There is no differing standard of justification for a seizure v. a search. The officers’ entry here was without exigent circumstances, and their findings made it into the search warrant affidavit, so the search was suppressed. United States v. Estrada, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86592 (D. Utah June 21, 2012):

2. Seizure vs. search

The government argues that, as the officer's intent was merely to secure the hotel room, remove any occupants, and obtain a search warrant, "their activity in entering the room should be considered a more limited intrusion than would be a warrantless search, and therefore subject to a different degree of scrutiny." In support of this contention, the government cites to the plurality opinion in United States v. Segura, which states:

[A] seizure affects only possessory interests, not privacy interests. Therefore, the heightened protection we accord privacy interests is simply not implicated where a seizure of premises, not a search, is at issue. We hold, therefore, that securing a dwelling, on the basis of probable cause, to prevent the destruction or removal of evidence while a search warrant is being sought is not itself an unreasonable seizure of either the dwelling or its contents.

However, this language comes from a section of the Segura opinion that was joined by only two justices. Furthermore, even if the language cited by the government garnered majority support, the same section of the opinion states that the justices did not believe that the holding would increase the possibility of illegal entries by police officers because: 1) "an entry in the absence of exigent circumstances is illegal;" 2) "officers who have probable cause and who are in the process of obtaining a warrant have no reason to enter the premises before the warrant issues, absent exigent circumstances which, of course, would justify the entry;" and 3) "officers who enter illegally will recognize that whatever evidence they discover as a direct result of the entry may be suppressed."

In the case at hand, the officers did not enter the premises "while a search warrant [was] being sought;" instead, they entered the premises before seeking the warrant, and included substantial evidence found in the apartment in the subsequently-prepared warrant affidavit.

Under the Segura plurality, an entry in the absence of exigent circumstances is illegal and evidence discovered from such a search may be suppressed. Therefore, the question before the Court remains the same: whether exigent circumstances existed to justify the officers' warrantless entry.

Under the Fourth Amendment, why would there be because both are provided for by its plain language.

Man with a gun report did not create a presumption that the gun was unlicensed or otherwise criminally possessed, so a stop and frisk was not justified. [Case does not cite the Second Amendment.] People v. Murrell, 56 V.I. 796 (2012):

We agree with Murrell that, if this Court were to apply the Ubiles and Lewis decisions, there is no question that the Superior Court correctly granted Murrell's motion to suppress. As in Lewis and Ubiles, there is absolutely no evidence in the record that Douglas received any information that Murrell possessed an unlicensed firearm or a firearm with an altered serial number, nor is there any evidence from which Douglas could have inferred that Murrell was engaging in criminal behavior. On the contrary, Douglas unambiguously testified at the suppression hearing that he only had reason to believe that Murrell lacked a license after Murrell told him that he did not have one, which did not occur until after Murrell had been told to place his hands on the hedge and Douglas obtained the loaded firearm out of Murrell's pocket. (J.A. 53-54.) Therefore, were we to concur with the Third Circuit's conclusion that local Virgin Islands law does not contain a presumption that an individual lacks a permit to carry a firearm, we would easily conclude that the Superior Court committed no error in granting the motion to suppress the firearm and the ammunition.

The prosecutor’s comment on defendant’s refusal to let the police look at the soles of his shoes was not a comment on the exercise of a constitutional right because there was no expectation of privacy in the soles of one’s shoes under state precedent. State v. Wright, 283 P.3d 795 (Ida. App. 2012).

Defendant was suspected of a murder and the police had the weapon and probable cause for her. There was a substantial basis for issuing a search warrant for her house to look for more. Hughes v. State, 90 So. 3d 613 (Miss. 2012).* [Note: What is missing from this case is a discussion of nexus: What is the relationship of the murder to the house or potential evidence in the house? Sure defendant lived there, but more has to be required. Granted, cases say “is it a reasonable and normal inference that evidence will be found in one’s house after a crime, a normal base of operations?” They never say what. Here, they found shoes linked to the murder, but they had no idea before; this was a general rummaging. Thus, the case virtually stands for the proposition that a murder suspect’s house is subject to search even though the murder didn’t occur there. Remember also that there is no murder scene exception to the warrant requirement, so does this case mean that there is a murder suspect exception to nexus?]

Sun-Sentinel: State seeks to expand secret tracking program that uses cellphones, GPS by Alexia Campbell:

Florida wants to expand a secret surveillance program that uses GPS cellphone tracking and other new tracking technology to help police solve violent crimes.

The Florida Department of Law Enforcement's Electronic Surveillance Support Teams have operated under the radar since the first one launched in the Orlando area in 2007. The teams have since spread to South Florida and all across the state, records show, and rising police requests for surveillance have led the department to push for $1.7 million to expand the program.

Although little is known about how agents on these teams use the high-tech surveillance equipment to help police, state records show that locating criminal suspects with GPS locators on smartphones is a common practice.