An elementary school teacher who showed up at work with the smell of alcohol about her person was reasonable suspicion not probable cause. Under the reasonableness special needs standard, a Breathalyzer test was reasonable because elementary school teachers have a reduced expectation of privacy at work. Donegan v. Livingston, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91884 (M.D. Pa. July 3, 2012):

Administration of a Breathalyzer test to an elementary school employee passes this reasonableness test. The Supreme Court has specifically recognized the school environment as one which "presents 'special needs' beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements." Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987)). Moreover, an analysis of the above factors demonstrates that an elementary school employee in Donegan's position could be properly subjected to a Breathalyzer test.

Like the corrections officer in Majewski, Donegan's profession subjected her to a reduced expectation of privacy in her sobriety while at work. Similar to railroad workers, teachers' privacy to ingest substances at work is "diminished by reasons of their participation in an industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure safety, a goal dependent, in substantial part, on the health and fitness of covered employees." Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627; see also Knox County Educ. Ass'n v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 158 F.3d 361, 384 (6th Cir. 1998) (noting that teachers play a unique role in their influence and access to children and "should not be surprised if their own use of drugs is subject to regulation and testing and, as such, their expectation of privacy, at least with respect to drugs and drug usage, might be diminished."); but see Am. Fed'n of Teachers-W. Virginia, AFL-CIO v. Kanawha County Bd. of Educ., 592 F. Supp. 2d 883, 904 (S.D.W. Va. 2009) (declining to find teacher positions as safety sensitive on the record before that court). As teachers inhabit a highly regulated environment which is particularly sensitive to alcohol and drug abuse, I find that teachers have a reduced expectation of privacy in the use of such substances while at work.

Search incident to arrest of the person pretty much remains the same and comes from the common law, but search incident of vehicles has changed. State v. Salinas, 169 Wn. App. 210, 279 P.3d 917 (2012).

Not a Fourth Amendment case on appeal, but interesting nonetheless, and one that may reappear as SORNA registrants are polygraphed on release: Defendant was convicted of sexual abuse of his two minor sisters in 1990. While on parole, he had to submit to polygraph examinations as a condition of release over his objection, and he was asked about and admitted viewing child pornography. ICE agents were called by state parole, and they did a knock-and-talk and defendant consented to a search of his computers [not an issue on appeal], and made statements to them which came in at his trial. United States v. Ramos, 685 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. July 2, 2012).*

Multiple 911 calls of shots fired with facts observed at the scene created a reasonable belief that a person was injured inside. (Critical factual findings of the trial court on the motion to suppress were unsupported by the record, so the court reviewed all de novo.) People v. Lomax, 2012 IL App (1st) 103016, 975 N.E.2d 115 (June 29, 2012):

[**P39] Multiple calls to 911 complaining that people overheard gunshots being fired created a reasonable belief that an emergency situation existed at the first-floor rear unit of the South Wells building and that someone was in need of aid. Defendant's arguments to the contrary, which are that the police could not be sure whether or not the sounds were in fact gunshots and that none of the calls were made by anyone who had physically observed a gun, if accepted, would frustrate the purpose of the 911 emergency system. As the Seventh Circuit found in Hanson, multiple reasons exist as to why no one who had observed a gun had called 911. Hanson, 608 F.3d at 337. If someone had been shot and was in need of medical attention, he or she might not be able to operate a phone. Hanson, 608 F.3d at 337. Furthermore, anyone else in the apartment might have been afraid to call 911 because of threats of physical violence from the person holding the gun. Hanson, 608 F.3d at 337.

[**P40] The reasonableness prong of the test is determined by the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of entry. Ferral, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 705 (citing Griffin, 158 Ill. App. 3d at 51). The United States Supreme Court has cautioned courts against second-guessing the police's assessment of the situation. Ryburn v. Huff, __ U.S. __, ___, 132 S. Ct. 987, 992 (2012) (per curiam). Police officers often must make split-second decisions, without the benefit of immediate hindsight, in situations that are often "'tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.'" Ryburn, __ U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 992 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1872 (1989)).

Hanson is Hanson v. Dane County, 608 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2010), posted here.

Officers lack objective evidence that this 14 year old defendant had a weapon when he stopped to remove something from his waistband and put it in his backpack. Matter of Jaquan M., 2012 NY Slip Op 05334 (1st Dept. July 3, 2012)* (3-2):

Reasonable suspicion could not be formed in this case based strictly on the officers' observation of appellant removing an object from his waistband, because they conceded that the object bore no obvious hallmarks of a weapon. Further, there were no other objective indicia of criminality because there were plausible, non-criminal reasons for appellant's behavior. For example, the fact that the backpack sagged at the bottom could have been the result of any number of things which it would have been legal for appellant to possess. Nor did appellant's actions in pacing back and forth and peering up and down the street and sidewalk, and then kneeling down to transfer something into the backpack exclude the reasonable possibility that he was engaged in innocent behavior. The fact that appellant was in a high-crime area and on his way to another high-crime area does not, without more, constitute a factor sufficient to create reasonable suspicion (Powell, 246 AD2d at 369-370). Nor do we believe that all of these factors, taken together, reasonably lead to the conclusion that appellant was in the process of committing a crime.

Even if the seizure of appellant was legal, we find that appellant's denials that there was anything inside the bag did not justify an increase in the level of suspicion such that the police properly searched his bag. In the cases on which the presentment agency and the dissent rely in arguing that similar lies can create probable cause, People v Febus (11 AD3d 554 [2004] lv dismissed 7 NY3d 743 [2004]) and People v Scott-Heron, 11 AD3d 364 [2004], lv denied 4 NY2d 804 [2004]), the police had already developed strong reason to believe that the defendants had secreted drugs, and the defendants' denials were found to have buttressed that belief. Here, as discussed above, the police had no basis to believe that there was a gun in appellant's backpack, other than their hunch. Appellant's denials were insufficient, on their own, to create probable cause.

A 30-45 second wait after knocking and entering was reasonable, per Banks. Walke v. Cullen, 491 Fed. Appx. 273 (3d Cir. 2012).

A DEA administrative subpoena under 21 U.S.C. § 876(a) for Sprint cell phone records was a proper use of the subpoena power and violated no right of privacy. Thereafter, pinging the cell phone with a search warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Jones, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92129 (M.D. Ala. June 15, 2012).

Defendant lacked standing as to a vehicle and a place searched. State v. Cumberledge, 2012 Ohio 3012, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 2660 (11th Dist. June 29, 2012).*