The inventory search here was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because of a lack of evidence of police policy. The officers simply testified that their searches of the wrecker, van, and its contents were inventory searches pursuant to the impoundment. Capellan v. State, 729 S.E.2d 602 (Ga. App. 2012).

Defendant’s consent to a search of her blood for BAC mooted application of the implied consent statute. McMullen v. State, 316 Ga. App. 684, 730 S.E.2d 151 (2012).*

Officers received a report of a reckless driver, and defendant was seen weaving 20 mph under the speed limit. He was stopped and was found under the influence. After the suppression hearing, he raised invalid inventory, but that was after the evidence closed and the trial court wouldn’t hear it. He reraised it in a motion for new trial and it was denied on the merits, and the record supports it. State v. Harvey, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 486 (June 22, 2011).*

Investigator’s use of E-Phex (“undercover investigative software”) to enter defendant’s computer when it was available for peer-to-peer file sharing was not an unreasonable search. United States v. Hill, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94505 (W.D. Mo. June 18, 2012), adopted 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94506 (W.D. Mo. July 9, 2012).*

Defendant was stopped based on a CI’s report, but the officers also ran defendant’s name and found he had a revoked license, and that justified the stop. United States v. Irons, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93935 (N.D. W.Va. July 9, 2012).*

CI’s information was corroborated by the officers as to how they were dressed and where they were located, and the officer immediately recognized one of the men as a convicted felon. The officers made a “soft approach” without lights and did not order them to stop. They got out of their car and asked to talk to them. “None of the traditional factors used to assess the presence of police coercion were present, and there was no objective indication that Shaw and Teixeira were not free to disregard Detective Almeida's request and leave the area. Such an encounter does not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny until and "unless it loses its consensual nature." United States v. Shaw, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144672 (D. Mass. April 7, 2010).*

TSA search of defendant’s bag at Oakland airport was not for explosives or other threat to airline security, and the motion to suppress is granted. The TSA officer’s report said that he concluded the dark mass on the screen was not an explosive before the search; he just didn’t know what it was. To be a valid administrative search, it has to be consistent with TSA’s mission; otherwise, it’s just a general search. United States v. Fulgham, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93909 (N.D. Cal. July 5, 2012):

In McCarty, the Ninth Circuit recently explained the scope of a lawful airport administrative search. "[U]nder federal law, TSA agents could legally search [Defendant's] entire bag for explosives or other safety hazards." 648 F.3d at 831 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 44901; 49 C.F.R. § 1540.111(c)). "However, because warrantless, suspicionless administrative searches remain subject to the Fourth Amendment, a particular search is constitutionally reasonable only where it is no more extensive nor intensive than necessary, in the light of current technology, to detect the presence of weapons or explosives and where it is confined in good faith to that purpose." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). See also United States v. Doe, 61 F.3d 107, 110 (1st Cir. 1995) ("lawful airline security searches of carry-on luggage may not be enlarged or tailored systemically to detect contraband (e.g., narcotics) unrelated to airline security").

"In other words, an airport search remains a valid administrative search only so long as the scope of the administrative search exception is not exceeded; 'once a search is conducted for a criminal investigatory purpose, it can no longer be justified under an administrative search rationale.'" McCarty, 648 F.3d at 831 (quoting United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989)). "Thus, because TSA screeners are limited to the single administrative goal of searching for possible safety threats related to explosives, the constitutional bounds of an airport administrative search require that the individual screener's actions be no more intrusive than necessary to determine the existence or absence of explosives that could result in harm to the passengers and aircraft." Id. at 831 (citing $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d at 1245). However, the mere fact that an airport screening procedure reveals contraband other than weapons or explosives does not automatically "'alter the essentially administrative nature of the screening process ... or render the searches unconstitutional.'" United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 617 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973)).