Any illegality in the initial traffic detention was attenuated by defendant's probation search condition. Although the patdown search and discovery of the gun occurred shortly after the traffic detention, they did not occur until after the officer had recognized defendant as a person subject to a search condition. The search condition supplied legal authorization to search that was completely independent of the circumstances leading to the traffic stop. Nor was there any flagrancy or purposefulness to the alleged unlawful conduct by the officer. While the trial court found that the stop was made without reasonable suspicion, it specifically found the officer did not act in an arbitrary, capricious, or harassing manner. The officer was aware of defendant's probation condition before the search, and the existence of that probation condition dissipated any taint that might flow from the detention. People v. Durant, 205 Cal. App. 4th 57, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 103 (1st Dist. 2012).

Defendant was a corrections officer, and that helps show he voluntarily consented. United States v. Francis, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54244 (W.D. Ark. March 29, 2012).

The stop should have ended when the officer gave a warning ticket, and he was made to stand in the rain while the officer continued on his investigative mission. United States v. Culp, 860 F. Supp. 2d 459 (W.D. Mo. 2012)*:

Here, the unfolding of the circumstances makes the detention much more akin to a prolonged investigatory expedition with the singular mission of searching Defendant's vehicle than a permissible course of action reasonably directed toward the proper ends of the stop. The parties agree that the purpose of the traffic stop was concluded, at the latest, once Gillespie made the decision to only give Defendant a warning and not issue him a ticket, and so informed Defendant, returning his belongings, and asked Defendant if he had any questions. It was only after that point, that Gillespie embarked on an extensive course of investigation and questions aimed at conducting a search. ...

Although Gillespie testified that he had already decided not to issue Defendant a ticket for "following too closely" and only give him a warning, he nonetheless returned to the driver's side of Defendant's vehicle, directed Defendant to get out of the car and had him move to the back of the vehicle, where he was further detained while Gillespie pursued a mission entirely separate from the underlying traffic violation. It is clear from the video recording that Defendant remained there, standing in the rain, at Gillespie's behest, and would not have thought he was free to leave. Certainly, had Defendant believed that this was a mere consensual encounter at this point, he would not have remained in the pouring rain, in his shirt sleeves, while Gillespie ambled on with questions.

As the Sixth Circuit noted in Everett, "the touchstone of any Fourth Amendment analysis is reasonableness." 601 F.3d at 494. The Court "must conduct a fact-bound, context-dependent inquiry in each case." Id. Having fully considered the circumstances as they unfolded during the stop, as viewed on the video recordings, in conjunction with Gillespie's testimony, the Court finds no acceptable purpose for Gillespie's extended detention and prolonged questioning of Defendant, pat-down, and persistent requests to search the vehicle, all after the purpose of the traffic stop had undisputedly ended.

The officer had reasonable grounds to detain defendant. Tasering him was a seizure because the barbs in the Taser connected them. United States v. Davis, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54346 (E.D. Tenn. March 29, 2012).* [Remember, Taser® is a trademark.]

Defendant’s 2255 argument that defense counsel was ineffective for not arguing invalid inventory rather than search incident wouldn’t work because there was justification for an inventory, too. Brunick v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55096 (D. Ore. April 19, 2012).*

Even if defendant’s car was blocked on a parking lot, it didn’t rise to a seizure. But, the USPS Postal Inspectors had reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in the theft of mail from their observations. United States v. Hampton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54421 (N.D. Ga. March 5, 2012).*

Searching a vehicle to “secure” it absent exigent circumstances was unreasonable. State v. Cleveland, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 3070 (Tex. App. – Houston (14th Dist.) April 19, 2012):

Likewise, here, the plain-view exception does not apply because, as in Keehn, the officers had no lawful right to access the object in appellee's truck absent exigent circumstances. See id. Our review of the record reveals no exigent circumstance capable of supporting Jones's seizure of the pills. Jones stated that at the time he entered the vehicle to seize the pills, "everyone was secured" and in police custody. Thus, there was no opportunity for any of the people at the scene to drive the vehicle away or dispose of any evidence while the officers were securing a search warrant. The State asserts that the "exigent circumstance" present here was the automobile exception. But as discussed above, this ground was not raised in the trial court. Thus, we may not consider it for the first time on appeal as a basis to reverse the trial court's orders. See Martinez, 91 S.W.3d 331. Under these circumstances, we overrule the State's sole issue on appeal.

Officers were questioning two others about bringing money to Puerto Rico to allegedly buy drugs. Defendant interjected himself into that conversation and raised reasonable suspicion as to himself. United States v. Hammonds, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54466 (M.D. Pa. April 18, 2012).*

Officers had probable cause for defendant’s vehicle stop, so whether there was a traffic stop was irrelevant. United States v. Sierra-Rodriguez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54069 (E.D. Mich. April 17, 2012).*

There was a serial rapist working the town, and the police were on the lookout because he may have been spotted. Defendant’s car was the only car in the area late at night. State v. Burdick, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 229 (April 18, 2012).*

Daily Sentinel: Juror: Fourth Amendment played minor role in Lawyer case: Trooper's actions reasonable under the circumstances, he says by Paul Shockley:

Two jurors who sat in judgment of Colorado State Patrol Trooper Ivan “Gene” Lawyer said Fourth Amendment principles had either too much emphasis by the prosecution, or little bearing on the main issues at play in the trooper’s trial.

Lawyer was acquitted Thursday on four counts, including criminally negligent homicide and first-degree criminal trespass. Two other counts, including second-degree assault with recklessness, were left undecided by a deadlocked jury.