Thermal imaging neighborhoods: Reason Magazine: Public Defender in GA: Cops Can't Use Thermal Images of Possible Grow Lights For Search Warrants by Matthew Feeney:

A public defender in Georgia is hoping to have his client's case dismissed by a Georgia Superior Court after claiming that evidence against his client was illegally obtained. James Brundgie has been charged with the manufacture of marijuana, possession with intent to distribute, and possession of a controlled substance after a judge approved a warrant to search his property after thermal imaging detected a 'hot spot' in his garage. If the search warrant is upheld it will be a worrying precedent to set as police forces and other agencies will be able to justify thermal imaging of entire neighborhoods in search of similar 'hot spots'.

The public defender, Benjamin Pearlman, is rightly arguing that the warrant should never have been issued as Georgia law states that a warrant may not be issued 'for anything other than physical, tangible evidence.' It is hard to see exactly how a thermal scan fits into the category of physical or tangible evidence.

While state law may say "tangible evidence," the Fourth Amendment is not so limited, so this is a state law argument only.

The judicially-created exclusionary rule is not applicable in a civil, administrative driver's license revocation or suspension proceeding. Miller v. Toler, 729 S.E.2d 137 (W. Va. 2012).*

Defendant’s truck was under surveillance near the border with Mexico for 72 hours, and officers suspected drugs in an auxiliary fuel tank, which had become common at the time. All the factors involving this vehicle pointed to reasonable suspicion because of the suspicious activities with the truck of proximity to the border. The officers suspected that the vehicle could have been driven across the river at a shallow point. United States v. Mark, 481 Fed. Appx. 899 (5th Cir. 2012).*

On the totality, the officer had reasonable suspicion that defendant was carrying drugs in his car. [Note the court mentions consent was denied, but this is not mentioned later as a factor in reasonable suspicion.] State v. Smith, 373 S.W.3d 502 (Mo. App. 2012)*:

Here, Appellant was first legitimately stopped for two traffic violations. Already knowing that Appellant had just left a residence known for drug activity, Officer Buske first made contact with Appellant and was struck by Appellant's nervousness, sweating, and shaking. Further, he recognized Appellant from dealing with him on previous occasions and knew of his history of drug use and criminal activity. It was at this point that Officer Buske requested to search Appellant's vehicle and Appellant denied that request such that Officer Buske made the decision to request a police dog to sniff the vehicle which was done in an expeditious manner.

Defendant’s conduct was suspicious enough to permit the officers to conduct a protective weapons sweep of his car for weapons, even though he was in the patrol car at the time. Long specifically permitted it. State v. Broughton, 2012 Ohio 2526, 969 N.E.2d 810 (10th Dist. 2012).*

Defendant’s hiding his hand during a traffic stop that would have made the officer fear he was going for a gun made it reasonable for the officer to pull his weapon and order defendant out. United States v. Bost, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80523 (E.D. Tenn. May 3, 2012).*

The search warrant was for “53 West James Circle,” which ostensibly was a duplex, but further investigation had revealed that the duplex was being converted into one unit with one driveway, one water meter, finally learning that it had “a mother-in-law suite” accessible from the common area inside. The search warrant was valid and particular. Conrad v. State, 163 Ga. App. 146, 730 S.E.2d 7 (2012).*

Strip searches of everybody at the jail, even those not going into general population, might be unreasonable even under Florence which left that question open, but, for civil liability, the question is “clearly established law,” and it’s not. Wamble v. County of Jones, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79969 (S.D. Miss. June 8, 2012)*:

In the wake of Florence, the central question is whether Merrill violated clearly established law by allegedly participating in the search of Wamble. Merrill argues that he could not have violated clearly established law because the Florence Court left "open the possibility of exceptions" to the blanket rule that newly arrested persons may be strip-searched without reasonable suspicion if they are going to be booked into the general population of a detention facility. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1523 (Roberts, J., concurring).

When there is an "open question" as to whether certain conduct is unconstitutional, the law cannot be considered clearly established. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 535 (1985) (holding that defendant was entitled to qualified immunity because "[t]he decisive fact is not that Mitchell's position turned out to be incorrect, but that the question was open at the time he acted"); Shepard v. Ripperger, 57 Fed. App'x 270, 272 (8th Cir.2003) ("Because the legality of refusing to identify oneself to police is an open question, it is not clearly established law for the purpose of denying qualified immunity." (citations omitted)); Polk v. District of Columbia, 121 F. Supp. 2d 56, 70 -71 (D.D.C.,2000) ("In both Davis v. Scherer and Mitchell v. Forsyth, the Supreme Court's holdings that the law was not clearly established turned on the fact that there was an 'open question' whether the Constitution outlawed the conduct at issue." (citations omitted)).

Thus, "[g]iven the Supreme Court's express reservation of the question of whether" detainees who are not going to be held overnight in a cell with other inmates may be strip-searched without a reasonable suspicion, the "contours" of Wamble's right to be free from unreasonable searches are "not sufficiently clear that the unlawfulness" of the search to which he was subjected would be "apparent" to all reasonable officials.

A suspicionless supervision condition was imposed on defendant “based on the facts in this case—involving violence, threats, and a firearm.” Defendant threatened to hunt down and kill anybody involved in her conviction, and that threat made the suspicionless search condition reasonable. State v. Rowan, 2012 WI 60, 341 Wis. 2d 281, 814 N.W.2d 854 (2012):

[*18] We next turn to the second part of the test relating to the constitutionality of the condition of extended supervision, including persons released on community supervision such as probation and parole. We conclude that the condition is, under the circumstances presented here, reasonably related to Rowan's rehabilitation. A condition is reasonably related to a person's rehabilitation "if it assists the convicted individual in conforming his or her conduct to the law." It is also appropriate for circuit courts to consider an end result of encouraging lawful conduct, and thus increased protection of the public, when determining what individualized probation, extended supervision, or parole conditions are appropriate for a particular person. Unsurprisingly, public safety is often mentioned in connection with the goal of rehabilitation: decreased criminality and greater public safety are logically connected to successful rehabilitation efforts. The trial in this case included evidence of the defendant's repeated explicit threats to shoot law enforcement officers and medical professionals and their family members, as well as evidence of the handgun and ammunition recovered from her vehicle, where it had been unlawfully concealed. In light of the circumstances that resulted in her conviction for battery to a law enforcement officer, the condition at issue was reasonably related to Rowan's rehabilitation, because her diminished right to be free from search was designed to assist her in "conforming [her] conduct to the law" by recognizing that her prior criminal conduct demonstrated a pattern involving guns and violent threats. Giving her an increased incentive to refrain from possessing a gun again was reasonably related to her rehabilitation. It is clear that Rowan's successful rehabilitation would also serve the interest of public protection and safety.

Suspicionless condition of supervised release search was appropriate here. Blakney v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79755 (D. S.D. June 8, 2012).*