Detectives testified that they were responding to a police report of harassment at defendant's residence when they viewed him through his front window engaging in drug trafficking. At the suppression hearing, the detectives each testified that they believed entry into defendant's apartment was necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence. However, there was no indication that any marijuana or other evidence was being destroyed. In fact, defendant was alone in his apartment and was unaware that the detectives were even at his front door until they announced their presence. Thus, the detectives had ample opportunity to secure the premises and obtain a valid warrant without risking retrieval of the evidence at issue. However, because defendant opened the door and took a step back when the detectives asked to enter his apartment, he consented to their entry. Once inside the apartment, the marijuana was in plain view, justifying defendant's arrest. State v. Booker, 2012 Ohio 162, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 126 (8th Dist. January 19, 2012).*

Defendant called police because of a domestic disturbance between him and his live-in girlfriend. The officer asked about the drugs and rolling papers on the dresser, and the girlfriend said it was his and she’d take a drug test. The stuff was in plain view and validly seized. State v. Seagle, 2012 Ohio 132, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 105 (3d Dist. January 17, 2012).* [Note: If you're inviting the cops into your house, at least have the presence of mind to hide your dope.]

Plaintiffs’ claim as medical marijuana growers against federal search warrants did not state a claim under the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments because of Gonzalea v. Raich. Mont. Caregivers Ass'n v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6425 (D. Mont. January 20, 2012):

Moreover, the federal government has never given a free pass to produce and consume marijuana, even for medical purposes. In the so-called "Ogden Memo," the Department of Justice communicated to its attorneys that certain marijuana users and providers would be a lower priority for prosecution than others. See David W. Ogden, Dep. Atty. Gen., U.S. Dept. of Just., Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana ("Ogden Memo") (October 19, 2009) (available at www.justice.gov/opa/documents/medical-marijuana.pdf) (accessed on Jan. 13, 2012). For example, "[I]ndividuals with cancer or other serious illnesses who use marijuana as part of a recommended treatment regimen consistent with applicable state law, or those caregivers in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state law who provide such individuals with marijuana," would be a lower priority than "large-scale criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels." Id. at 1-2. But the Department also made clear that it did not intend to "legalize" marijuana (nor could it). ...

. . .

The plaintiffs claim the federal government violated their fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures when authorities searched their property and seized thousands of marijuana plants, hundreds of pounds of marijuana, various pieces of equipment and supplies, and money. The plaintiffs claim the searches and seizures were unreasonable only because federal authorities failed to acknowledge that the plaintiffs were acting legally under Montana law. As discussed above, though, whether the plaintiffs' conduct was legal under Montana law is of little significance here, since the alleged conduct clearly violates federal law. As a result, the searches and seizures were not unreasonable, and the plaintiffs' fourth amendment claim fails.

Officers came to defendant's place to arrest him on a warrant for bank fraud, and they knew a computer had been used. In plain view was defendant’s laptop, and that gave the officers probable cause to seize it. After seizure, they applied for a search warrant to search it. The seizure was valid. United States v. Van Santvoord Camp, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5878 (E.D. N.C. January 18, 2012):

"[S]eizures of property are subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny even though no search within the meaning of the Amendment has taken place." Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 68, 113 S. Ct. 538, 121 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1992). Law enforcement officers may seize evidence in plain view if "(1) the seizing officer is lawfully present at the place from which the evidence can be plainly viewed; (2) the seizing officer has a lawful right of access to the object itself; and (3) the object's incriminating character is immediately apparent." United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 521 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and citation omitted). After announcing the requirements of the plain view doctrine, the Supreme Court subsequently tailored the "immediately apparent" requirement: an officer need not "know" that an item is contraband or evidence of a crime, but rather must have probable cause to believe that the object is associated with the criminal activity. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741-42, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983).

Here, Agent Spears and Detective Boyce were lawfully in Defendant's office pursuant to an arrest warrant. Defendant's laptop was on Defendant's desk in his office, in plain view of law enforcement. It was the only computer visible to law enforcement in Defendant's office. Agent Spears, an investigating agent on Defendant's case, knew that Defendant had used a computer as an instrumentality of the fraud that Defendant was being charged with and had been made aware by a reliable witness that Defendant utilized a laptop computer for business activities. Because Agent Spears had probable cause to believe that Defendant's laptop was associated with Defendant's criminal activity, the seizure of the laptop computer in Defendant's office was pursuant to a valid exception to the warrant requirement.FN1

1 Defendant's argument as to the validity of Agent Spears' seizure of the laptop computer focuses solely on whether the seizure was a valid search incident to an arrest, assumedly because, in his affidavit in support of his application for a search warrant, Agent Spears refers to his seizure of the laptop as "incident to the arrest of [Defendant] on June 8, 2011." Because the Court has found that a valid exception to the warrant requirement existed when Agent Spears seized the laptop, it is inapposite whether the Agent correctly identified his justification for seizing the laptop while arresting Defendant in his application for a search warrant.

Defendant who had been staying in a mobile home with the owner for six months had a reasonable expectation of privacy in it. The officer’s observation of defendant inside doing something through the window from the driveway was not an illegal search. State v. Lowe, 2012 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 8 (January 20, 2012).*

A church parking lot was often littered with beer bottles and sometimes used condoms, so the pastor would call the police to roust those who would be parking there at night. He called the police on a car found there. The officer walked up to the vehicle and could smell marijuana smoke, and that was reasonable suspicion or more. Webb v. State, 313 Ga. App. 620, 722 S.E.2d 360 (2012).*

The drug dog’s positive alert on money, despite false alerts on money, still was probable cause to believe there were drugs in the vehicle. United States v. Giuffrida, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151875 (D. Me. January 19, 2012).*