Reason.com: NYPD Stops Drop As Officers Learn About This Fourth Amendment Thingie by Jacob Sullum:

The number of street stops by the NYPD, which has increased every year of the Bloomberg administration but one and hit a record 684,330 last year, fell by 25 percent in the second quarter of this year compared to the same period in 2011. The New York Times suggests the drop is largely the result of uncertainty about political support for the city's stop-and-frisk program, which involves detaining, questioning, and (about half the time) searching supposedly suspicious people, overwhelmingly black or Hispanic men. Citing unnamed police sources, the Times says sergeants conducting roll calls no longer push officers to make such stops, which have been widely criticized and are the target of a recently certified federal class action. The lawsuit argues that the NYPD routinely violates the Fourth Amendment because its stops and searches are not justified by reasonable suspicion and that the program is racially biased, violating the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. "Cops are nervous, and supervisors are nervous," one supervisor told the Times.

ProPublica: How Do You Feel About Smartphone Surveillance? Our Readers Respond:

Your cell phone tracks where you go and what you do, revealing details about your life that can prove quite valuable to the government and companies. Last week, we asked you to sound off on whether or not this smartphone surveillance bothers you – and what, if anything, we should do about it.

There was no reasonable suspicion for detaining defendant who was on a parking lot in a BMW at night with a door open in a supposedly high crime area. There was no indication that it was a high crime area, and defendant was doing nothing wrong. The state’s alternative argument that the stop was justified under the community caretaking function fails, too, because there is no indication that the defendant was in distress needing help. The fact it was possible he might be in distress isn't enough. Hernandez v. State, 376 S.W.3d 863 (Tex. App. – Ft. Worth 2012).

As a “mere passenger,” defendant had no standing in the car he was in. United States v. Allman, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108803 (D. S.D. August 3, 2012),* R&R 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108817 (D. S.D. June 29, 2012).*

Illinois once again holds, contrary to the law in the rest of the country, that the defendant has the burden of showing that his arrest was unjustified. Apparently Illinois believes that all arrests are presumptively valid. People v. Liekis, 2012 IL App (2d) 100774, 362 Ill. Dec. 669, 973 N.E.2d 1065 (2012)*:

[P20] On appeal from a trial court's ruling on a motion to quash and suppress, the reviewing court "will accord great deference to the trial court's factual findings and will reverse those findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence." People v. Close, 238 Ill. 2d 497, 504 (2010). However, the trial court's ultimate decision to grant or deny the motion is subject to de novo review. Id. A defendant moving to quash and suppress bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case that she was doing nothing unusual to justify the intrusion of a warrantless search or seizure. People v. Linley, 388 Ill. App. 3d 747, 749 (2009). "If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the State to present evidence to justify the search or seizure." Id.

[P21] In this case, defendant failed to establish a prima facie case that would have shifted the burden to the State. At the hearing on defendant's motion to quash and suppress, defense counsel called defendant to testify. Defendant testified only that she recalled being pulled over by the Antioch police on December 20, 2009, at about 9:30 p.m., "by the Advertiser in Antioch"; that there was no warrant for her arrest; and that she was arrested after she took field sobriety tests. After defendant provided this testimony, defense counsel asked the trial court to shift the burden to the State and, after argument, the trial court stated that the burden had shifted.

[P22] Ordinarily, a trial court should find that a defendant has made a prima facie case after the defendant has established that he or she was doing nothing unusual to justify the seizure. See People v. Matous, 381 Ill. App. 3d 918, 923 (2008). Because defendant failed to establish that she was doing nothing unusual to justify the stop, she failed to establish a prima facie case. Thus, the trial court's determination that the burden shifted to the State was erroneous.

This holding violates the Fourth Amendment. Warrantless arrests presumptively valid with the burden on the defendant to show it was unreasonable? Impossible. Sounds like a third world country. Or the KGB.

A school resource officer was acting as a police officer enforcing the law when he arrested defendant in the boys bathroom holding a bag of marijuana. A search incident of his backpack was otherwise unreasonable under Washington law, and it was suppressed. State v. Meneese, 174 Wn.2d 937, 282 P.3d 83 (2012) (dissent).*

The record supports the conclusion that defendant consented to a search of his duffle bag for evidence of shoplifting. The encounter was recorded on audio, and defendant did not audibly respond to the officer’s statement he needed to search the duffle bag, and the consent was unrestricted. Defendant did not testify. The officers suspected defendant of being an airport shoplifter after a store owner identified him as stealing something the day before. Berezyuk v. State, 282 P.3d 386 (Alas. App. 2012).*

Defendant was stopped for walking on the roadway, and his patdown was unreasonable because there was no fear of weapons and defendant was completely cooperative. The state's alternative argument that a patdown was needed before putting defendant in the police car was also rejected. State v. Baber, 2012 Ohio 3467, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3045 (8th Dist. August 2, 2012).

The officer responded to a 911 call of an overdose, and he entered [with what appeared to be clear consent from defendant’s mother] to see what was going on, and defendant assaulted him. The separate crime against the officer is not suppressible because her assault is an intervening circumstance. State v. Hammer, 2012 Ohio 3497, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3083 (2d Dist. August 3, 2012).*

The facts and circumstances showed reasonable suspicion for a stop and then probable cause for defendant’s arrest for OVI. City of Parma Heights v. Dedejczyk, 2012 Ohio 3458, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3049 (8th Dist. August 2, 2012).*

NYTimes.com Editorial: DNA and the Fourth Amendment:

Earlier this year, Maryland’s highest court held that collection of DNA samples from people arrested but not yet convicted violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Last week, Chief Justice John Roberts Jr. stayed that ruling while the Supreme Court decides whether to hear Maryland’s appeal of the state court decision. The Supreme Court should take up this case, but there was no good reason for the chief justice to allow the police to continue collecting DNA while the case is on appeal.