New Yorker: Here’s Looking at You; Should we worry about the rise of the drone? by Nick Paumgarten:

ABSTRACT: THE WORLD OF SURVEILLANCE about drones. The prospect of unmanned flight has been around—depending on your definition—since Archytas of Tarentum reputedly designed a steam-powered mechanical pigeon, in the fourth century B.C., or since Nikola Tesla, in 1898, demonstrated a radio-controlled motorboat at an exposition in Madison Square Garden. By the sixties the Air Force was deploying unmanned reconnaissance jets over Southeast Asia. Still, it was the advent, in the mid-nineties, of the Global Positioning System, along with advances in microcomputing, that ushered in the possibility of automated unmanned flight. The Department of Defense, meanwhile, developed a keen interest. With the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and manhunts in places like Yemen, the military applications, and the corporations devoted to serving them (Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman), came to dominate the skyscape. Many of these manufacturers had one client: the Department of Defense. In 2001, the military had just a few Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (U.A.V.s). Now it has more than ten thousand. Later this month, the F.A.A. will present a regulatory regimen enabling law-enforcement departments to fly small drones, and the military contractors will suddenly have some eighteen thousand potential new customers. As of now, only a tiny percentage of municipal and state police departments have any air presence, because most can’t afford helicopters or planes. Small camera-loaded U.A.V.s are much cheaper. The public proposition, at this point, anyway, is not that drones will subjugate or assassinate unwitting citizens but that they will conduct search-and-rescue operations, fight fires, catch bad guys, inspect pipelines, spray crops, count nesting cranes and migrating caribou, and measure weather data and algae growth. For these and other tasks, they are useful and well suited. Of course, they are especially well suited, and heretofore have been most frequently deployed, for surveillance.

“No more than reasonable suspicion is required to search a parolee's home when the search is conducted pursuant to a valid parole condition.” State v. Heaton, 812 N.W.2d 904 (Minn. App. 2012).*

Defendant was stopped for a turn lane violation. Defendant’s detention was based on the fact that he would not make direct eye contact, his eyes were red and glassy, he was looking around the vehicle, and he acted somewhat suspicious. This led the officer to believe that he might be engaged in criminal activity. State v. Aguirre, 2012 Ohio 2014, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1765 (3d Dist. May 7, 2012).*

Defendant has the burden of showing that the search warrant was issued without probable cause. Evaluating all the information, there was a substantial basis for concluding there was probable cause. State v. Fruge, 95 So. 3d 1112 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2012).*

To apply a Davis good faith exception to an officer’s interpretation of the statute, it has to be correct and in accord with existing case law that thereafter changed. If the officer is wrong on application of the statute, that’s a mistake of law and any good faith exception would not apply. United States v. Gore, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64784 (D. S.C. May 9, 2012).*

Officers approached defendant outside a store and got her ID to run a “local check” finding no warrants. They let her go but watched her walk and then decided to encounter her again, having her back against a wall and officers to both sides. A reasonable person would not have felt free to leave, and this was a Terry stop without justification. Defendant had the burden of showing that this was a seizure, and she satisfied it. State v. Young, 167 Wn. App. 922, 275 P.3d 1150 (2012).*

COA (2253(c)) in a 2254 denied on petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim. The contention that the free standing Fourth Amendment claim was decided wrongly by state courts is barred under Stone v. Powell and AEDPA. McIntyre v. McKune, 480 Fed. Appx. 486 (10th Cir. 2012):

Unlike the situation in Gamble, however, there is no indication that the Kansas courts refused to recognize or apply the correct legal standards in this case. McIntyre's belief that the state courts decided the claim wrongly does not mean that he was denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate. See Matthews v. Workman, 577 F.3d 1175, 1194 (10th Cir. 2009). He was able to brief his arguments, and the trial court held a hearing on whether to hold a Franks hearing. At that hearing, in addition to concluding that a Franks hearing was not warranted, the trial court held that the omissions were not material. McIntyre's counsel declined to raise suppression in his direct criminal appeal, but the Kansas Court of Appeals allowed McIntyre to file a pro se supplemental brief challenging the denial of suppression. After the Kansas Court of Appeals specifically acknowledged the pro se brief and stated that the arguments were meritless, McIntyre again on direct appeal was able to file a pro se petition for review to place the issue before the Kansas Supreme Court. No reasonable jurist would find it debatable whether McIntyre had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim in the Kansas courts.2 See Miranda v. Cooper, 967 F.2d 392, 401 (10th Cir. 1992) (concluding that defendant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate, even though he did not receive a Franks hearing).

The fact there were innocent explanations for what was described in the application for the search warrant does not undermine probable cause. The showing as to one of the searches was not supported and was thus waived. United States v. Durham, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65126 (S.D. Ind. May 9, 2012):

Mr. Durham's motion also purports to challenge the fruits of a search warrant issued in Ohio. [See dkt. 153 at 1.] He has not provided the Court with a copy of that warrant, its application, or with any argument specifically addressing the legal and factual circumstances for that warrant (including, for example, an explanation of the extent of his reasonable expectation of privacy there). Those failures constitute a waiver of any argument that he may have had, for lack of cogent development. E.g., Kawasaki Heavy Indus. v. Bombardier Rec. Prods., 660 F.3d 988, 994 n.3 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

Inmate telephone calls out of a federal prison are recorded, and recording and listening to one is not an illegal search. United States v. Bassett, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65068 (E.D. Mo. April 13, 2012).*

Narcotics officers executing two search warrants at a motel were justified in detaining those around the scene for officer safety. “The record in this case fully supports the determination that the initial detention of Thompson was a valid investigatory stop. The officers were engaged in executing narcotics search warrants, "... the kind of transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy evidence." Summers, 452 U.S. at 702, 101 S.Ct. at 2594. Moreover, Agent Parker's testimony that guns are frequently used in narcotic trafficking is a factor which increases the possibility of danger to the officers.” State v. Thompson, 93 So. 3d 553 (La. 2012), revg 58 So.3d 994 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2011).

An officer at a sobriety checkpoint observed a vehicle abruptly pull into a parking lot of closed businesses. He went to investigate, and defendant’s vehicle pulled in, too. The police car blocked the exit. This was a stop without reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, and it was not consensual. Jones v. State, 291 Ga. 35, 727 S.E.2d 456, 729 S.E.2d 428 (2012).*

The search warrant for defendant’s cell phone was based on probable cause, and the nine months between transactions did not make it stale here. The good faith exception also applies. United States v. Sinclair, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63864 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2012).*