NYTimes.com: Stop-and-Frisk Policy ‘Saves Lives,’ Mayor Tells Black Congregation by Kate Taylor:

As criticism of the Police Department’s so-called stop-and-frisk policy grows louder, Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg took to the pulpit before a black congregation in Brooklyn on Sunday to make his most forceful and nuanced defense of the practice yet, arguing that it had helped make New York the safest big city in the country, while acknowledging that the police needed to treat those whom they stopped with greater respect.

Defendant agreed to a knock-and-talk at his gate, and the officers’ insistence on coming inside violated the curtilage and the scope of consent. Ferrer v. State, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 9211 (Fla. 2d DCA June 8, 2012):

We reject the State's contention that once Ferrer opened the locked gate, general "knock-and-talk" principles authorized the deputies to proceed to the front door area. See, e.g., State v. Navarro, 19 So. 3d 370, 372-73 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). The State argues that because the officers were free to proceed to the front door of the house to knock and talk, the evidence of marijuana was legally obtained under the "plain smell" doctrine. The flaw in this argument is that it does not recognize that the deputies' encounter with Ferrer at the gate was a knock and talk encounter. Rather than leaving his property open for any member of the public to enter, Ferrer had taken steps to keep out uninvited visitors by fencing it and erecting an electric gate across his driveway, thereby demonstrating an expectation of privacy. Cf. Nieminski v. State, 60 So. 3d 521, 525-27 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (finding no violation of privacy where officers entered fenced property through a closed, but unlocked, gate). Thus, while officers were free to approach the gate to conduct a knock and talk—which they did—the area inside the fence fell under the same constitutional protections as the residence itself, and the officers were not at liberty, absent consent, to approach the residence. Compare Fernandez v. State, 63 So. 3d 881, 883-84 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the fenced yard adjacent to his residence and that the momentary opening of the gate to allow the defendant to leave was not an invitation for police to enter); with State v. Triana, 979 So. 2d 1039, 1045 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (finding no constitutional violation where the police had a consensual encounter with the defendant outside of the locked gate to the defendant's property and the defendant agreed to a search and opened the gate to allow the police to enter). [¶] It is undisputed that the only thing Ferrer consented to was to speak to the officers "on the other side of the gate." ...

Defendant’s flight from the officer who was attempting to seize him for a minor offense was a new crime to which the exclusionary rule did not apply. His dropping his gun when shot at was still abandonment under Hodari D. United States v. Gant, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78853 (D. Minn. June 7, 2012), R&R 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79269 (D. Minn. May 22, 2012).*

Probable cause developed to search defendant and his companion’s purse, and that provided probable cause to search the car they arrived in. The defendant admitted that the stop started with the officer quite respectfully offering assistance because they might be lost. One thing turned into another into another, and PC developed. [A new one on me: “motel drug interdiction duty” in North Carolina.] United States v. Laihben, 482 Fed. Appx. 827 (4th Cir. 2012).*

The stop here was not so long that the traffic stop was turned into a detention requiring reasonable suspicion. The passenger also had no standing in the vehicle. United States v. Santos, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79252 (N.D. Ga. April 24, 2012).*

Undercover officers used a man who didn’t know they were police to go to defendant’s house to buy drugs, which he did. When he got back to the car, he was arrested, and the officers went to the house to do a knock-and-talk, ultimately entering and doing a protective sweep and seizing the house pending investigation. In the meantime, another had gone to get a search warrant for the house. They had probable cause to get a search warrant before the protective sweep, and suppression was not ordered because of the inevitable discovery doctrine even though the view of drugs during the protective sweep made it into the search warrant application. Kamara v. State, 205 Md. App. 607, 45 A.3d 948 (2012):

Thus, the issue here is whether the later search pursuant to the warrant was genuinely independent of the earlier observation of the marijuana in the house. The Court in Murray gave guidance on how to assess this issue. It noted two situations in which the evidence would not be deemed to be obtained by independent lawful means: (1) where the officer's "decision to seek the warrant was prompted by what they had seen during the initial entry"; and (2) where "information obtained during that entry was presented to the [judge] and affected his decision to issue the warrant." Id.

In the present case, neither of these situations are present. The evidence here established that the police planned to get a warrant prior to the protective sweep or the discovery of any contraband. Detective Oaks testified that, when Sergeant Carafano arrived at the house, he announced that the police were going to detain appellant while they sought a search warrant. Appellant was then handcuffed and detained, and two officers conducted the protective sweep. The uncontradicted evidence shows that the decision to seek the search warrant was not prompted by what the officers saw during the initial protective sweep.

Defendant was suspected in the murder of his wife, and he was on the lam with their son. He was tracked to a hotel room that night, but the police waited until the next day to make an entry, which, of course, led to the argument that they had no exigent circumstances. The court finds that they had probable cause to believe that defendant was involved in the murder and the son was likely a witness. And, with probable cause, he could be arrested without a warrant under VI law and the Fourth Amendment. However, the police knew he was at the hotel but not the room, and there was nobody to ask, and that’s why they waited until morning. If they could have isolated the room, then they could have gotten an oral or telephonic warrant if necessary [n.13]. As soon as they had a room number, they went in. Nicholas v. People, 56 V.I. 718 (2012):

Here, the police clearly possessed exigent circumstances at the time they entered the hotel room. "Circumstances involving the protection of a child's welfare, even absent suspicions of criminal activity, may present an exigency permitting warrantless entry, but only if the officer reasonably believes that 'someone is in imminent danger.'" Ray v. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Parkhurst v. Trapp, 77 F.3d 707, 711 (3d Cir. 1996)). At the time the police gathered the relevant information—that Nicholas was in Room 205 of the Bella Vista Hotel with his son—they had reason to believe that D.N. witnessed his mother's murder and may, in fact, have been the only eyewitness. (S.A. 144.) They knew that a gun was used in the killing but was not left at the crime scene. (S.A. 172.) The police had statements from neighbors establishing that Nicholas entered the apartment that morning. (S.A. 238.) Shortly after he entered, the neighbors heard the sound of a gunshot and a loud thump, and Nicholas was seen leaving the apartment in a hurry with his son. (S.A. 143, 144, 200; J.A. 113-15.) Although the police had no evidence that Nicholas ever threatened his son, they knew that he had both a motive and the opportunity to silence his son, the only likely eyewitness. Therefore, the police acted reasonably and the trial court correctly found that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry and search. See United States v. Thompson, 357 Fed. Appx. 406, 411 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding exigent circumstances where witnesses to a shoot-out saw a participant to the crime pull a child out of a bullet-ridden vehicle and enter an apartment); United States v. Parris, 229 Fed. Appx. 130, 135 (3d Cir. 2007) (determining that it was reasonable for police to enter a home without a warrant where a man who had been firing a weapon outside the house had entered the home, where children were inside and appeared afraid, and where the police could not see inside well enough to determine if anyone was injured or being held against their will); State v. Aviles, 891 A.2d 935, 945 (Conn. 2006) (concluding that police acted reasonably when they entered the room of someone suspected of having committed murder within the last twelve hours and where the murder weapon had not yet been recovered, because the assailant might still have possessed the gun and might still have been willing to use it); Columbus v. Montgomery, No. 09AP-537, 2011 WL 983080, at *10 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2011) (unpublished) (finding exigent circumstances where children may have been sexually abused and were inside an apartment, possibility with the alleged assailant, even though there was no evidence of ongoing violence).