be done. I get a call a week from somebody who wants to sue when charges were dropped or they were acquitted. It takes considerably more than just getting out of it.]

Defendant was under a protective order barring him from the property where he was found, and that denied him a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises, despite the fact the person to benefit from the protective order let him in. This is "wrongful presence"; therefore, no REP. United States v. Conshafter, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110501 (E.D. Tex. July 24, 2012).

Hiding in a house from the police does not give one standing under Olson. United States v. Pate, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109088 (D. Minn. August 3, 2012), R&R 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110574 (D. Minn. July 18, 2012).

Defendant was the passenger in a car stopped after a shooting on an Indian reservation. He lacked standing. United States v. Allman, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108803 (D. S.D. August 3, 2012), R&R 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108817 (D. S.D. June 29, 2012).*

Defendant made a sufficient showing to get the CI’s identity under Roviaro on the question of defendant’s standing. The government argued there was an alternative ground to sustain the search without it which the court did not yet decide. United States v. Johnson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111085 (D. Nev. August 7, 2012):

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendant has made the required threshold showing for an in camera hearing regarding the identity of the informant, the substance of the information that the informant provided to the police officers, and whether the informant was reliable. An in camera hearing is also justified to determine whether the informant has any knowledge relating to whether Defendant was a trespasser or was lawfully present on the subject premises at the time of the officer's entry and subsequent search. The Government states that "[i]f the Court feels that an in camera review of the CI file is necessary to make this determination, the Government will provide the file upon the Court's request." Opposition to Motion to Compel (#27), pg. 9. In view of the foregoing, the Court directs the Government to provide a copy of the CI file under seal to the Court's chambers for in camera review. This does not mean, however, that production of the CI file for in camera review will alone be sufficient to satisfy the requirement for an in camera hearing. The Court will entertain further oral argument on this issue at the hearing presently scheduled for August 13, 2012.

NYC has a program where livery cabs opt to be stopped for protection of the driver from robbery. The livery cab owner has to opt in and there are decals for the police to see. This livery cab had a decal from its prior owner but this owner had not opted in. The stop was still objectively reasonable because the mistake was reasonable, and the officer's plain view of a gun between the feet of the passenger was sustained. The failure to comply with some program details was not sufficient to suppress the search. United States v. Edwards, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110344 (S.D. N.Y. August 6, 2012).* Describing the program: “In People v. Abad, 98 N.Y.2d 12, 17, 771 N.E.2d 235, 744 N.Y.S.2d 353 (2002), the New York Court of Appeals held that TRIP ‘properly balances the competing interests under Brown.’”

Even if Officer 1 had failed to ask the driver to open the passenger door, the fact that he had seen the portion of a gun in plain view at Edwards' feet provided "independent reason to detain [him]." Abad, 98 N.Y.2d at 18. Furthermore, the fact that Officer 1 may not have specifically inquired about the driver's safety is insufficient to suggest that the stop was unlawful, particularly in light of the fact that the officer had already identified the potential danger when he observed the gun's hammer while approaching the vehicle and pointing his flashlight into the interior of the car.

. . .

Finally, Edwards contends that the stop is unlawful because the officers failed to record the stop in an activity log, as required by the TRIP protocol. The officer's failure in this instance to complete a separate TRIP log is not sufficient to invalidate the stop. The purpose of the requirement is "to afford[] the possibility of post-stop judicial review to the extent questions are raised as to the actual operation of the program," Abad, 98 N.Y.2d at 18 (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, Edwards was afforded considerable post-stop judicial review, including the opportunity to cross-examine the officers who arrested him. The Government also provided, at the evidentiary hearing, Officer 1's contemporaneous record of the stop in his regular notebook. The absence of an official activity log thus did not deprive the Court of the ability to review the facts of the stop as recorded by the arresting officer.