The search warrant in this case was not supported by probable cause, and it was so deficient that the good faith exception did not apply. Accordingly, there was no qualified immunity for the search in a § 1983 case. Armijo v. Perales, 688 F.3d 685 (10th Cir. 2012):

We conclude a reasonably well-trained officer would have known a search pursuant to such a facially overbroad warrant was illegal under clearly established law. As discussed earlier, the search warrant affidavit did not provide details of any crime other than the alleged larceny of the two firearms. Nothing in the affidavit linked Plaintiff to any impropriety regarding money or drugs. Yet the warrant inexplicably authorized a broad search for financial transaction documents, drugs, and other firearms. A reasonably well-trained officer would have known the affidavit failed to establish probable cause for crimes not even identified. Under the circumstances of this case, a reasonable officer would have known his actions were unlawful because, as the district court stated, "the search warrant was so facially overbroad and the affidavit so lacking in probable cause to support the broad search that the warrant purported to authorize that it could not be reasonably relied upon." (Appellants' App. at 470.)

Consider this: The government already gets all the breaks under the good faith exception. Remember Warren Burger's wish in Bivens that we don't need an exclusionary rule because there can be civil rights suits against the officers? If so, they have to have teeth. This shows it. Of course there still is the question of damages: How much damages can somebody who also might be a criminal really expect?

A Texas DPS officer pulled up behind defendant and defendant slowed down. This did not create reasonable suspicion that he was impeding traffic. United States v. Coleman, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107614 (E.D. Tex. July 10, 2012).*

The fact the DEA officer was not found credible during a prior state proceeding on a search when he was a Texas DPS officer did not amount to a Brady issue because he was not found to have lied or perjured himself. Besides the guilty plea waived the Brady claim. Brewer v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107569 (N.D. Tex. July 20, 2012).*

The officer at defendant’s door could see crack cocaine on the table behind him in the house, and that justified a warrantless entry to preserve the evidence when it became apparent that defendant knew the officer’s intention. Alternatively, this was justified as a parole search. United States v. Patterson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106568 (W.D. Tenn. March 30, 2012).*

The Sheriff’s Office executed a drug search warrant and saw code violations. They called the code enforcement officers who came and entered illegally. The code enforcement entry didn’t vitiate the search warrant entry. State v. Marr, 95 So. 3d 394 (Fla. App. 3d DCA 2012):

The defendant moved to suppress all of the evidence seized by the Sherriff's Officers claiming that the search conducted was invalid due to the subsequent presence of Code Enforcement Officers on the scene. The trial court granted the motion and suppressed all of the evidence. We are in agreement with the State's position that, because the code enforcement inspection took place after the search warrant had been fully executed by the Sheriff's Officers and because the code enforcement inspection did not directly lead to the seizure of the contraband, the evidence seized by the Sheriff's Officers should not have been suppressed. ... See State v. Vargas, 667 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1995); ... cf. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614, 119 S. Ct. 1692, 143 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1999) (holding that it is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for police to bring members of the media or other third parties into a home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of the third parties in the home was not in aid of execution of the warrant; not addressing whether the exclusionary rule would apply to any evidence discovered by the media).

Defendant waived his reasonable expectation of privacy in a closed container he gave to another to control and hide. J.W. v. State, 95 So. 3d 372 (Fla. App. 3d DCA 2012). [Note: This is a lot like Rawlings where the defendant gave his drugs to another when the police came in.]

Defendant’s 2255 contention that defense counsel was ineffective for not challenging the PC in the search warrant was way off the mark. The 2255 petition omitted plenty that the search warrant was based on, and there clearly was PC. United States v. Jeffery, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105637 (E.D. La. July 30, 2012).*

On the totality of circumstances, the court finds that defendant voluntarily consented to a search of his house. He was warned of his right to refuse, and he apparently believed that what he had wouldn’t be found. United States v. Fernandez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107182 (S.D. Fla. July 24, 2012).*

Officers were conducting a buy/bust in Kansas City to arrest the seller, but he got into an apartment building before they could move in on him and ran to an upstairs apartment. The officers encountered the renter of the apartment who told them the only person who should be in there was her boyfriend, Anderson. She permitted them to enter, and it was valid. United States v. Anderson, 688 F.3d 339 (8th Cir. 2012).*

When defendant went on state parole, he signed a consent to parole search at anytime by any officer, and it was valid. The finding of drugs was in plain view. United States v. Patterson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105914 (W.D. Tenn. March 30, 2012).*

The evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion defendant consented to a blood draw against his attorney’s advice. State v. Jacobs, 2012 WI App 104, 344 Wis. 2d 142, 822 N.W.2d 885 (App. 2012).*

In a child pornography investigation, the government had information that specific CP files were downloaded from a “host computer” with a specific IP address. The government was able to link defendant to the host computer, and obtained a search warrant for it. While there were three pages of boilerplate about how P2P worked that could be disregarded, the meat of the affidavit clearly showed probable cause as to defendant’s computer. United States v. Gozola, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106000 (D. Neb. July 10, 2012), adopted 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103925 (D. Minn. July 26, 2012):

Further, boilerplate language concerning previous investigations serves no purpose toward establishing probable cause and must be disregarded. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 90, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1979) (search must be supported by probable cause particularized to defendant); see also United States v. Weber, 923 F.2d 1338, 1345-46 (9th Cir. 1991) (boilerplate statements "may have added fat to the affidavit, but certainly no muscle").

Boilerplate will always be there because the affiant will always justifiably fear not giving enough for the search warrant. How many affidavits for search warrants have you read where the PC was in one or two sentences? The boilerplate is just prelude, but ultimately necessary to show the context. It can lead to cut and paste errors, but they will almost always be disregarded unless prejudice shown.