Officers had a restraining order against a bar and frisked all the patrons. As to defendant, the first frisk found nothing, but he was “fidgety,” so they frisked him again finding drugs. The officers detained all the patrons until they could run criminal history checks. The motion to suppress should have been granted. This is like Ybarra. State v. Sweeney, 2012 Ohio 3152, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 2783 (8th Dist. July 12, 2012).

2254 petitioner’s search and seizure claim in federal court was the same as his state court, so it was barred by Stone v. Powell. COA denied. Cheeks v. Zupan, 490 Fed. Appx. 110 (10th Cir. 2012).*

Defendant did not submit to a seizure because he was jogging when the police tried to talk to him, and, as he was finally stopped, he admitted he had a gun, and that justified a frisk. United States v. Denson, 488 Fed. Appx. 314 (10th Cir. 2012).*

Inability to answer basic questions about travel plans and lying about criminal history was reasonable suspicion. United States v. Riley, 684 F.3d 758 (8th Cir. 2012):

Riley's case is distinguishable from Jones and Beck when one considers the combination of Riley's nervous condition, his difficulty in answering basic questions about his itinerary, and his failure to be forthright about his criminal history relating to drugs. In Jones, we noted that an inconsistent answer as to a traveler's destination and purpose "casts suspicion and doubt on the nature and legitimacy of the activity being investigated." 269 F.3d at 928. Likewise, in Beck we recognized that reasonable suspicion could derive from "unusual or suspicious travel plans." 140 F.3d at 1139 ... Unlike the suspects in Jones and Beck, who stated their purpose and destination without difficulty, Riley was hesitant and gave conflicting answers to basic questions about his itinerary. ... Furthermore, Riley's misrepresentation about his criminal history was different from the suspect in Jones because Riley's history involved drugs, which reasonably added to Trooper Rutledge's suspicions that Riley was trying to hide drug-related activity. See Jones, 269 F.3d at 928; United States v. Gill, 513 F.3d 836, 844 (8th Cir. 2008) (weighing in favor of reasonable suspicion the fact that defendants had prior arrests for drugs and weapons but "[n]either of the defendants answered questions about their criminal records forthrightly").

Defendant’s stop was with reasonable suspicion because of the officer’s knowledge of defendant’s prior history with domestic violence and firearms. An officer does not have to let a person walk away from a stop with RS without a frisk. United States v. Preston, 685 F.3d 685 (8th Cir. 2012):

Finally, we recognize that allowing the occupants of the vehicle to walk away unsearched would have posed a further threat to officer safety. As we noted in United States v. Oliver, 550 F.3d 734 (8th Cir. 2008), a person who is allowed to walk away from a stop without a pat-down search could hypothetically turn around and shoot officers remaining at the scene. Id. at 738.

Defense counsel can’t be ineffective for not raising a meritless issue. United States v. Motton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96454 (N.D. Tex. May 25, 2012).*

While there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in a tent while camping, the camping has to be lawful. Here defendant was on land he was not permitted to be on, and that’s a big difference. People v. Nishi, 207 Cal. App. 4th 954, 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 882 (1st Dist. 2012):

Defendant's unlawful, temporary occupation of the campsite distinguishes the present case from United States v. Gooch (9th Cir. 1993) 6 F.3d 673, 676-677, in which the court concluded that the defendant had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in a tent pitched for several days in a public campground where he was "legally permitted to camp." (Id. at p. 677; see also United States v. Basher (9th Cir. 2011) 629 F.3d 1161, 1167-1168.) In United States v. Sandoval (9th Cir. 2000) 200 F.3d 659, 660-661 (Sandoval), the court extended the holding in Gooch to find a legitimate expectation of privacy associated with the seizure of a medicine bottle discovered during a search of a "makeshift tent" "located on Bureau of Land Management" property, (id. at p. 660), where it was "unclear whether Sandoval had permission to be there." (Id. at p. 661.) The defendant's tent in Sandoval was located in an area that was heavily covered by vegetation and virtually impenetrable. In addition, the tent was closed on all four sides, and the medicine bottle was not visible from outside. (Id. at p. 660.) The court in Sandoval concluded: "[W]e do not believe the reasonableness of Sandoval's expectation of privacy turns on whether he had permission to camp on public land. Such a distinction would mean that a camper who overstayed his permit in a public campground would lose his Fourth Amendment rights, while his neighbor, whose permit had not expired, would retain those rights." (Id. at p. 661, fn. omitted.)

. . .

Here, in contrast to Sandoval and Hughston, not only was defendant clearly camped in a prohibited location, the shotgun shells were seized from outside his tent, in a pile of debris under a loose tarp. While a tent located in a public campground may be considered a private area where people sleep and keep valuables, functionally somewhat comparable to a house, apartment, or hotel room, the remainder of defendant's unauthorized, undeveloped campsite was a dispersed, ill-defined site, exposed and open to public view. The area around the tent was not within a defined residential curtilage in which defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy. (United States v. Basher, supra, 629 F.3d 1161, 1169.) Also, after his repeated removal by officers from campsites he had occupied in the same preserve in the recent past, defendant was conscious of the illegality, which further tends to negate his legitimate expectation of privacy in that location. (People v. Thomas (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1333-1334 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 610] (Thomas).)

We find the decision in United States v. Ruckman (10th Cir. 1986) 806 F.2d 1471, persuasive in the present case. ...