Attenuation was found with a two hour delay, (unnecessary) Miranda warnings, defendant counseling with his father on his cell phone who told him not to cooperate, and finally thinking about his predicament for at least an hour. United States v. Conrad, 673 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2012)*:

If ordered, suppression of unconstitutionally obtained evidence can permit "[t]he criminal ... to go free because the constable has blundered." People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.). Given a blunder that the Government does not dispute here, Defendant David Conrad argues that the district court should have suppressed all the evidence of child pornography that was recovered following an illegal entry into his father's home. As we explain below, however, the district court correctly denied exclusion of evidence obtained from Mr. Conrad's own home—an hour's drive away from the home that had been illegally entered and which Mr. Conrad authorized the Government to search. That evidence was sufficiently attenuated from the original illegal entry so as to have been purged of the unconstitutional taint.

. . .

Consistent with existing precedent, the district court identified intervening circumstances that favored attenuation: Mr. Conrad's repeated consents to search and his waiver of Miranda rights (which law enforcement was not even required to give because he was not in custody), about two hours after the underlying constitutional violation and in a completely different location. As for the different location, we note that in contrast to cases where no attenuation was found after the defendant was taken, for example, to a police station, e.g., Taylor, 457 U.S. 687, here Mr. Conrad volunteered to go from his family home, a location where, according to the unchallenged findings of the district court, he "was undoubtedly comfortable," Conrad, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 1037, to a location that was as yet unknown to the agents, the Chicago Apartment. He was likely as or more comfortable there, and thus in a better position to decide whether to stand on his constitutional rights there. Furthermore, because the Chicago Apartment was independently protected under the Fourth Amendment, extending the scope of the exclusion would have little additional deterrent effect. Cf. Harris, 495 U.S. at 20 ("Even though we decline to suppress statements made outside the home following a Payton violation, the principal incentive to obey Payton still obtains: the police know that a warrantless entry will lead to the suppression of any evidence found, or statements taken, inside the home. If we did suppress statements like Harris', moreover, the incremental deterrent value would be minimal.").

Although the district court did not explicitly rely on it for this second factor, we also attach particular significance to another, rather unusual, circumstance. Mr. Conrad not only could use his cell phone to obtain advice about his predicament, but he actually did—and was, as the district court found, specifically told by his father "not to talk to the officers." Conrad, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 1025. While he suggests that his decision to ignore that advice was in recognition that he had already confessed to so much that he had no choice but to continue, the district court found, and he does not contest, that his statements were voluntary. Id. at 1036-37. The voluntariness of his statements—made despite superfluous Miranda warnings, a specific warning from his father, and after an hour to think in the car and twenty minutes to think while tending to his cats and showing off music equipment—help establish that his conduct at the Chicago Apartment was "sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963) (footnote omitted).

Officer’s waiting for backup to arrive before doing frisk of occupants of the car was not a separate seizure requiring a new analysis of reasonable suspicion. United States v. Boone, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33914 (W.D. N.C. March 8, 2012).

This started as a motorist assist and ended up as a warning ticket. The whole thing took nine minutes, which was not unreasonably long. As defendant was leaving, the officer asked if he could ask some additional questions, and that led to a valid consent. The granting of the motion to suppress was reversed. People v. Kats, 967 N.E.2d 335, 2012 IL App (3d) 100683, 359 Ill. Dec. 605 (2012).*

“The 911 hang-up call, combined with the lack of answer on the return and Defendant's overtly aggressive and hostile behavior and refusal to answer basic questions, provided a reasonable basis for the officers to conduct a protective sweep of the house to ensure that no one inside was in need of immediate help. While Defendant had a right to respond as he did, this nevertheless did not dispel the officers' concern for the safety of the occupants.” United States v. Obbanya, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33627 (N.D. Cal. March 13, 2012).*

A police request to “take a look” in a car or to “check” it for contraband does not include looking in locked containers. Here, the officer did take a look, then took the keys and unlocked the glove compartment finding a gun. That exceeded the consent. The state's burden in a consent case is "heavy," and here not met. People v. McFarlane, 2012 NY Slip Op 01754, 939 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1st Dept. 2012):

Here, the officer's request to "take a look" into the car or "check" it for contraband could reasonably have been understood to be a request to search the vehicle, possibly to include closed containers, but it did not reasonably imply a request for permission to open the locked glove compartment (cf. People v Gomez, 5 NY3d 416, 418-419, 838 N.E.2d 1271, 805 N.Y.S.2d 24 [2005] [general consent to search car did not authorize breaking into hidden compartment]). That the officer subjectively intended to search the glove compartment when he made the request is not determinative. Normally, a locked container can only be opened by breaking into it or using a key. A reasonable person in defendant's situation would have assumed that if the officer wanted to open the glove compartment with defendant's consent he would have asked for the key or asked defendant to open it. The officer did neither; after checking the seats and the center console, he simply took the keys from the ignition and opened the glove compartment.

In a probation search, the government must first have probable cause to believe the home is the defendant’s, a fact not in dispute in this case. This search was based on a CI saying that defendant was involved in a homicide, but the CI’s track record and information was clearly lacking. A shotgun was found at defendant’s house. A California probation search, however, can be suspicionless, so the gun was not suppressed after all. United States v. King, 672 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2012).

Where defendant’s father signed a consent to search form, his mother’s refusal to sign because she disagreed with the search was not binding on the police. Brunetti v. Comm'r of Corr., 134 Conn. App. 160, 37 A.3d 811 (2012).*

A “road closed” sign is a traffic control device, and disobeying it justified a stop. State v. Morrissey, 19 Neb. App. 590, 2012 Neb. App. LEXIS 52 (March 13, 2012).*