Plaintiff was acquitted of domestic battery so he sued all the officers involved, and they had qualified immunity. The entry into plaintiff’s house was with the apparent authority of the victim who still had it despite having been forcibly removed by plaintiff. Hays v. Bolton, 488 Fed. Appx. 971 (6th Cir. 2012):

We have held that "magic words" are not necessary for effective consent; rather, the totality of the circumstances, including a party's non-verbal conduct, should be considered in determining whether consent exists. See United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 588 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding consent "considering th[e] testimony and all [of] the circumstances" where an ordinary citizen would have recognized that assent had been given). Here, the totality of the circumstances suggested that Heather was a forcibly removed co-tenant with authority to consent to a warrantless search of the residence. Even assuming Heather was no longer a resident and lacked the actual authority to consent to a search, we conclude that she displayed apparent authority sufficient to justify Officers Bolton and Grassnig's conduct under the Fourth Amendment.

It was a valid strategic decision not to file a motion to suppress a search of defendant’s bedroom where bloody shoes were found. Defendant’s contention all along was that the shoes were not his, were the wrong size, and he had an alibi for the murder. Besides, it looks like there was no valid ground to suppress anyway. Gardner v. State, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 526 (July 20, 2012).

Officers conducted an illegal protective sweep of defendant’s house before they got a search warrant. Removing what was learned from the illegal protective sweep from the search warrant affidavit still left probable cause for the search. Martinez-Vargas v. State, 730 S.E.2d 633 (Ga. App. 2012).*

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in not suppressing defendant’s arrest for “a vicious murder” without an arrest warrant. When police arrived at the residence of the defendant, they saw him doing something with a bicycle, which was the motive for the murder. Paul v. State, 971 N.E.2d 172 (Ind. App. 2012).*

Defendant’s motion to suppress was sufficiently detailed [not a lot but still enough] to put the state on notice what the issues were at the suppression hearing, and the state was not entitled to a continuance at the hearing to get the dog handler there to testify to finding the drugs. State v. Rife, 2012 Ohio 3264, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 2856 (4th Dist. July 10, 2012).

Walking through the parking lot of a closed business at 1:30 am to an illegally parked car is reasonable suspicion. State v. Pittman, 2012 Ohio 3297, Ohio App. LEXIS 2900 (6th Dist. July 20, 2012).*

When the officer stopped defendant for a headlight being out, she was asked “is there anything in the car I should be concerned about,” and she produced a pipe. That was enough to get her out of the car and extend the stop further. State v. McDaniel, 2012 Ohio 3286, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 2887 (2d Dist. July 20, 2012).*

Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity for this entry because unlocking the door to answer it is not consent to enter. Even if it could be construed as consent, the officers’ banging on the door and threatening jail time if he didn’t let them in is hardly consent. Turk v. Comerford, 488 Fed. Appx. 933 (6th Cir. 2012).*

Officers who traveled outside their jurisdiction in Illinois could not statutorily arrest the defendant without a local officer present. Search incident and statements suppressed. People v. Harrell, 2012 IL App (1st) 103724, 975 N.E.2d 624 (2012).*

Collateral estoppel: “The district court properly granted summary judgment on Patten's Fourth Amendment claim because issues related to the initial search and seizure were precluded by the California Court of Appeal's judgment affirming the denial of Patten's motion to suppress.” Patten v. County of Lake, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 14934 (9th Cir. July 20, 2012).*

Defendant’s consent to search the car included the kickplate which could be removed without tools. Cedeno v. State, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 2716 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi-Edinburg April 5, 2012), Released for Publication May 17, 2012

A motion to reconsider is appropriate to bring attention to something that changed or is missing, but this one doesn’t, and it’s also untimely. United States v. Lopez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100749 (D. Kan. July 20, 2012).*

The police received an anonymous call about a black Saturn in a particular location occupied by a man with a gun who was hunting another man who’d robbed him so he could shoot the robber. The first effort to find the car was fruitless, but later in the night the car was found and the details were corroborated. The officers had reasonable suspicion. United States v. Garcia, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99754 (S.D. N.Y. July 10, 2012).*