Officers responded to a de facto anonymous 911 call that defendant was beating his girlfriend, the caller’s sister. The police arrived and found nothing that would support that domestic violence was going on. They frisked defendant and found no gun. They searched the house and found a gun. Objectively, searches were invalid under the “emergency-aid test.” New Jersey law should now comport with federal law on this issue. State v. Edmonds, 211 N.J. 117, 47 A.3d 737 (2012):

In light of recent federal precedent, we conclude that the second factor in the emergency-aid test set forth in Frankel, which addresses the officer's subjective motivation, is no longer consonant with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Since Frankel, the United States Supreme Court has made clear that, in the emergency-aid context, the subjective motivation of a police officer is irrelevant in determining whether a search or seizure is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404-05, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 1948, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650, 658 (2006). Rather, the test is simply one of objective reasonableness -- viewing the circumstances objectively, were the actions of the officer justified. Ibid.; Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. __, __ , 130 S. Ct. 546, 548, 175 L. Ed. 2d 410, 413 (2009) ("This 'emergency aid exception' does not depend on the officers' subjective intent or the seriousness of any crime they are investigating when the emergency arises. It requires only 'an objectively reasonable basis for believing,' that 'a person within [the house] is in need of immediate aid.'" (citations omitted)).

The Ninth and Tenth Circuits had a three-part emergency-aid test -- almost identical to the one in Frankel -- and eliminated the subjective-motivation factor in the wake of Brigham City. United States v. Snipe, 515 F.3d 947, 951-52 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 718 (10th Cir. 2006).6 We now do the same to align our jurisprudence with federal law.

Towing a vehicle under the community caretaking function was justified where defendant’s car was stopped for a traffic offense and the driver had a suspended DL. It was in a parking lot in a high crime area known for car break-ins, and the vehicle had expensive stuff in it. State v. Oneill, 251 Ore. App. 424, 285 P.3d 1127 (2012).*

The officer’s founded conclusion that the defendant was under the influence of meth when her car was stopped did not also support the inference that the paraphernalia to ingest was also on her person. The motion to suppress should have been granted. State v. Kolb, 251 Ore. App. 303, 283 P.3d 423 (2012).*

Defendant had a valid re-sentencing issue, but he couldn’t gain the benefit of 2009's Gant decision on his 1995 conviction. State v. Pittman, 20 Neb. App. 36, 817 N.W.2d 784 (2012).*

Plaintiff’s girlfriend discovered that he had an apparent stroke, and she called 911. EMTs arrived, and plaintiff threatened them with a baseball bat. They called for the police, and they arrived and Tasered him when he was threatening and verbally abusive to them. His girlfriend told them he had a rifle in the house, and that concerned them. He sued claiming that they didn’t appropriately respond to the stroke, and he suffered permanent damage. The entry was valid because of the threat with the bat and the report of the gun. Carpenter v. Gage, 686 F.3d 644 (8th Cir. 2012)*:

A reasonable deputy sheriff could have believed that exigent circumstances justified entering Carpenter's home without a warrant. Deputies Gage and Paul both received reports that Carpenter had threatened first responders with a baseball bat. Although Carpenter denies wielding a bat while ordering the first responders out of his house, the relevant question is whether the deputies reasonably believed that he had used a baseball bat. ... Here, the deputies were advised by a reliable source that Carpenter had done so. The deputies also were advised by Carpenter's companion that Carpenter kept a rifle in the home. In light of these facts and Carpenter's belligerence toward the first responders and the deputies, it was reasonable for Gage and Paul to believe that Carpenter may have withdrawn abruptly into his home to retrieve a gun. As neither deputy knew where Carpenter's rifle was located, it was reasonable for them to fear that they lacked time to make a safe retreat. A reasonable officer therefore could have concluded that allowing Carpenter to go unaccompanied back into his home posed a threat to the lives of the law enforcement officers and first responders outside the house. ... For these reasons, the district court correctly dismissed Carpenter's claim alleging an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.

2255 IAC claim involving a search requires an allegation that the search was invalid for some reason. This one didn’t, so counsel’s failure to file a motion essentially means there was no ground to. United States v. Smith, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103848 (E.D. Va. July 24, 2012), R&R 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97851 (E.D. Va. July 11, 2012).

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not challenging search that was clearly a losing issue. United States v. Luke, 686 F.3d 600 (8th Cir. 2012).*

Defendant’s guilty plea waived the issue of the legality of his arrest in the Phillippines. United States v. Feldman, 879 F. Supp. 2d 231 (N.D. N.Y. 2012).*

Police investigating a kidnaping placed a GPS on defendant’s car pre-Jones, and this was valid under Davis because of settled circuit law. United States v. Nelson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103944 (S.D. Ga. July 25, 2012).

An anonymous tip of marijuana at a house led to a knock-and-talk and consent which was not coerced. Officers could smell it and see paraphernalia when the door was opened. State v. Delgado, 92 So. 3d 314 (Fla. App. 3d DCA July 25, 2012).*

Detention of the defendant while a search warrant was being executed on his premises was reasonable. State v. Wilburn, 93 So. 3d 1115 (Fla. App. 4th DCA 2012).*

Under the category of "why move to suppress in the first place": The trial court struck parts of the affidavit in support of the search warrant, and it still yielded probable cause. Admission at the trial of the shotgun seized was not even prejudicial here because the defendant testified to it trying mitigate guilt. State v. Martin, 169 Wn. App. 620, 281 P.3d 315 (2012).

Defendant’s guilty plea to felony shoplifting waived his search and seizure claim [which would have failed anyway]. Swilley v. State, 93 So. 3d 901 (Miss. App. 2012).*

Defendant was arrested for domestic battery and removed from the home. His girlfriend was packing his stuff and found a box with child porn in it which she turned over to the police. This was a classic private search. State v. Cameron, 2012 WI App 93, 344 Wis. 2d 101, 820 N.W.2d 433 (2012).*