Slate.com: Safe Data: Amending the Constitution to protect informational privacy by Adam Cohen:

When the National Security Agency spying scandal broke in 2005, it revealed that the government was engaged in a sweeping program of surveillance of its own citizens. As technology advances, the ability of the government to spy on ordinary Americans is growing rapidly. The government has sophisticated methods of intercepting phone calls and Internet traffic. And the FBI has just told Congress it wants to expand its ability to monitor Web-based communications, including Facebook and Twitter, in part by requiring these services to build special "back doors" for the government to use for monitoring. We are also being observed every day by spy cameras, throughout major cities and suburban shopping malls. The public has no way of knowing how much information the government is collecting and what it is being used for.

LATimes: Who's got your back online? by Michelle Maltais:

Twitter may be full of a bunch of followers, but the social networking site has proved itself a leader when it comes to protecting its users' privacy.

In an annual survey of who's got your back, the Electronic Frontier Foundation gave Twitter three and a half gold stars out of four. New to the list this year, Sonic.net was the only four-star company.

EFF examined the policies of 18 major Internet companies to assess whether they publicly commit to standing with users when the government seeks access to user data. The companies included email providers, ISPs, cloud-storage providers, and social networking sites.

Speaking of the "mosaic theory":

Most cell phone providers keep location data for a year. AT&T has it going back to 2008.
--Jim Harper, Director of Information Policy Studies, The Cato Institute (June 1, 2012)

As cells get smaller, the tracking data gets more accurate.
--Greg Najeim, Senior Counsel, Center for Democracy & Technology (June 1, 2012)

[I just added it up: There were 1572 posts to this website 6/1/11-5/31/12]

The Amvest Post, a private club, had an Ohio liquor license, and health inspectors showed up to investigate complaints of violation of the Ohio's Smoke Free Workplace Act, and they went into areas not open to the public. The entry and inspection did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the club was closely regulated under New York v. Burger. Amvets Post #711 v. Rutter, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74743 (N.D. Ohio May 30, 2012):

Ohio's Smoke Free Act authorizes warrantless administrative searches to protect its citizens against the well-documented dangers of and harms from secondhand smoke. The regulation complies with the requirements the Supreme Court set out in Burger. The Act, therefore, does not violate plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. Because defendants have not violated plaintiff's constitutional rights, they are entitled to dismissal of plaintiff's complaint.

[Note: The court does not differentiate between the liquor licensing authorities and the health department. The point of Burger is the expectation of privacy vis-a-vis one's license. What about inspections unrelated to the license, like here?]

Reasonableness for due process purposes can equal reasonableness for Fourth Amendment purposes. Kinnison v. City of San Antonio, 480 Fed. Appx. 271 (5th Cir. 2012):

"As the text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a government search is 'reasonableness.'" Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995). "[A] 'reasonableness' determination[] involves a balancing of all relevant factors," Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817 (1996), and for Fourth Amendment purposes generally "requires no more of government officials than that of due process of law. Both constitutional provisions recognize an exigency exception, and, thus, lead to no practical distinction in" the summary action context. Flatford v. City of Monroe, 17 F.3d 162, 170 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43 (1993)); see also Freeman, 242 F.3d at 652 (noting that Supreme Court precedent "forecasts, even if it does not compel, that a balancing of the public and private interests at stake will favor the public interest in nuisance abatement after the conclusion of adequate administrative proceedings" (citing GM Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977))).

We see no reason to depart from the general practice of tethering the outcome of the Fourth Amendment inquiry to whether the property deprivation offended due process. In light of the procedural due process analysis above, we conclude that the district court should not have granted summary judgment on Kinnison's Fourth Amendment claim. Cf. Samuels v. Meriwether, 94 F.3d 1163, 1168 (8th Cir. 1996) ("[A]n abatement carried out in accordance with procedural due process is reasonable in the absence of any factors that outweigh governmental interests.") (citations omitted).

Defendant was the suspect in a string of burglaries and thefts to support a drug habit, and the police went where he was staying to get consent. A guest’s backpack and shopping bag in a house could not be the subject of consent by the host. Commonwealth v. Magri, 462 Mass. 360, 968 N.E.2d 876 (2012):

Thus, the crucial question is whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his bags that were in Barnes's bedroom. It is well settled that an overnight guest maintains an expectation of privacy in luggage stored in a host's dwelling. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 332 F.3d 1163, 1167-1168 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Salinas-Cano, 959 F.2d 861, 864-865 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Wilson, 536 F.2d 883, 884-885 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 982 (1976). See also 4 W.R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.5(d), at 231-232 & n.104 (4th ed. 2004) ("Among the articles which it would seem would most commonly be deserving of the 'high expectation of privacy' label in the host-guest context would be the overnight bag or suitcase or similar object brought to the premises by the guest").

Although the bags in this case were not traditional luggage, there is no reasoned basis to draw a legal distinction between a guest's containers based on the materials from which they are made, their shape, or the mechanism by which they are closed. Cf. Commonwealth v. Linton, 456 Mass. 534, 557 (2010) (defendant held expectation of privacy in backpack he brought to his brother's house for extended visit). The Commonwealth makes no claim that the bags were not closed. We conclude that the defendant maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in both his backpack and the shopping bag.

“It light of Kellerman’s ‘words and gestures,’ the officers reasonably believed that Kellerman had consented to their entry into the basement. See Almeida-Perez, 549 F.3d at 1171 (‘Our circuit precedent ... has been more liberal about allowing police to form their impressions from context.’).” United States v. Derden, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74684 (D. Minn. April 16, 2012), adopted 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74218 (D. Minn. May 30, 2012).*

Defendant consented to the entry of her home by the police: “No, no, come in and look. No one is home.” She was arrested for resisting. United States v. Hernandez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74499 (W.D. N.C. April 16, 2012).*

A pre-Gant search in reliance on it was not subject to the exclusionary rule under Davis. Hinkle v. State, 86 So. 3d 441 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).*