BLT: D.C. Judge Weighs Constitutional Challenge to 'Post and Forfeit' by Zoe Tillman:

U.S. District Judge Amy Berman Jackson heard arguments today about whether a legal challenge to a controversial post-arrest procedure in the District of Columbia known as "post and forfeit" should survive a motion to dismiss.

Under "post and forfeit," a person arrested for certain low-level offenses in D.C. can post collateral and then agree to forfeit it in exchange for having the case essentially dropped. The Metropolitan Police Department has come under scrutiny in the past amid concerns that officers used "post and forfeit" to quickly close and cover up wrongful arrests.

Indiana Law Blog: Ind. Law -- Gov. signs SEA 1, the right to defend against unlawful entry

A news release just received:

Tuesday evening, Governor Daniels signed SEA 1, titled “Right to defend against unlawful entry.” He issued the following statement about his decision to sign the bill:

“After close inspection, I have decided to sign Senate Enrolled Act 1. Contrary to some impressions, the bill strengthens the protection of Indiana law enforcement officers by narrowing the situations in which someone would be justified in using force against them. Senate Enrolled Act 1 puts into place a two-part test before a person can use deadly force against a law enforcement officer: First, it clarifies and restates the current requirement that a person reasonably believe the law enforcement officer is acting unlawfully. Second, it adds that the force must be reasonably necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to the citizen. This second requirement is not part of the current law.

“Moreover, unless a person is convinced an officer is acting unlawfully, he cannot use any force of any kind. In the real world, there will almost never be a situation in which these extremely narrow conditions are met. ..."

The Act is to counter the Indiana Supreme Court's Barnes case, posted here.

Update: IndyStar.com: Indiana's new "right to resist" law worries police:

Gov. Mitch Daniels is warning Hoosiers that a new Indiana law meant to protect citizens from an illegal intrusion by police is no green light to resist law enforcement.

Police, though, fear it will lead to just that.

While the 911 calls did not say that there was a domestic disturbance in progress, the officer could reasonably assume that when he arrived and assessed the situation, and that was exigency for an entry on these facts. United States v. Ladeaux, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37251 (D. S.D. March 16, 2012).*

Defendant lost on his arrest issue on the merits on appeal, so he can’t pursue it on a 2255. Martinez v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36781 (D. S.D. March 19, 2012).*

Officers had reasonable suspicion first from a CI tip that “Little Rob” was dealing meth from a red F-150. They later learned that it was defendant. Then, another officer in an “ongoing investigation” [never telling us the quality of this information] told this officer that defendant would be delivering meth and they set up surveillance. This was reasonable suspicion when defendant showed up. The traffic stop was reasonable based on a traffic offense. United States v. Harrelson, 465 Fed. Appx. 866 (11th Cir. 2012) (unpublished).* [This case essentially says that a search on reasonable suspicion was proper because it never says there was probable cause for the search of the vehicle after the stop on reasonable suspicion or the traffic offense. If that’s what it means, it’s wrong. This may just be sloppy writing.]

Defendant was in a car that was stopped and the police had probable cause. They made her leave her purse behind. When the warrant issued, the purse could be searched because it was with the car, for which there was probable cause. State v. Campbell, 166 Wn. App. 464, 272 P.3d 859 (2011), Order Granting Motion to Publish 165 Wn. App. 1021, 2011 Wash. App. LEXIS 2915 (Wash. Ct. App., Dec. 29, 2011):

Circumstances can exist where probable cause may exist for a search of an individual's property even though officers do not have equivalent probable cause that the owner of the property is involved in crime. Cf. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556-57, 98 S. Ct. 1970, 56 L. Ed. 2d 525 (1978) (Fourth Amendment does not prevent issuance of a warrant to search property simply because the owner or possessor is not reasonably suspected of criminal involvement); see also 2 Wayne R. Lafave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 4.10(b) at 747-48 (4th ed. 2004) (distinguishing entitlement to search a visitor's belongings where police have grounds to believe items sought in the warrant might be concealed there). Both Worth and Hill implicitly recognize that personal property belonging to someone other than the owner of premises can be subject to a warrant for a premises search where probable cause exists and the scope of a warrant is accordingly broad: Worth's holding depends on its reasoning that no probable cause brought Worth's purse within the scope of the warrant. Hill's holding that “generally officers have no authority under a premises warrant to search personal effects an individual is wearing or holding” implies that sometimes they do. 123 Wn.2d at 644 (emphasis added).

The search warrant was for marijuana, cocaine, and paraphernalia, but there was only probable cause for marijuana, so the remainder is excised from the warrant. Nevertheless, the police were properly in defendant’s home on the warrant, and they could seize other drugs in plain view and as inevitable discovery. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 2012 PA Super 65, 40 A.3d 1245 (2012).

Two people lived at defendant’s house besides him, and one of the others granted consent. There was no reason to doubt their authority to consent. Smallfoot v. State, 2012 WY 39, 272
P.3d 314 (2012).*

The district judge does not need to say that a de novo review was done because it is presumed that it was. Defendant was removed from the house and another officer stayed behind to ask about others in the house, and then a plain view occurred. It was reasonable. United States v. Ginn, 465 Fed. Appx. 585 (8th Cir. 2012) (unpublished).*