Police had consent from a roommate to enter the apartment, but defendant was asleep, and the officers had no consent to enter his bedroom. Therefore, the search of the bedroom violated the Fourth Amendment. Still, under Herring, the court has to determine whether exclusion is justified, and it is. United States v. Wohlmaker, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103069 (D. Mont. July 24, 2012):

Where police act in objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful, based on a statute, case law, a warrant, or paperwork that is later found to be incorrect or to violate the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule does not apply because the deterrent value is low. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427-28 (citing cases involving good-faith reliance). On the other hand, where the police deliberately and flagrantly violate the Fourth Amendment, suppression does have a deterrent effect which may outweigh its costs. Herring, 555 U.S. at 143-144. The standard is objective, not subjective, but an officer's knowledge and experience may be considered. Id. at 145. "It is the government's burden to show that evidence is not 'fruit of the poisonous tree.'" United States v. Shetler, 665 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2011). In this case such a showing was not made.

Here, the officers did not rely on any statute, case law, warrant, paperwork, consent, or other belief that would justify their intrusion into Wohlmaker's bedroom. Case law unquestionably establishes that a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his own bedroom, and that only a person with apparent or actual authority may consent to a search of that bedroom. It is also firmly established that consent to search a house or apartment does not extend to others' private bedrooms within that house, unless the consenting individual has joint access and control of the room. E.g. Mejia, 953 F.2d at 466. Nonetheless, the experienced officers in this case entered the bedroom they believed to be Wohlmaker's without a warrant, without consent, and without exigent circumstances. They did not attempt to ask Ritchie for permission to enter Wohlmaker's bedroom, and they did not ask if Ritchie had authority to give such consent. Nor did they attempt to wake Wohlmaker from the hallway to obtain his consent to enter.

The deterrence value of suppression in this case is clear, while the social costs of suppression are low. Wohlmaker could face other charges and has been released on his own recognizance for over a year. Police officers cannot justify peering in every private area of a shared home when consent has only been obtained to enter the common areas. Permitting such activity—which is in clear violation of the Fourth Amendment—would have a high social cost and impact on individuals' legitimate expectation of privacy in their own bedrooms. Thus the evidence that directly and indirectly derived from the officers' illegal intrusion must be suppressed.

Officers had reasonable suspicion, and the judge thought he’d be cute. Instead, he showed that he’s a jerk. United States v. Haynesworth, 879 F. Supp. 2d 305 (E.D. N.Y. July 24, 2012)*:

The United States Supreme Court held in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961) that no evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful search and seizure may be used in a criminal prosecution. Judge, later Justice, Benjamin Cardozo summarized the exclusionary rule in his iconic phrase: "The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered." People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585 (1926). The motion to suppress the gun discovered and the statements made after arrest present the question of whether or not the constables blundered. After hearing the parties and the witnesses to the events in this case, after assessing the credibility of those witnesses, after reviewing the authorities cited by counsel and after determining the facts material to the resolution of the motion, this Court has a one word answer to the question presented: No. These constables did not blunder. This criminal does not go free. The motion to suppress is denied.

He’s an accused criminal, sir. And remember Defore? There the constable arrested Defore outside his house and took him in his house for a search incident. That’s not a blunder–that’s just stupid.

And, judge, just how much do you hate the exclusionary rule that you have to say this? (Did defense counsel say something to set you off enough to prejudge guilt?)

There was probable cause to arrest defendant for kidnaping, and he doesn’t dispute it. The inventory of his vehicle [why was it not searchable with PC?], however, was invalid because the search was for criminal evidence, like hair follicles, not for high value items. United States v. Caskey, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103026 (D. Minn. July 25, 2012):

In contrast, because the Court finds that the United States has not met its burden of establishing that Officer Bobo conducted the search in accordance with standard police procedures, it finds that the items seized inside the truck are inadmissible. When describing the items that officers could seize pursuant to department policy, Officer Bobo did not define the term "high value items." The Court finds that some of the items seized by Officer Bobo – including receipts, hair follicles, and fingerprints – are not "high value items" within the plain meaning of that term. While it is possible that other items seized by Officer Bobo – such as the camera or women's clothing – might qualify as "high value items" pursuant to department policy, the Court cannot make this determination without further information about the policy.⁶

6. Furthermore, the NPBD policy may be unconstitutional if it allows investigation into items of "value" only to the police. "[P]olice 'may keep their eyes open for potentially incriminating items that they might discover in the course of an inventory search, as long as their sole purpose is not to investigate a crime,'" United States v. Petty, 367 F.3d 1009, 1013 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Marshall, 986 F.2d 1171, 1176 (8th Cir. 1993)), and "the coexistence of investigatory ... motives will not invalidate the search." United States v. Wallace, 102 F.3d 346, 348 (8th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, inventory search policies must relate to the purpose of inventory searches, Best, 135 F.3d at 1225, and an officer's discretion cannot be exercised for the "sole purpose" of investigating a crime, Hall, 497 F.3d at 851.