Use of blue lights when a police car stops behind an already parked car as a part of the community caretaking function is not a stop. It is for safety. State v. Vandergriff, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 452 (June 28, 2012).

Defendant’s cotton mouth and slurred speech and seeing a corner of a clear plastic sandwich bag was not reasonable suspicion of drugs. DUI? Likely, but that was not the focus of this investigation, and the continuation of this stop was unreasonable. State v. Jones, 47 Kan. App. 2d 866, 280 P.3d 824 (2012).

Defendant’s almost nonsensical answers to basic questions were enough to make reasonable suspicion. (Something like “where’s your luggage?” “In the back seat?” “There’s no luggage in the back seat.” “I’m wearing it all.”) State v. Dow, 375 S.W.3d 845 (Mo. App. 2012).*

Not disclosing there was no strip search of the CI before the controlled buy did not undermine probable cause under Franks. United States v. Rigaud, 684 F.3d 169 (1st Cir. 2012).*

Defendant was accused of sex with a minor and production of child pornography with that minor. The fact the early information was partially years old did not make it stale because the sexual relationship just ended and its continuing utility to the defendant. Cochran v. State, 2012 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 45 (June 29, 2012).*

Driving the wrong way on an interstate highway was reasonable suspicion for a stop. During the stop defendant admitted to a gun, and it was not suppressed. State v. Taylor, 97 So. 3d 522 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2012).*

“In light of the appellant's status not simply as a parolee generally but as a parolee for whom a parole retake arrest warrant was outstanding, we hold, pursuant to the balancing test of United States v. Knights, that the search of Room 133 of the Days Inn, based on reasonable suspicion to believe that the appellant was engaged in criminal activity, was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” The state didn’t argue a lack of standing in somebody else’s motel room, so they waived it. Feaster v. State, 206 Md. App. 202, 47 A.3d 1051 (2012). This is a Moylan opinion, always entertaining, sometimes overdone. But always entertaining.

In 1945 in Animal Farm, George Orwell told us, "All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others." A similar relativism prevails with respect to the protections of the Fourth Amendment. The people are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures, but probationers and parolees are less protected than other people. More precisely, searches that would be unreasonable with respect to other people would not be unreasonable with respect to them. The key to the puzzle now before us is that the appellant, when searched, was a parolee.

. . .

This case would have presented no Fourth Amendment problem if the appellant, who, if challenged, would have borne the burden of proof on standing, Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130-31 n.1, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978), Fitzgerald v. State, 153 Md. App. 601, 662, 837 A.2d 989 (2003), aff'd. 383 Md. 484, 864 A.2d 1006 (2004); Burks v. State, 96 Md. App. 173, 195, 624 A.2d 1257, cert. denied, 322 Md. 381, 631 A.2d 451 (1993), had not been able to show a Fourth Amendment interest in Room 133. Such a threshold challenge, it would seem, ought to be an automatic prosecutorial instinct when dealing with hotels and motels.

There is no point in locking the barn door, however, once the horse is out. A failure of the State to raise a challenge to a defendant's standing at the suppression hearing operates as a waiver of the challenge. ...

No-knock provision in this search warrant was supported only by generalizations about drug dealers, and the accused here was only suspected of being a user. Entry was unreasonable. State v. Cash, 316 Ga. App. 324, 728 S.E.2d 918 (2012):

The affidavit and evidence presented in this case are remarkably similar to that presented in our recent decision in Barnett, supra, 314 Ga. App. at 17-20, where we held that the blanket provisions based on the agent's generalized experience in drug investigations were insufficient to justify a “no-knock” provision in a search warrant. Here, as in Barnett, the affidavit requested a “no-knock” search warrant based upon the agent's general experience that drug evidence can be easily destroyed and that drug suspects commonly possess firearms. See Barnett, supra, 314 Ga. App. at 19. While the affidavit stated that the drug suspect had been in the military and likely had “knowledge” regarding firearms, there was no indication that the drug suspect or any occupant of the residence possessed a firearm. The affidavit also failed to set forth any information indicating that the drug suspect had packaged or located the drugs in the residence for quick disposal. In sum, the affidavit and evidence in this case failed to present any particular facts and circumstances justifying a “no-knock” provision, and instead, was based entirely upon generalizations. Consequently, the “no-knock” provision was invalid, which rendered the execution of the warrant without knocking and announcing illegal and supported the trial court's decision granting the motion to suppress. See Barnett, supra, 314 Ga. App. at 20; Poole, supra, 266 Ga. App. at 114-119 (1).

In a Title VII case, plaintiff claimed the defendant school district violated her Fourth Amendment rights by looking at e-mails on the school district’s computers. It wasn’t her computer and she signed off on a technology policy that she didn’t own anything on the computer system. Dombrowski v. Governor Mifflin Sch. Dist., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90674 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2012):

Plaintiff claims that GMSD violated her right to privacy when (1) it ordered an outside forensic investigator to search Plaintiff's work computer (which Plaintiff had turned over when she was suspended); (2) the forensic investigator produced Plaintiff's personal e-mails (including e-mails between Plaintiff and her attorney) which were found on her computer and a network server; and (3) it introduced many of the produced e-mails into evidence during Plaintiff's Loudermill and public School Board hearings. The Court must consider whether Plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mails (including e-mails between Plaintiff and her counsel) that could be accessed by the forensic investigator solely by searching property owned by GMSD.

Courts have considered the confidentiality of e-mails and documents sent from work computers, including e-mails between attorneys and clients. In re Asia Global Crossing,
Ltd., 322 B.R. 247 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005), cogently sets forth four critical factors that a court should consider with respect to an employee's expectation of privacy in computer files and e-mail:

(1) [D]oes the corporation maintain a policy banning personal or other objectionable use,
(2) does the company monitor the use of the employee's computer or e-mail,
(3) do third parties have a right of access to the computer or e-mails, and
(4) did the corporation notify the employee, or was the employee aware, of the use and monitoring policies?

Id. at 257 (footnote omitted); see also United States v. Nagle, No. 1:09-CR-384, 2010 WL 3896200, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2010). The Asia Global court then discussed numerous
federal cases from which these factors were derived. Asia Global, 322 B.R. at 257-58. The conclusion often turned on whether there was a company policy respecting the privacy of work computers; whether the employee was aware of the policy; and whether the company actually implemented its policy. Id. (describing collected cases).