Volokh: Are Historical Cell-Site Data Protected Under the Fourth Amendment After United States v. Jones? by Orin Kerr:

No, concludes Judge Bennett in United States v. Graham (District of Maryland, March 1, 2012). Judge Bennett concludes that historical cell-site records are not protected because they fall under the third-party doctrine: ...

[posted here, too].

“This is an appeal asking that we overrule State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992), and hold that the Leon good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to violations of Article I, section 17, of the Idaho Constitution. Because the State has not shown any ground for doing so, we decline to overrule that case and affirm the order of the district court suppressing evidence obtained incident to an arrest pursuant to a wrongly issued warrant.” Considering state case law, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule in State v Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254 P. 788 (1927), and the good faith exception was not adopted in Guzman. State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 272 P.3d 483 (2012).

Officers responded to an alleged burglary call, but they found that a tenant was removing stuff, and there was no burglary. Defendant asked to get a cigarette, and the officer said no because of “officer safety,” but she reached into her purse and pulled out a cigarette pack which the officer took away from her and laid it down. After awhile the officer looked in the cigarette pack and found a glass pipe, so he then searched her purse. The search of the cigarette package could not be justified for officer safety which, the officer said, was based on his experience with prostitutes and drug addicts having sharp objects in there, which this case wasn’t. Also, his casual after-the-fact search of the cigarette package belied the “officer safety” rationale. Finally, the state’s failure to raise an expectation of privacy argument in the trial court is a waiver on appeal [not that it would have worked anyway]. State v. Johnson, 293 Kan. 959, 270 P.3d 1135 (2012).

Officers approached an already parked car, and they did not need reasonable suspicion to do that. When defendant got out of the car and reached for his pocket, officers were justified in a patdown because of information from an informant. State v. Ray, 2012 Ohio 840, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 733 (2d Dist. March 2, 2012).*

Plaintiff was “confined” when she was strip and body cavity searched, so the state one year limitations applied, and this suit was not timely. Bing v. Haywood, 283 Va. 381, 2012 Va. LEXIS 40 (March 2, 2012).*

There was actual authority to consent to a search by the consenter, although she did not have a working key to the front door, she did to the back. Alternatively, the court finds that it was reasonable for officers to believe in her apparent authority to consent. Finally, even if the information derived from that entry were excised from the application for the search warrant, there still would be probable cause for issuance. United States v. Taitano, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27489 (D. Guam February 17, 2012).*

Defendant’s guilty plea waived his illegal search claim, so defense counsel was not shown to be ineffective for not challenging the search before the guilty plea. Schniepp v. State, 2012 Ark. 94, 2012 Ark. LEXIS 108 (March 1, 2012).*

Neither defendant had standing to challenge the search of the car: the passenger because he was a passenger and the driver showing no connection to having it with permission of the owner. They did have standing to challenge the stop, and there was cause for the stop for wandering within a lane. United States v. Perez-Guerrero, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27365 (D. Kan. March 2, 2012).*

A dog alert on a car justifies a search of the trunk. A new Fourth Amendment issue raised in a reply brief is waived. United States v. Greene, 468 Fed. Appx. 303 (4th Cir. 2012) (unpublished):

Greene's second argument — that the search of the trunk was outside the scope of a warrantless search — is likewise meritless. See Kelly, 592 F.3d at 589-90 ("The scope of a search pursuant to [the automobile] exception is as broad as a magistrate could authorize. Thus, once police have probable cause, they may search 'every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.'") (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (citation omitted)).

Information from Medivac crew was sufficient to provide probable cause defendant was under the influence when he was taken to the hospital after a wreck. Crowe v. State, 314 Ga. App. 527, 724 S.E.2d 831 (2012).*

A Wii stolen in a burglary had the victim’s Netflix account, and the police were able to track the Netflix use back to defendant’s IP address. That was sufficient nexus for a search warrant for the premises, and it also was not stale. United States v. Medel, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27410 (C.D. Cal. February 29, 2012).*

The protective sweep here was legal. But, even if it wasn’t, the person consenting didn’t know about it, so the consent was not tainted by the sweep. United States v. Gomez-Rivero, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (N.D. Ga. 2012).*

As a mere passenger, defendant had no standing to challenge the inventory search of the car. State v. Parker, 2012 Ohio 839, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 730 (2d Dist. March 2, 2012).*

Officers saw a van parked in an industrial area around noon on Sunday, and they approached because that was unusual. Defendant would not roll down the window and reached under the seat, and that justified a protective search of where he was reaching. State v. Rose, 814 N.W.2d 622 (Iowa App. 2012).*

In this circuit the good faith exception is considered first, and the affidavit for the warrant is not so lacking in probable cause that the good faith exception would not apply. United States v. Oldaker, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25788 (N.D. W.Va. February 16, 2012).*