Defendant answered his door in his underwear and was told he was under arrest. He asked if he could get dressed, and an officer went to his bedroom with him. The room was checked by a protective sweep. Defendant’s conduct in the bedroom led the officer to suspect a weapon, so the officer lifted the mattress and found a gun. That was lawful under Chrisman. Commonwealth v. Quilter, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 808, 969 N.E.2d 163 (2012):

The firearm was not discovered during the protective sweep after the police entered the bedroom. Rather, it was discovered when an officer, suspicious of the defendant's conduct -- sitting at the end of the bed farthest away from the closet -- found the firearm under the mattress where the defendant had been sitting. While the judge stated that the officer was "acting on a hunch -- an excellent one, but a hunch nevertheless," the facts instead indicate that the officer's decision to look under the mattress was objectively reasonable. It is not unreasonable "for a police officer, as a matter of routine, to monitor the movements of an arrested person, as his judgment dictates, following the arrest. The officer's need to ensure his own safety -- as well as the integrity of the arrest -- is compelling." Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 7, 102 S. Ct. 812, 70 L. Ed. 2d 778 (1982). "[A] police officer's decision how and where to conduct the search is 'a quick ad hoc judgment.'" Commonwealth v. Elizondo, 428 Mass. 322, 324, 701 N.E.2d 325 (1998), quoting from United States v. Queen, 847 F.2d 346, 352 (7th Cir. 1988).

Defendant was arrested by the DEA with a SWAT team, and he consented to a limited search and a gun was found. He effectively withdrew consent, and the search stopped. The gun found earlier was admissible. United States v. Posa, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78456 (M.D. Fla. June 6, 2012).*

Defendant consented to a search of his car, and there was probable cause in any event. United States v. Lee, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78579 (D. Haw. June 6, 2012).*

On the totality of evidence, there was probable cause to believe there was drug evidence in defendant’s car. United States v. Rucker, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78323 (N.D. Fla. June 6, 2012).*

Defendant’s nervousness, criminal history, geographical limitations on use of his rental car, and possession of industrial degreaser was not reasonable suspicion. United States v. Johnson, 482 Fed. Appx. 137 (6th Cir. 2012).*

Inevitable discovery applied because the search warrant was being sought when defendant was arrested and a search occurred. State v. Myers, 728 S.E.2d 122 (W. Va. 2012).

Defendant’s car was searched because of the strong odor of marijuana after he was stopped on the street with reasonable suspicion of drug dealing and they “discovered more than $500 in small, disorganized bills stashed in various pockets.” The search was valid under the automobile exception or the search incident doctrine because he was standing at the door when all this went down. United States v. Carter, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11265 (11th Cir. June 5, 2012).*

While Washington law grants automatic standing, somebody with third-party authority can still consent. State v. Libero, 168 Wn. App. 612, 277 P.3d 708 (2012).*

A police officer from another city working plain clothes at a bar with a t-shirt with “Security” on the back who found a gun was not a state actor at the time of employment. The record was clear he was serving the interests of the bar and not the police, and he called the police to “sort it out” after the encounter. United States v. Cintron, 482 Fed. Appx. 353 (10th Cir. 2012):

The OK Corral Club, not the Boley Police Department, hired and paid Mr. Reed for his security guard work at the club. Not all security team members were off-duty police officers. As for the members of OK Corral's security staff who were off-duty police officers, the OK Corral Club hired them and did not rely on official assistance from the police department. See Traver v. Meshriy, 627 F.2d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that off-duty police officer working as security teller at a bank was a state actor when that position was part of a "secondary hiring" program and the security teller's "primary duty was to the [police] department, not to the bank").

Mr. Reed was not wearing his police uniform, did not have his badge, and never identified himself as a police officer. See Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 749 F.2d 1423, 1429-30 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that off-duty police officer working as a store security guard was acting under color of state law when he flashed his badge, identified himself as a police officer, and arrested the alleged shoplifter on the spot), vacated on other grounds,City of Lawton, Okla. v. Lusby, 474 U.S. 805 (1985).

At the suppression hearing, Mr. Reed explained that he was working to further the interests of the OK Corral Club, not those of the police department. ... "Well, yeah, but I don't [enforce the laws] there. I just ... protect and keep the staff and the property safe over there. It's not a matter of me really enforcing the laws over there. We just look out for the safety over there." Id. at 34-35. He also explained that had he been acting as a police officer, he would have acted differently and would have "put [Mr. Cintron] on the ground." Id. at 32.

Finally, Mr. Reed did not formally arrest Mr. Citron. ...

Under the facts, it probably wouldn't make any difference, either.

Plaintiff’s car was validly towed to impound because she was hospitalized after an accident. She had difficulty in regaining her vehicle, and she sued for $500B. “Plaintiff's claims do not appear to challenge the actual seizure of her vehicle, but instead focus on her inability to regain possession of her vehicle. Plaintiff's interest in regaining her vehicle, however, is outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment. See Fox v. Van Oosterum, 176 F.3d 342, 351 (6th Cir. 1999) (‘[T]he Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s interest in retaining possession of property but not the interest in regaining possession of property.’).” Mathis v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76780 (S.D. Ohio June 4, 2012).

Defendant was possibly speeding and hastily exited from a freeway, but the officer didn’t stop the defendant. He followed him home. Defendant got out of his van and went onto his porch and the officer followed. The attempted stop on defendant’s porch was without reasonable suspicion of any wrongdoing other than the alleged traffic offense, and that wasn’t good enough. Defendant testified that he did not know there was a police officer in the car because it was unmarked. “Sgt. Norman followed and grabbed Defendant by the back of his coat. Defendant pulled away and continued behind the house. At this point, uniformed officers appeared on the property, and they Tasered, handcuffed and arrested Defendant.” The search that relieved him of his gun was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Walker, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76781 (S.D. Ohio June 4, 2012)*, reconsideration denied 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111919 (S.D. Ohio August 9, 2012).*

14-month-old information in a child pornography case is not stale. More importantly, it seems that computer forensics makes staleness almost irrelevant: “the age of the information supporting a warrant is increasingly irrelevant when the object searched is stored on a computer.” United States v. Johnson, 865 F. Supp. 2d 702 (D. Md. 2012)

Additionally, the ability of forensic examiners to recover files from a computer—even those deleted by a user—impacts a court's staleness analysis. Since evidence on a computer is recoverable months or years after it has been downloaded, deleted, or viewed; the age of the information supporting a warrant is increasingly irrelevant when the object searched is stored on a computer. See, e.g., Gourde, 440 F.3d at 1071 ("Having paid for multi-month access to a child pornography site, Gourde was also stuck with the near certainty that his computer would contain evidence of a crime had he received or downloaded images in violation of § 2252. Thanks to the long memory of computers, any evidence of a crime was almost certainly still on his computer, even if he had tried to delete the images. FBI computer experts, cited in the affidavit, stated that 'even if ... graphic image files [] have been deleted ... these files can easily be restored.' In other words, his computer would contain at least the digital footprint of the images."); United States v. Toups, No. 2:06-cr-112-MEF, 2007 WL 433562, at *4 (M.D. Ala. February 6, 2007) ("Further bolstering the conclusion that the staleness calculation is unique when it comes to cases of Internet child pornography is the images and videos stored on a computer are not easily eliminated from a computer's hard drive. The mere deletion of a particular file does not necessarily mean that the file cannot later be retrieved.").

Note: The court also notes that no case it could find had ever found staleness in a CP case.