Where only vehicle around was the police officer in front of defendant, defendant's failure to use a signal might have affected that vehicle, so it justified a stop. The undisputed evidence was that the police car was the only car around. Mitchell v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 128 (February 8, 2012).* [I find this laughable. The court is straining so hard it loses its credibility as an institution.]

Defendant’s trash search was valid, and that led to a search warrant with probable cause. United States v. Rodgers, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13865 (E.D. N.C. February 06, 2012).*

Defendant ran a stop sign, recorded by the dashcam, and fled when the officer tried to stop him. When finally stopped, the officer validly saw drugs in the car in plain view. Defendant’s pro se motion to suppress denied. United States v. Scott, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14053 (W.D. Mo. January 6, 2012).*

Defendant’s roommate consented to an entry by officer to look around for the defendant who was alleged to be an unregistered sex offender. The officer looked in a grey bag that was suppressed. As to a shelf, however, the court declines to find getting a stepladder to look on the shelf was an unreasonable search. Add to that the roommate’s getting the stepladder. The box of ammunition proclaimed its contents, and it was validly seized under plain view. United States v. Tolbert, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14287 (E.D. Wis. February 7, 2012):

It is true that, ordinarily, the police must obtain a warrant before opening a closed container because, by concealing the contents from plain view, the possessor creates a reasonable expectation of privacy. United States v. Banks, 514 F.3d 769, 773 (8th Cir. 2008). “However, like objects that sit out in the open, the contents of some containers are treated similarly to objects in plain view.” Id. Courts have held that containers which permit one to infer their contents based on their outward appearance are not entitled to full Fourth Amendment protection. Id. (citing Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764-65 n.13 (1979) (“Not all containers and packages found by police during the course of a search will deserve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, some containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance.”), overruled on other grounds by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991)); United States v. Meada, 408 F.3d 14, 23 (1st Cir. 2005) (collecting cases holding that containers which betray their contents are treated as being in plain view); United States v. Miller, 929 F.2d 364, 364-65 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that no warrant was required to search a bag whose size and shape suggested it contained a gun). Individuals possess a lesser expectation of privacy in the contents of such containers when the container is observed from a lawful vantage point. Banks, 514 F.3d at 774.

In the present case, the boxes Decker saw proclaimed their contents -- Remington ammunition. While it might be theoretically possible that the boxes contained something else, there is certainly a reasonable likelihood that they contained bullets. Because ammunition, possessed by a felon, is evidence of a crime, Decker lawfully seized these boxes. See Banks, 514 F.3d at 775-76.

. . .

Second, even if Decker used a stool to observe and photograph the ammunition, I cannot conclude that this exceeded the scope of Warren’s consent. While a person’s failure to object should not be construed as expanding the scope of consent, the court may properly consider silence in understanding what it is she allowed the police to do. Thus, while I agree with the magistrate judge that Warren’s acquiescence to Decker’s looking through the gray bag cannot bring that search within the ambit of her consent, her apparent agreement in Decker’s use of a stool to photograph the bedroom is something else. Indeed, it appears that Warren may have fetched the stool for Decker, which suggests that she did not see this as outside the scope of what she agreed he could do.

Democracy Now: Ramarley Graham: NYPD Slays Unarmed Black Teen as Outrage Over Targeting of People of Color Grows:

The New York City Police Department is under mounting criticism after police shoot dead an unarmed teenager inside his own home. Eighteen-year-old Ramarley Graham was shot at close range in his parents’ apartment in the Bronx after being chased into the house by narcotics detectives. Police said they found marijuana in the home and think Graham may have been trying to flush some down the toilet. The NYPD is coming under criticism not only for shooting Graham, but also for its broader "stop-and-frisk" policy, which critics say disproportionately targets people of color. On Monday, about 500 protesters rallied in the Bronx to condemn the police treatment of black youth. We speak to Jamel Mims, an organizer with the Stop Mass Incarceration Network, which is working to end the practice of stop-and-frisk; and Nicholas Peart, who is serving as a witness in a federal class action lawsuit challenging "stop-and frisk" as racist and unconstitutional.

During this stop with reasonable suspicion, the defendant wanted cigarettes and the officer was permitted to go into the car after them, seeing crack cocaine in plain view. United States v. Scott, 463 Fed. Appx. 216 (4th Cir. 2012) (unpublished).*

Defendant’s claim that the government coerced him to provide the password to his cell phone has no support in the record at all. He was only asked his phone number when he was booked. United States v. Askew, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152781 (W.D. Ky. December 2, 2011).*

Officers had both reasonable suspicion for a stop and saw a traffic violation. Approaching the vehicle, the officer smelled fresh marijuana, and that was probable cause. United States v. Salcido-Guzman, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152791 (W.D. Ky. October 28, 2011).*

The officer’s observation of defendant stopping nearly in the middle of an intersection and almost hitting mailboxes was reasonable suspicion for his stop. State v. Napier, 2012 Ohio 394, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 338 (9th Dist. February 6, 2012).*