“[T]he Court finds that the warrantless entry into the apartment was justified based on the fact that there was a violent altercation in the apartment, evidence of blood on people, the entrance, and inside the apartment and based on the information that individuals — including several children — and a firearm were said to be still inside. See Flores-Castaneda, 384 Fed. Appx. at 367; see also United States v. Rodriguez, 601 F.3d 402, 408 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that ‘domestic disputes often involve high emotions and can quickly escalate to violence’).” United States v. Fuentes, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153004 (E.D. Tex. November 10, 2011).*

Based on collective knowledge, officers had reasonable suspicion that a Honda and a cargo van driving in tandem from one place to another were hauling drugs in the van. The collective knowledge doctrine applies to reasonable suspicion. United States v. Montero, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153022 (W.D. Ky. November 1, 2011).*

Pulling up behind a car with just headlights on and the officer knocking on the window does not communicate that the person is not free to leave. State v. Randle, 152 Idaho 860, 276 P.3d 732 (App. 2012),* Review denied by State v. Randle, 2012 Ida. LEXIS 132 (Idaho, May 22, 2012).

USMJ finds that officer was not credible because the proof at the suppression hearing was developed by leading questions, and the officer seemed to have little independent recollection of the stop, needing to repeatedly look at this file. Also, there was a proven embellishment in the reports. United States v. Northington, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153029 (E.D. N.C. November 29, 2011):

Further detracting, at least to some degree, from Daughtry's credibility is the fact that various portions of the direct examination of him were leading in character. (Id., e.g., 14:21; 15:8-10; 18:3-4; 18:15-17; 19:7-8; 19:10-11; 21:7; 21:15-17; 30:13-15; 30:20-21). In addition, Daughtry repeatedly looked at his report for the first two-thirds of his direct examination before the questioning was stopped and Daughtry provided time to review it. (Id. 21:23 to 22:16). The inference, of course, is that Daughtry lacked a strong, if any, independent recollection of the events about which he was being examined.

The court concludes that Daughtry is not a reliable source of information regarding the stop of defendant. As discussed, his lack of credibility is shown by a broad range of factors, including the implausibility of certain statements he made, the inconsistency of his conduct with certain statements, the inconsistency of his testimony with his report and/or the ATF Letter, the inconsistency of portions of his testimony with other portions, the inconsistency of his testimony with portions of Johnson's testimony, omissions from his report, and other factors. Some of the statements shown to lack credibility relate to facts central to the question of reasonable suspicion and their unreliability therefore directly undermines the government's case on that issue. But the other statements are also material to reasonable suspicion because they shed light on Daughtry's overall credibility.

Similarly, there are statements by Daughtry that do not themselves bear indicia of unreliability and there is some evidence tending to support Daughtry's credibility, such as Johnson's corroboration of Daughtry's testimony that defendant was acting erratically (see id. 92:10-21). However, the number of statements that do bear such indicia, the significance of many of these statements to the issue of reasonable suspicion, and the underlying deficiencies in veracity the demonstrably noncredible statements reveal, such as possible misperceptions, deficient memory, and embellishment, render all of Daughtry's statements unreliable. Given the government's reliance on Daughtry's statements to support its case on reasonable suspicion, his lack of credibility precludes the government from establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that reasonable suspicion existed. Defendant's motion to suppress should accordingly be allowed.

This case isn't really precedent for anything, but it is significant for all of us to see how this court discounted testimony when the government carries the burden of proving reasonable suspicion because of "possible misperceptions, deficient memory, and embellishment." Look, officers: you don't need to embellish. Your truthful testimony will usually carry the day. If it doesn't, too bad; you were operating on a hunch. Having made the arrest, you felt you had to follow through to bring some "bad guy" to justice. The ADA or AUSA, however, took your reports at face value, as they are expected to. When you had to be led through the testimony, the AUSA here should have seen this coming. And, AUSA's, don't lead. Let the case collapse of its own weight. You got the indictment, but you don't own this case. Also, this was a Federal Defender case.

Where defendant was under state probation that included a search term and he was revoked and put back on probation with new conditions and no express search term, California law precluded a search term under such circumstances. United States v. Silva, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152967 (N.D. Cal. March 7, 2011).*

Plaintiff was believed to have purchased t-posts for his property with a stolen check. Some were installed on his property and some were in his truck when he was stopped. They were in plain view, and the officer had probable cause for the seizure. Thompson v. City of Shawnee, 464 Fed. Appx. 720 (10th Cir. 2012).*

Defendant was felony fleeing from officers and stopped and attempted to hide. He was arrested, and his car was properly impounded after his arrest. United States v. Scott, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14053 (W.D. Mo. January 5, 2012).*