Where this § 1983 trial was only about damages for excessive force during the entry of the wrong apartment based on inaccurate informant information, the district court erred in accepting the defense jury instructions that combined damages and liability for the jury. Plaintiff got a nominal damages verdict and appealed. Guzman v. City of Chicago, 689 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2012),* prior appeal Guzman v. City of Chicago, 565 F.3d 393 (7th Cir. 2009). The introductory paragraph telegraphs the seriousness of this case:

Maira Guzman will likely never forget June 14, 2005. She was seven-and-a-half months pregnant. Her husband went to work early that morning, leaving her home alone. As she lay in bed, undressed and talking on the phone, she heard the doorbell ring and the sound of someone knocking on her front door. She slipped on a loose-fitting t-shirt, and began walking toward the door. Sergeant Marvin Bonnstetter of the Chicago Police Department burst through the door as Guzman approached it. Up to ten officers wearing body armor rushed into the apartment, many with their guns drawn. Guzman, fearful and crying, was ordered to lie face down on the floor. When she tried to position herself more comfortably, Officer Danilo Rojas grabbed her and forced her down, pressing her pregnant belly firmly against the floor. The entire team of approximately seventeen Chicago police officers and FBI agents—members of a Joint Gang Task Force—then executed a search warrant, searching the apartment for up to an hour. Guzman sued the City of Chicago, Sergeant Bonnstetter, and Officer Rojas, claiming that the search and seizure were illegal. The district court agreed and entered summary judgment in her favor, finding Bonnstetter and Rojas liable and leaving only the question of damages to be resolved.

They searched the apartment after it was obvious that they were in the wrong apartment. He who lives by the informant, dies by the informant. That's why the Fourth Amendment requires corroboration of snitches.

Merely being an “overnight guest” confers no standing. A party guest who spent the night was not entitled to standing because of no luggage or stuff. State v. Jeffries, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 570 (July 31, 2012):

The items in appellant's possession on the night of January 4th were typical items that an individual would carry on a regular basis: a cellular telephone, cigarettes, a lighter, and a jacket. The purpose of appellant's visit to Ms. Albright's apartment was to "play some cards, drink some beers, and relax...." Appellant's reliance on the fact that he moved freely about the apartment, storing and retrieving his beer from the refrigerator and using the bathroom, is unpersuasive to our determination of whether he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment. Appellant's leaving his jacket behind is also not pertinent. A party guest who spends the night at a residence does not clothe himself with an expectation of privacy therein. State v. Patterson, 966 S.W.2d 435, 441 n.5 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); State v. Transou, 928 S.W.2d at 957-58 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). Appellant failed to establish that he resided at her apartment or was an overnight guest rather than a "party" guest. Patterson, 966 S.W.2d at 441 n.5. Appellant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy that would confer standing to challenge law enforcement's search of Ms. Albright's apartment.

Defendant was removed from the premises and then his co-tenant was asked for consent. The court disagrees with the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2008), as have most other courts. People v. Fernandez, 208 Cal. App. 4th 100, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51 (2d Dist. 2012):

We believe that the line we draw is consistent with that drawn by the Supreme Court in Randolph. As in Randolph, the line we draw is a clear one, distinguishing between cases in which a defendant is present and objecting to a search, and those in which a defendant has been lawfully arrested and thus is no longer present when a cotenant consents to a search of a shared residence. It thus preserves the “simple clarity of complementary rules” established by Randolph. (Randolph, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 121.)

Further, our rule preserves the law enforcement prerogatives recognized by Randolph. As we have said, Randolph expressly reaffirmed the holdings of Matlock and Rodriguez, noting that “it would needlessly limit the capacity of the police to respond to ostensibly legitimate opportunities in the field if we were to hold that reasonableness required the police to take affirmative steps to find a potentially objecting co-tenant before acting on the permission they had already received.” (Randolph, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 122.) We believe that requiring officers who have already secured the consent of a defendant's cotenant to also secure the consent of an absent defendant would similarly and needlessly limit the capacity of law enforcement to respond to “ostensibly legitimate opportunities in the field.” (Ibid.)

We note, as the Seventh Circuit did in Henderson, that the rule advocated by defendant and adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Murphy permits “a one-time objection” by one cotenant to “permanently disable the other [co-tenant] from ever validly consenting to a search of their shared premises.” (Henderson, supra, 536 F.3d at p. 783.) Like Henderson, we think such a rule “extends Randolph too far.” (Ibid.)

Every circuit seems to have rejected Murphy, so the Ninth Circuit en banc may overrule it.

Just writing down a detainee’s name and DOB does not mean he is not free to leave. Further, being required to assume the position for a search adds nothing to it when the defendant is told he is free to leave after that. State v. Canfield, 251 Ore. App. 442, 283 P.3d 438 (2012).* Update: Reversed: Defendant’s consent came during the unlawful stop, not after, so reconsideration of the prior opinion is granted and the judgment reversed. State v. Canfield, 251 Ore. App. 442, 283 P3d 438 (2012), reversed. State v. Canfield, 2012 Ore. App. LEXIS 1344 (November 21, 2012).

The Portland inventory policy required that inventories occur before the defendant is placed in the police car, but here was after, so inventory doesn’t work. Here, a laptop bag was unreasonably searched under the state constitution. Still, the court is required to determine whether suppression is warranted, and it is [although not a Herring inquiry]. State v. Rowell, 251 Ore. App. 463, 283 P.3d 454 (2012).*

The government got tracking information for defendant’s Sprint cell phone to locate him to arrest him for a bank robbery in 2009. His defense counsel could not be ineffective for not moving to suppress it because it was a novel claim at the time. And, even if it wasn’t, the court can’t see how it would change the result. United States v. Reaves, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107278 (D. Neb. August 1, 2012).*

ABAJ.com: Kansas City Police Say 7M License Plate Shots Showing Date, Time and Location Are a Public Record by Martha Neil:

In the wake of an American Civil Liberties Union campaign launched this week to determine how much information from automatic vehicle license plate readers is being stored by law enforcement agencies nationally and how the database is being used, police statistics are starting to hit the headlines.

In Kansas City, police have stored about 7 million plate numbers over the past two years. The records show the date, time and the vehicle's exact location when the plate snapshot was taken, reports the Kansas City Star.

Almost as good as GPS but without the trespass.

Douglas B. McKechnie, Don’t Daze, Phase, or Lase Me, Bro! Fourth Amendment Excessive-Force Claims, Future Nonlethal Weapons, and Why Requiring an Injury Cannot Withstand a Constitutional or Practical Challenge, 60 Kan. L. Rev. 139 (2011), on SSRN.