Where a suspect in custody was told by his lawyer that a search of his office was imminent, the suspect's call to his wife to move records was an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1). United States v. Mann, 11-1504 (8th Cir. July 17, 2012):

Mann also was convicted of aiding and abetting tampering with evidence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) by removing from Dr. Mann’s medical office a special power of attorney, a general power of attorney, pre-signed blank checks, and other financial documents related to Sandip Mann, her brother-in-law, before a search warrant was executed there. Section 1512(c)(1) prohibits, inter alia, corruptly “conceal[ing] a record, document, or other object, or attempt[ing] to do so, with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding.”

An “official proceeding” includes a proceeding before a federal judge, court, or grand jury, 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(1)(A), and “an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense,” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f)(1). Mann contends first that there was no “official proceeding” within the meaning of the statute because there was no official proceeding focusing on Sandip Mann specifically. She also argues that there is insufficient evidence that her actions were related to any official proceeding or that she corruptly concealed the documents in question.

Mann’s first argument is flawed. Section 1512(f)(1) specifically provides that no “official proceeding need ... be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense.” Thus, § 1512(c)(1) requires only that Mann have acted with the intent to impair the documents’ availability to an official proceeding. It does not require the Government to prove the existence of an official proceeding focusing on Sandip Mann. Furthermore, notwithstanding Mann’s protestations to the contrary, the Government never argued that there was an official proceeding to investigate Sandip Mann specifically but rather argued that he was a person of interest in the ongoing federal grand jury investigation into the bombing, which clearly was an official proceeding within the meaning of the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(1)(A).

In some jurisdictions, they'd probably indict the lawyer, too.

An officer observed two men get in a car and then he stopped it before a turn signal violation. The record supports that there was no reasonable suspicion to believe that one of the men was one Barbosa who was darkskinned, and not one of the two men. Therefore, there was no justification for an exit order under state law, and the motion to suppress should have been granted. [A brick of heroin was found in the console.] Commonwealth v. Damon, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 164, 971 N.E.2d 809 (2012).*

Not a search case, but interesting: Defendant answered the door at a house that the police showed up to search. He said he couldn’t consent to a search because he didn’t live there. The police searched and found drugs. The evidence was insufficient to connect him to the drugs other than spatial proximity. He did not control the premises, so his mere presence infers nothing. Conviction reversed. Garcia v. State, 316 Ga. App. 787, 730 S.E.2d 455 (2012).*

Slight inconsistency between the testimony of the officers did not mean that there was no reasonable suspicion. The facts here on the totality of circumstances show probable cause. United States v. Elmore, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98269 (M.D. Pa. July 16, 2012).*

Defense counsel can’t be ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress that would have lost. The government clearly had probable cause to stop and arrest. Graham v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97418 (C.D. Ill. July 12, 2012).*

Officers had probable cause based on responding to a man with a gun call and seeing defendant with a gun who fled and discarded the gun in flight. PC could also be based on the plain view before it all started. United States v. Moten, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97479 (E.D. Pa. July 12, 2012).*

A stop because a temporary paper license plate was not visible was still valid. The officer couldn’t see the plate until after he was out of the car, but that does not prohibit him from checking the DL of the driver and to be sure it is valid. This case is similar to United States v. Clayborn, 339 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2003)[, yet this is published]. United States v. Hollins, 685 F.3d 703 (8th Cir. 2012):

Here, the officer did not see any plates or stickers, so he stopped Hollins' vehicle. Only after shining his spotlight, exiting his car, and approaching the SUV did he see the In Transit sticker. Even then, it was not immediately verifiable as a valid sticker. The officer did not see its expiration date, and his experience taught him that even facially valid stickers are not legally valid (since illegally sold and distributed In Transit stickers are relatively common). He then conducted a reasonable investigation by requesting the driver's license, insurance card, and registration. The initial traffic stop and the officer's limited inquiry—which led to the search and Hollins' arrest—were constitutionally valid.

Defendant was a mere visitor and not an overnight guest. United States v. Henry, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97624 (D. V.I. July 15, 2012):

Defendant Henry claims that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy based on his status [as] an "overnight guest" or "social guest." Defendant Henry identifies several facts in support of his claim that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy at the time of the search: 1) he was in Apartment 195 at a late hour of the night; 2) when police encountered him he was in a "subconscious" state (because he may have been smoking marijuana); 3) he was in the apartment watching a basketball game on television with the permission of the tenants; 4) he "periodically" hangs out at Apartment 195: and 5) he has a friendship with the alleged tenants. (Dkt. No. 77 at 2-3). [¶] When viewed in their totality, these facts establish only that Defendant was a "short-term guest" or a "casual visitor" at Apartment 195, not an overnight guest.

“Pariseau voluntarily consented to the search. After the arresting officer explained that he would be detained while they sought a warrant to search him, he said, ‘You may as well just search me now.’” The record supports consent. United States v. Pariseau, 685 F.3d 1129 (9th Cir. 2012).*

A claim that plaintiff was touched during her strip search stated a Fourth Amendment claim. There is no distinction between a search of a woman’s breasts and her genital area for invasiveness. Van Beek v. Robinson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98273 (E.D. Mich. July 16, 2012)*.

Defendants have dissected the patdown search into two components, claiming that the search of Plaintiff's genital area is somehow distinct from the search of Plaintiff's breasts. Defendants' argument is not supported by any legal authority. Whether the search of Plaintiff was a reasonable and routine search-as Defendants' contend-"depends upon all of the circumstances surrounding the search." Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537. The search of Plaintiff, therefore, includes the search of her genital area, along with the search of her breasts. Having conceded that the search of Plaintiff's breasts creates a genuine dispute of fact, Plaintiff has established a constitutional violation under the Fourth Amendment by Defendants' own admission.