NYTimes.com: Philadelphia Defends Policy on Frisking, With Limits by Erica Goode:

PHILADELPHIA — Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg of New York was dismissive when asked if his police department, under siege for the way it uses the stop-and-frisk tactic, might take a lesson from Philadelphia’s response to a similar challenge.

Popular Science: FYI: How Can I Protect My Cell Phone Data Records From Law Enforcement Subpoenas? Our wireless carriers hand over data from millions of users per year. How can we protect ourselves? by Dan Nosowitz:

When it came to light that law enforcement has issued millions of annual requests/demands to the wireless carriers (AT&T, Verizon, etc) to hand over user data, we all got a little concerned. Our carriers know everything about us, and according to findings by Rep. Markey (D-MA), "Information shared with law enforcement includes data such as geolocation information, content of text messages, wiretaps, among others."

But! We have weapons. Here are some tricks to help protect your privacy.

Search of a cell phone taken at booking into a jail was unreasonable. There was no security need for the search. State v. Granville, 373 S.W.3d 218 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 2012):

We are looking at a privacy interest in data hidden within electrical components contained in the device as well as potential information not in the phone but accessible through its manipulation, that is, data saved on the internet. The State cited us to no evidence suggesting that such data can be scraped off the phone surfaces or components, like blood or DNA affixed to clothes. Nor is there evidence of record that the picture found by the officer was somehow playing or appearing upon the phone's screen. Quite the contrary. The cell phone had to be activated, or turned on, by the officer, and he had to pull up or scroll through the information imprinted on electronic chips to uncover the photo. It was not exposed to anyone happening to touch the item, which differentiates it from the miscellaneous things accessible on a prisoner's pants.

Evidence of the phone being off has other import, as well. That evinces some precautionary measure being taken to secure the data from curious eyes. The power button can be likened to the front door of a house. When on, the door is open and some things become readily visible. When off, the door is closed, thereby preventing others from seeing anything inside. And though some cell phones may require the input of a password before it can be used, no evidence suggests that Granville's was of that type. So, the officer's ability to venture into the phone's informational recesses by merely pressing the power button does not suggest that Granville's interest in assuring the privacy of his information was minimal. Whether the phone was locked or not via a password, a closed door is sufficient to illustrate an expectation of privacy. See Rodriguez v. State, 653 S.W.2d 305, 307 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).

Now we turn to the subject of society recognizing (or not) an arrestee's privacy interest in a cell phone impounded during the booking process.1 It must be remembered that Granville was simply a pretrial detainee. This is of import since detainees, in some ways, are accorded greater constitutional protection than a convicted individual. Ex parte Green, 688 S.W.2d 555, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (punishment); Rocha v. Potter County, No. 07-09-001-2-CV, 2010 Tex. App. Lexis 2859, at *10-11 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 20, 2010, no pet.) (due process). They also have a greater chance of being freed soon after their detention through posting bond or other measure. In fact, if the officer who took the cell phone is to be believed, Granville was subject to being released quickly, given that he was arrested for a class C misdemeanor. It also lessens the duration of any control law enforcement officials may exercise over the instrument.

. . .

Due to the potential invasiveness of the search, Granville's status as a pretrial detainee, the fact that his stay in jail for a class C misdemeanor would be of short duration, the utter lack of any nexus between the cell phone and the crime for which appellant was jailed, and the lack of evidence suggesting that the phone and its contents posed any risk to the jail's penalogical interests, we conclude that society would recognize his continued, and reasonable, privacy interest in the instrument despite his temporary detention. Indeed, holding that the mere impoundment of property does not vitiate all reasonable expectation of privacy in the item confiscated is nothing new. Law enforcement officials have long been barred from searching impounded vehicles in any manner that they may care to.

Defendant was on the receiving end of a drug courier’s delivery. The courier had already been arrested and agreed to continue on the trip for the government. After the delivery, there was reasonable suspicion as to defendant. United States v. Torres, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96036 (S.D. N.Y. July 3, 2012).*

The corroboration of the CI’s really detailed information down to the lump hidden in the groin during a patdown as the hiding place of drugs all was probable cause. United States v. Williams, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95992 (D. Vt. July 10, 2012).*

Officers were investigating a check cashing scheme. The independent source doctrine supports the seizure of brass knuckles found in the car. United States v. Maxwell, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96375 (D. Minn. July 11, 2012).*

Defendant’s stop was with probable cause, and the following search was incident to the arrest, so the patdown is moot. United States v. Smith, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 14268 (11th Cir. July 12, 2012).*

Failing to file a futile motion to suppress is not IAC. United States v. Lohrman, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95474 (S.D. Tex. July 10, 2012).*

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not arguing that a trash search was unreasonable considering Greenwood. Defense counsel did argue that the search of a cell phone was unreasonable, but it was held harmless on the direct appeal if error at all. Therefore, no prejudice. United States v. Roberts, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95306 (D. Nev. July 9, 2012).*

Defendant’s version of the facts amounts to an abandonment; the government’s version of the facts is a plain view of a firearm in a car visible to anyone. United States v. Contreras-Espinal, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95577 (D. P.R. May 18, 2012).*

In a child pornography search involving an IP address at an apartment building, the officers obtained a search warrant for a specific apartment on the first floor that supposedly belonged to the defendant, whose name was omitted from the affidavit. In fact, the defendant had moved out a couple of years earlier. The officers searched the first floor apartment, realized that defendant didn’t live there, and then went to the second floor and searched his apartment based on the warrant for the first floor apartment. When they realized the mistake, Rule 41 permitted them to call the magistrate for guidance and even possible amendment of the search warrant, but they didn’t do that. Suppression was required to deter the police from doing this again. United States v. Voustianiouk, 685 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012):

In determining the permissible scope of a search that has been authorized by a search warrant, however, we must look to the place that the magistrate judge who issued the warrant intended to be searched, not to the place that the police intended to search when they applied for the warrant. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561 (2004) ("The mere fact that the Magistrate issued a warrant does not necessarily establish that he agreed that the scope of the search should be as broad as the affiant's request."); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 90 n.2 (1979) ("Had the issuing judge intended that the warrant would or could authorize a search of every person found within the tavern, he would hardly have specifically authorized the search of 'Greg' alone."); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 4.5 (4th ed. 2004) ("One of the specific commands of the Fourth Amendment is that no warrants shall issue except those 'particularly describing the place to be searched.' Quite obviously, the primary purpose of this limitation is to minimize the risk that officers executing search warrants will by mistake search a place other than the place intended by the magistrate." (emphasis added)).

We conclude that these agents searched an apartment other than the one that the magistrate intended to authorize them to search. Indeed, we have no reason to believe that the magistrate judge who signed the warrant at issue intended for the scope of the search to cover any apartment in the building other than the one on the first floor. The search warrant and accompanying affidavit explicitly authorize the search of the first-floor apartment and make no mention of the second-floor apartment or even of Voustianiouk's name. The government concedes as much on appeal, acknowledging that "Agent Raab did not disclose Voustianiouk's name to the judge who issued the warrant." Indeed, the affidavit submitted by Raab in support of his application for a search warrant would not have provided probable cause to search Voustianiouk's apartment on the second floor, because the information in the affidavit, by omitting any mention of Voustianiouk, does not provide any basis for concluding that he may have been involved in a crime.

. . .

Accordingly, given the specific facts of this case, we conclude that the evidence seized as a result of this unconstitutional search must be suppressed in order "to deter police misconduct in these circumstances." Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2423 (2011). Indeed, we believe that suppression is necessary in this case "to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty." Id. at 2426 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 264 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Prior findings that an officer was unbelievable on the stand were not binding in this case. United States v. Lopez-Urquiza, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95970 (E.D. Tenn. May 15, 2012):

The undersigned is certainly in no position to second guess another court in another case, even if it involves the same witness in the case currently before the undersigned. Neither, however, is the undersigned bound by the other court's evaluation of that witness. See United States v. Atkins, 1999 WL 1045942 *3 (6th Cir. Nov. 8, 1998) (the district court did not err in refusing to admit past judicial decisions of an officer's untruthfulness.).

One of the benefits of Lexis and Westlaw is running the names of the law enforcement officers involved to see what happened elsewhere. Every once in a while the officer was not believed and it ends up in an opinion.