Defendant was stopped because the color of the vehicle did not match the DMV record, which turned out to be erroneous. This was chargeable to the state, and the good faith exception did not apply. State v. Bromm, 20 Neb. App. 76, 819 N.W.2d 231 (2012).*

The officer was uncontradicted, and the evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion there was reasonable suspicion for the stop. Cocaine was found in defendant’s mouth during the stop. State v. Harris, 98 So. 3d 903 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2012).*

“[A]t the time S made the investigatory stop of the defendant, he had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant had just committed the burglary reported by police dispatch, and the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant's lone presence, close in temporal and physical proximity to the scene of the burglary and his behavior and demeanor immediately before S stopped him, supported the court's finding of reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant, and because this court determined that S's stop of the defendant was not unlawful, it was not necessary to address the issue of whether it tainted the defendant's consent to the search of his car.” (Syllabus) State v. Miller, 2012 Conn. App. LEXIS 383 (August 14, 2012).*

Defendant was in a house that the police reasonably thought was abandoned. He had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the house, but the police acted reasonably under the circumstances, and the search was valid. United States v. Harrison, 689 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2012):

The same logic applies to a person's abandonment of his house. A person can, through his own acts or omissions, manifest an intent to relinquish his legitimate expectation of privacy in his real property, as the same test applies regardless of the nature of the property. This is, however, a difficult standard to meet, and one that requires a careful analysis of all the facts and circumstances of a particular case. Before the government may cross the threshold of a home without a warrant, there must be clear, unequivocal and unmistakable evidence that the property has been abandoned. Only then will such a search be permitted.

In this case, it is undisputed that the house was not actually abandoned and that Harrison, as a renter, possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property. Therefore, the only issue before us is whether the police officers' belief that the house was abandoned justified their warrantless entry.

The law does not require that police officers always be factually correct; it does demand, however, that they always be reasonable. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990). "Consequently, a reasonable mistake of fact does not violate the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 398 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Elliott, 50 F.3d 180, 185-86 (2d Cir. 1995). In deciding what is reasonable, a court is to apply an objective standard, looking at whether "the facts available to the officer at the moment ... warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief" that the search was permissible. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188 (internal quotation marks omitted).

So, while a warrantless entry into the home is the "chief evil" the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect (Payton), an objectively reasonable belief it isn't a home makes it ok?

A search warrant for an address is particular enough. Defendant challenged it in the suppression hearing without any citation of authority, and thus essentially waived the argument, but would lose on the merits anyway. There was also probable cause to connect the address to the robbery as a place where evidence would likely be found. United States v. Harris, 884 F. Supp. 2d 383 (W.D. Pa. 2012).

The FTCA does not apply to discretionary government functions, like the decision to investigate, but it does apply to illegal searches conducted after the decision to investigate. Muhammad v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110617 (E.D. Pa. August 6, 2012).

“Finally, Movants' argument that the subpoenas violate the Fourth Amendment lacks merit. In United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-443 (1967), the Supreme Court held that bank customers have no legitimate expectation of privacy in their bank records. Therefore, when a federal agency issues a subpoena for customer records from a bank, the customer cannot successfully challenge the subpoena on Fourth Amendment grounds. Id.” Tabet v. United States SEC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110048 (S.D. Cal. August 6, 2012).*

Drawing weapon and order to show hands a seizure. United States v. Griffin, 884 F. Supp. 2d 767 (E.D. Wis. 2012). The officer:

effected a seizure when, after identifying himself as an officer, he drew his weapon and ordered defendant to show his hands. See Gentry v. Sevier, 597 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 2010) ("When the officers pulled up in their patrol car and one officer exited the car and told Gentry to keep [his] hands up,' the officer executed a Terry stop."); see also Carlson v. Bukovic, 621 F.3d 610, 619 (7th Cir. 2010) (listing "the display of a weapon and the police officers' language and tone of voice suggesting compulsion" as relevant factors in determining whether a seizure occurred) ...

Defendant’s coresident consented to a police entry to check on her welfare, and whatever was seen was based on her consent. Her voluntary statement about where defendant’s gun was was not a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. United States v. Napolitan, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108983 (W.D. Pa. August 3, 2012).*

Teri Dobbins Baxter, Low Expectations: How Changing Expectations of Privacy Can Erode Fourth Amendment Protection and a Proposed Solution, 84 Temp.L.Rev. 599 (2012):

Technology has changed the lives of every American, but it has revolutionized the way that young people socialize and become socialized. The increasing use of technology to interact with their peers and shape their identities has led to a change in the way personal information is shared and the privacy expectations that are held with respect to that information. Various studies have found that, in general, younger generations have lower privacy expectations than their older counterparts. This Article considers how these changing attitudes towards privacy among youth have the potential to erode Fourth Amendment protection for everyone. The Article then proposes changes to the current test for Fourth Amendment protection that take into consideration the changes in society brought about by rapidly developing technology. Specifically, the Article proposes a test that asks: (1) whether a person has taken steps to reasonably limit access to the information or place targeted for search or seizure; and (2) if so, whether society is prepared to protect the information or space from government intrusion.