The long duration of a trip does not give the passenger any enhanced reasonable expectation of privacy in car, akin to an overnight guest. United States v. Symonevich, 688 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2012):

Symonevich argues in the alternative that the particular circumstances in this case gave him a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. Relying on our decision in United States v. Lochan, 674 F.2d 960, 963-65 (1st Cir. 1982), Symonevich argues that the duration of the trip between Maine and Massachusetts — a nearly six hour round-trip drive — was long enough that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. We did say in Lochan that the fact of a long trip "would engender a slightly greater privacy expectation than would a short trip." Id. at 965. Symonevich says that vehicle passengers on long rides are akin to overnight guests and thus have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. As he puts it, "[s]ociety would consider it reasonable to bring personal items along on such a lengthy car ride ... and recognize that this long of a trip would give rise to some expectation of privacy on the part of a passenger within the vehicle."

We are skeptical about the continued relevance of the type of duration argument that Symonevich makes.5 Since we decided Lochan, the Supreme Court has developed extensive case law on the automobile exception, circumscribing the amount of privacy one can expect in a vehicle and further differentiating searches of automobiles from searches of homes. Compare, e.g., New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112-113 (1986) ("One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view." (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted)), and St. Hilaire v. City of Laconia, 71 F.3d 20, 28 n.6 (1st Cir. 1995) ("Fourth Amendment law ... recognizes a distinction between a person's home and a person's car. For example, the Fourth Amendment permits a slightly broader search pursuant to the arrest of the occupant of a vehicle and some warrantless searches of vehicles are permitted even if there are not emergency circumstances."), with Carter, 525 U.S. at 99 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The Fourth Amendment protects '[t]he right of the people to be secure in their ... houses,' and it is beyond dispute that the home is entitled to special protection as the center of the private lives of our people." (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV)). Thus, any analogy between an automobile and a house is suspect. In any event, without categorically rejecting the relevance of the duration of a trip in an automobile to the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis, we conclude that the duration of the trip here, under all of the circumstances, did nothing to enhance Symonevich's expectation of privacy.

I applaud defense counsel for the ingenuity of this argument. We need more creative defense lawyers to keep Fourth Amendment rights viable.

“The Section 2703(d) standard [for cell phone records data] is lower than that of probable cause.” “This Court agrees that the time may indeed have arrived to reevaluate the Fourth Amendment framework as it applies to new technologies. Nevertheless, under the existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, this Court finds Smith to require the result set forth in this opinion.” United States v. Valencia, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105553 (D. Neb. July 30, 2012):

The Section 2703(d) standard is lower than that of probable cause. In re Application, 620 F.3d 304, 313 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 291 (6th Cir. 2010). As the Third Circuit has described this standard, the Government must state "specific facts in its application[] that provide[] a basis for believing that [the person whose cell phone records are being sought] [is] a suspect and that cell phone records [are] relevant to solving the case." United States v. Powell, 444 F. App'x 517, 520 n.4 (3d Cir. 2011). Similarly, in a case involving an order under Section 2703(d) requiring an Internet service provider to reveal the Internet protocol address assigned to a particular screen name as well as other attendant information, the Tenth Circuit upheld the issuance of the order where it found that the details set forth in the application were specific and "certainly would lead to a reasonable suspicion" that [the person using the screen name for which the information was sought] was involved in [a crime]." United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1203 (10th Cir. 2008).

The Application at issue in this matter crosses the Section 2703(d) bar. First, the Application includes numerous specific and articulable facts surrounding the armed robbery that occurred on October 1, 2010; the preparations made for that robbery; Defendant's alleged ties to the one known participant in the robbery (at the time of the cell-site Application); and Defendant's alleged skill set and modus operandi for stealing cars like the ones involved in the robbery.

United States v. Madison, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105527 (S.D. Fla. July 30, 2012) (same).

Defendant passenger’s unrebutted testimony he was a bailee of a car gave him standing. However, the driver also had a possessory interest and he had apparent authority to consent. United States v. Valencia, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105554 (D. Neb. June 29, 2012).

Probable cause here is viewed through the lens of the good faith exception rather than free standing, and it is not so deficient that the warrant should not be sustained. Defendant fails in his burden of proof in showing that the good faith exception does not apply. United States v. Hurst, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105168 (N.D. W.Va. June 22, 2012).*

Defendant argues that the district court’s ruling was too inspecific. It was valid either as a search or inventory. United States v. Kalu, 485 Fed. Appx. 366 (11th Cir. July 30, 2012).*

Defendant could only have understood that the officer wanted to search him for both drugs and weapons, and he consented. People v. Tully, 54 Cal. 4th 952, 282 P.3d 173, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 146 (2012).*

Defendant was arrested four blocks from his home and the officers had probable cause for his house but no search warrant. The government’s contention that somebody in the neighborhood would possibly give a “heads up” and evidence could be destroyed was too tenuous on the facts. “How would a person who witnessed a traffic stop a few blocks away know that it was a result of a controlled buy which occurred a few minutes earlier at that address?” [The court does not mention that this is a classic “police created exigency” argument.] United States v. Watson, 489 Fed. Appx. 922 (6th Cir. 2012).

Three officers testified they could smell marijuana coming from defendant’s car during the stop, and they were credited. That justified a dog sniff, alert, and search. United States v. Gardner, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105024 (M.D. Ala. June 27, 2012), adopted 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104498 (M.D. Ala. July 27, 2012).*

An issue in the motion but not briefed is waived in the district court. United States v. Laughlin, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104921 (N.D. Ga. July 6, 2012).*