Defendant’s stop for allegedly having struck an object in the roadway that did not affect the drivability of the car was unjustified. State v. Kurth, 813 N.W.2d 270 (Iowa 2012):

This case presents the question whether an officer is justified in activating his emergency lights and blocking a driver into a parking space under the "community caretaking function" exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment based solely upon his knowledge that the vehicle has just struck an object in the roadway and suffered minor damage not affecting the drivability of the car. We conclude that under these circumstances, the community caretaking exception is inapplicable, and the seizure was impermissible. For this reason, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand this case.

Tinted license plate cover was probable cause for a stop. State v. Tyler, 817 N.W.2d 495 (Iowa App. 2012).*

Four armed police officers and two security officers at the door for a knock-and-talk who moved forward when the door was opened was a coercive show of force making the consent involuntary. State v. Clark, 2012 Ohio 2058, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1806 (8th Dist. May 10, 2012):

[*P21] While accepting the trial court's findings of fact as true, we find that upon considering these factors, the totality of the circumstances in this case demonstrates that Clark did not voluntarily consent to the officers' entry into and search of his apartment. The record reflects that four police officers and two uniformed security officers were waiting for Clark when he opened his apartment door. Even discounting Clark's testimony that one of the officers had his gun drawn, we find the presence of six officers immediately outside Clark's apartment door to be an overwhelming show of force that was inherently coercive, especially if, as Det. Kreischer testified, the purpose of a "knock and talk" is simply to "engage a suspect in conversation."

[*P22] The record also reflects that when Clark opened the door, the officers immediately surged forward into the doorjamb, making it impossible for Clark to shut the door. This tactic could only be meant to intimidate Clark into letting the police into his apartment so they could observe any contraband, consistent with Det. Carpenter's testimony that the real purpose of a "knock and talk" is to develop probable cause and make an arrest.

. . .

[*P24] Based on the foregoing, we can only conclude that under the totality of the circumstances, any consent was the result of coercive police tactics, and not voluntarily given. "'Consent' that is the product of official intimidation or harassment is not consent at all. Citizens do not forfeit their constitutional rights when they are coerced to comply with a request that they would prefer to refuse." Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). Therefore, any evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless entry into and search of Clark's apartment should have been suppressed as tainted fruit of the poisonous tree and, accordingly, the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).

The officer had information about defendant usually being in possession of drugs when he was driving in town, and the officer saw him. Once the officer started following, defendant’s driving pattern of going in circles suggested evasion. Defendant tossed drugs when the lights came on and Tennessee law favors the defendant on that, but the existence of reasonable suspicion makes the stop reasonable. State v. Gibson, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 289 (May 8, 2012)*:

Additionally, we are compelled to address the State's and the trial court's mistaken reliance on California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1991), and State v. Baker, 966 S.W.2d 429 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997), for the proposition that Gibson could not challenge the admissibility of the drugs he dropped out of the car after O'Dell turned on his blue lights. The Tennessee Supreme Court has rejected the holding of Hodari D., making it, and our previous cases relying on it, inapplicable here. See State v. Randolph, 74 S.W.3d 330, 337 (Tenn. 2002).

The officer had probable cause to stop the defendant for DUI. State v. Padgett, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 291 (May 9, 2012).*

Defendant was stopped for following too close, and the driver exhibited signs he was under the influence of marijuana. Ultimately, a dog alerted. People v. Wofford, 969 N.E.2d 383, 2012 IL App (5th) 100138 (2012), Motion to Publish Granted May 9, 2012.*

New law review article: Suspicionless Searches of Public School Students: An Empirical Legal Analysis by Jason P. Nance forthcoming in the U. Colo. L. Rev. Abstract:

This Article presents an original empirical legal analysis of recent data from the U.S. Department of Education’s School Survey on Crime and Safety. The results of the analysis suggest that many public schools are violating students’ civil rights by conducting suspicionless, intrusive searches without valid justifications, such as having particularized evidence of a drug or weapons problem. Furthermore, the data indicate that many school officials may be using illegitimate criteria – most notably race – to determine whether to conduct those searches. For example, in schools that did not report any student violations relating to weapons, alcohol or drugs during the school year, schools with high minority populations were more than twice as likely to perform suspicionless, intrusive searches than schools with low minority populations. These findings hold true even when taking into account schools officials’ perceptions of the levels of crime where students live and where the school is located. The results underscore the importance of requiring school officials to provide particularized, objective evidence of a drug or weapons problem to justify these searches under the Fourth Amendment. Performing such searches without sufficient justification violates a fundamental civil right in the very institution where children should be educated about good citizenship. Schools cannot expect students to learn important constitutional principles when school authorities disregard them.