Police saw defendant acting furtively in a high crime area, and he avoided contact with the police while they tried to apprehend him. He was not seized until the police got him on a porch, and that was with reasonable suspicion by the time it happened. His actions avoiding the police further added to the reasonable suspicion. United States v. Denson, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 14143 (10th Cir. July 11, 2012).*

Police received a 911 call from defendant’s girlfriend who was moving out, and she showed them a firearm and ammunition of defendant who was a convicted felon. Her consent was voluntary. The findings supported a later search warrant. United States v. Franco, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95569 (D. Mass. July 10, 2012).*

Defendant agreed with defense counsel that the best course was to forego a motion to suppress that was a loser and negotiate a better deal. Defense counsel was not ineffective. Villareal v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95086 (E.D. Tex. June 12, 2012).*

Aside from pre-Jones placement of a GPS device on defendant’s vehicle to track it for six days, there was probable cause for stop and search of the vehicle, so the motion to suppress is denied. A cell phone “dump” by the DEA and returning the phone was an unreasonable search. The fact a cell phone is a tool of the trade of drug traffickers was not enough. United States v. Lujan, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95804 (N.D. Miss. July 10, 2012):

The Government has not, at either the hearing or through briefing, established that Lujan's cell phone contained evidence of a crime, or that there was probable cause to believe such evidence existed on his cell phone. The Government asserts that cell phones have been recognized as tools of the narcotics trade, and that is enough to justify its warrantless search. The Fifth Circuit has recognized that "cell phones contain a wealth of private information, including emails, text messages, call histories, address books, and subscriber numbers." United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 577 (5th Cir. 2008). Indeed, a cell phone is "similar to a personal computer that is carried on one's person. Id. Thus, there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in this information. Id. Because cell phones contain such a wealth of private information, in this situation, where no probable cause has been established as to Lujan's cell phone, the evidence must be suppressed. Indeed, requiring the government to secure a warrant prior to searching the contents of a properly seized cell phone is typically not overly burdensome in light of the privacy interests at stake. See United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1090 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting the "vast amounts of diverse personal information" contained in electronic devices).

Defendant hiding in a house failed to show that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in it where it was attempted to be proved by one sentence in a police report and he did not testify. United Sates v. Manson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95799 (N.D. Ga. July 11, 2012)*:

Defendant would have no reasonable expectation of privacy for purposes of Fourth Amendment protection unless he could show that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the particular quarters of the house where he stayed over night and that those specific rooms were subject to the challenged search. In the absence of such a showing, the Defendant would not have standing to challenge the search and seizure. United States v. Rackley, 742 F.2d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 1984). The Defendant's showing here relied on a slim reed of evidence - his own statement to one of the officers, as reflected in a police report, made after he was caught hiding out in the house. No affirmative evidence was presented as to how long the Defendant purportedly had stayed in the house or in what room(s) he stayed. Ms. Caja's statements to the police lend no support for the Defendant's assertion. Under these circumstances, the Court finds insufficient credible, specific evidence to sustain Plaintiff's contention that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in some portion of the house where the search was conducted and where contraband was discovered.

The CI’s information for the search warrant was not given a time frame, but there was a confirming trash pull within 72 hours of the search warrant, and that mooted the time problem. Also, there is no higher constitutional right in trash in Ohio. An “all persons” warrant was valid. State v. Quinn, 2012 Ohio 3123, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 2751 (12th Dist. July 9, 2012).*

Validity of consent to search a backpack in a vehicle was moot where there was probable cause for search of the whole vehicle. State v. Young, 2012 Ohio 3131, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 2752 (12th Dist. July 9, 2012).*

Where the IRS was on the premises with a warrant and they found syringes while looking for flashdrives, state officials did not need a separate warrant to come in and take what the IRS was not taking. State v. Lorenzo, 2012 Ohio 3145, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 2774 (9th Dist. July 5, 2012).*

To detain a person who appears to be a danger to himself or others because of mental difficulties, there must be probable cause. State v. Standifer, 2012 Ohio 3132, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 2758 (12th Dist. July 9, 2012):

[*P17] We find that based on the Ohio Supreme Court's language in Miller and the constitutional requirements regarding criminal arrests and exigent circumstances, police officers must possess probable cause that a person "represents a substantial risk of physical harm to [her]self as manifested by evidence of threats of, attempts at, suicide or serious self-inflicted bodily harm" to seize that person pursuant to R.C. 5122.10. Probable cause exists when the officer has sufficient information, derived from his own knowledge or a trustworthy source, which would lead a prudent person to believe the person did certain acts. State v. Cearley, 12th Dist. No. CA2003-08-213, 2004 Ohio 4837, ¶ 8. When determining whether probable cause exists, a court reviews the totality of facts and circumstances. State v. Gargaris, 12th Dist. No. CA2007-06-142, 2008 Ohio 5418, ¶ 13.