The officer here had a first tip that defendant as a felon in possession of a firearm and a second tip that defendant had shot an antelope. The officer verified that defendant was a convicted felon. When defendant was seen with the dead antelope in his truck, that was reasonable suspicion of FIPF. United States v. Whitley, 680 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2012).

Defendant’s stop for driving one block without headlights for 12 minutes before sunrise was still based on a traffic violation. His continued detention was based on suspicion he was with a prostitute in the car because, among other things, his zipper was down. Defendant’s allegedly answering questions truthfully “are overwhelmingly outweighed by the suspicious circumstances detailed” in the officer’s testimony. Defendant consented to a search that produced a gun. United States v. Anderson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75992 (M.D. La. May 31, 2012).*

There was probable cause for two searches. The second had a warrant. Even if the information for the second warrant was partially misleading under Franks, there was probable cause without it. United States v. Jones, 473 Fed. Appx. 761 (9th Cir. 2012)* [The actual opinion is not much longer than this.]

A police show of force at an “armed party” where several officers converged and at least one had a gun drawn on the group was a seizure. Under Florida v. J.L. there is no firearms exception to the reasonable suspicion requirement. Here, there was none on this anonymous report. Without articulable reasonable suspicion, the court would be sanctioning general searches on the street. State v. Williamson, 368 S.W.3d 468 (Tenn. 2012), revg State v. Williamson, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 656 (August 19, 2011):

Since the Court's decision in J.L., its principles have been applied in a variety of cases on both the federal and state levels. Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed the denial of a motion to suppress under facts similar to those before this Court today. In United States v. Massenburg, 654 F.3d 480 (4th Cir. 2011), police received an anonymous phone call alleging that eight shots had been fired in "a high-crime area." Id. at 482-83. As in this case, there was no description of the suspect. Id. at 483. One of the officers who responded to the call saw four young black men walking a few blocks from where the shots were allegedly fired. Id. ... The district court upheld the propriety of the stop and frisk .... The Fourth Circuit reversed, first emphasizing that in order to justify a frisk, "the Constitution requires 'a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.'" Id. at 486 (quoting United States v. Griffin, 589 F.3d 148, 152 (4th Cir. 2009)). The court found "precious little" to demonstrate that the officer "had reasonable, particularized suspicion ... such that a non[-]consensual frisk was lawful under the Fourth Amendment," holding that the anonymous tip neither provided any predictive information about the suspect nor tested the knowledge or credibility of the informant. Massenburg, 654 F.3d at 486-87. In addition, the court found that the tip's reliability was undermined because it did not include a "physical description of the perpetrators or any other outward identifying features," meaning that "the only link between the tip and Massenburg's group was [their] rough proximity to the alleged site of the gunfire." Id. at 487. Finally, the court observed that the location of the incident in a high-crime area failed to bolster the credibility or reliability of the anonymous tip. Id. at 488. "To hold otherwise," the court ruled,

would be to authorize general searches of persons on the street not unlike those conducted of old by the crown against the colonists. Allowing officers to stop and frisk any individuals in the neighborhood after even the most generic of anonymous tips would be tantamount to permitting a regime of general searches of virtually any individual residing in or found in high-crime neighborhoods, where complaints of random gunfire in the night are all too usual[].

Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

. . .

Based upon our review of J.L., and the numerous cases with comparable facts, we conclude that the anonymous tip to the Covington police was insufficient to support the stop and frisk of the Defendant. The unidentified 911 caller, whose complaint was relayed to the various officers by dispatch, contained only an allegation that an armed individual was outside a particular room at the Baxter Motel. The content of the tip provided even less support for a stop and frisk than that in J.L., as there was no description of the suspect, much less "predictive information," which would allow police "to test the informant's knowledge or credibility." 529 U.S. at 271; ... Because of the lack of descriptive information, as in Massenburg, "the only link between the tip" and the Defendant was his proximity to Room 21. 654 F.3d at 486-87.9 In Gomes, the tip at issue was substantially more detailed than the one before this Court, including a description of the suspect's appearance, the make and color of his car, in addition to the allegation that he was "holding a gun in the air" in a high-crime area, 937 N.E.2d at 14, yet the court determined that it was insufficient. In comparison, the tip in this case falls far short of providing sufficiently probative information.

Defense counsel was ineffective for misapprehending the standard for motel operator consent to search a room in not filing a motion to suppress. But, defendant was not prejudiced because he couldn’t show here that he wouldn’t have gone through with it anyway and not pled guilty. Goins v. State, 397 S.C. 568, 726 S.E.2d 1 (2012):

Although the PCR court found that the police were in Goins' room to serve a warrant on the distribution charges, there is no evidence to support this finding in the record. Absent a warrant or exigent circumstances, the law is clear that a motel owner cannot lawfully consent to a search of a guest's room. However, in his PCR testimony as to why he advised against proceeding with the suppression hearing, counsel stated: "I told him in the suppression hearing that the law favored the landlord or basically that the proprietor of the motel being able to consent - - excuse me. Being able to unlock the door and let someone in." This unqualified statement is clearly inaccurate considering the search and seizure jurisprudence that specifically recognizes a landlord or motel owner does not enjoy an unfettered right to grant entry into the rented guest rooms of his establishment. We therefore agree with Goins that counsel informing him he could not have prevailed in the suppression hearing was erroneous and does not reflect "reasonable professional judgment. "

. . .

Although counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to properly advise Goins on the law regarding whether a motel owner can freely admit police into a rented room, Goins has failed to prove this advice was his reason for electing not to go to trial and has thus failed to establish prejudice. We therefore affirm the circuit court order denying Goins' PCR application.