No exigency justified ordering a doctor to take defendant’s blood in a DWI case, and the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence was affirmed. State v. McNeely, 358 S.W.3d 65 (Mo. 2012):

The patrolman here, however, was not faced with the "special facts" of Schmerber. Because there was no accident to investigate and there was no need to arrange for the medical treatment of any occupants, there was no delay that would threaten the destruction of evidence before a warrant could be obtained. Additionally, there was no evidence here that the patrolman would have been unable to obtain a warrant had he attempted to do so. The sole special fact present in this case, that blood-alcohol levels dissipate after drinking ceases, is not a per se exigency pursuant to Schmerber justifying an officer to order a blood test without obtaining a warrant from a neutral judge.

Seizure of a gun from the defendant was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The officers’ testimony was contradicted by the video. For example, they said the discussion was quiet and restrained, but the video showed them shouting obscenities at him. They also turned off the video because they said they wanted to protect his identity if they “turned him.” A first warrantless search was found valid, but the second was not. United States v. Rosas, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151622 (D. Minn. November 23, 2011).*

FISA probable cause determinations are subject to a split on what the standard of review is for issuance of a warrant. Also, defendant doesn't get to see the affidavit for the FISA warrant where the Attorney General certifies disclosure is contrary to national security. United States v. Mahamud, 838 F. Supp. 2d 881 (D. Minn. 2012):

There is no agreement among the federal courts as to whether the probable cause determination is made de novo or if a deferential standard is applied. See Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d at 130; Warsame, 547 F. Supp.2d at 990 (court reviewed probable cause determination de novo, given that the Court's review is ex parte). Even applying a de novo review, however, the Court finds that there was sufficient probable cause set forth in the applications and related materials that Defendant was an agent of a foreign power, al-Shabaab, and that the places to be searched or to be surveilled were being used by Defendant.

Defendant’s objection to a search after the jury heard about the evidence was a waiver of the issue. Black v. State, 358 S.W.3d 823 (Tex. App. – Ft. Worth 2012).

Officers came to defendant’s house to do a knock-and-talk for drugs, and they had to come though a gate to get to the front porch. They talked to defendant’s longtime live-in companion who told them he wasn’t home. She agreed they could come in and talk. They concluded she was lying about where he was and then finally admitted he was upstairs. They told him to come down, and he did. He said no search without a warrant, and they said they could do that, but the house would be secured and they would likely tear the place up during the search. If he consented, they said he wouldn’t be incarcerated. He consented to a search of the house, cutting off their reading the consent form to him. They found a considerable amount of marijuana and arrested him. Neither lesser intrusive measures nor reasonable suspicion are constitutionally required before a knock-and-talk. Knowledge of a right to refuse is only a factor in the totality, particularly when facing strong evidence of consent. United States v. Claus, 458 Fed. Appx. 184 (3d Cir. 2012):

Claus argues that the officers' conduct should not be sanctioned as a constitutional "knock and talk" because they did not first attempt other less intrusive investigatory steps. However, the recognized purposes behind the "knock and talk" procedure is to either speak with occupants or ask for consent to search. As a result, no objective level of suspicion is required. See United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that "no suspicion is needed to be shown in order to justify the 'knock and talk'" (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991))). We therefore refuse to impose the additional protections urged by Claus.

Defendant was handling his rifle and accidentally shot himself. He called 911, and paramedics and the police arrived. The police officer could seize the rifle in plain view when the officer was in the house. United States v. Taylor, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4950 (E.D. Mich. January 17, 2012). [Note: As a general rule, a call to 911 is a waiver of a reasonable expectation of privacy for all who might show up: police, EMS, firemen. If you want to protect your privacy, either don't call 911 or go outside and wait. The number of cases arising from the simple fact the police were called is astounding. How dumb can some people be? My favorite is having a burglar alarm and then complaining because the police showed up, checked the premises, and stumbled upon evidence of crime.]

Under the “four corners” of the affidavit, United States v. Hudspeth, 525 F.3d 667, 674 (8th Cir. 2008), it shows probable cause for issuance of the search warrant for defendant’s house. Even if it didn’t, there was enough for the good faith exception. United States v. Mariano, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151528 (D. Minn. November 22, 2011), R&R United States v. Mariano, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4346 (D. Minn. January 13, 2012).*

Defendant’s post-conviction motion that he should have search warrant materials was moot because he got them before the trial. United States v. Reynolds, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151546 (E.D. Tenn. June 8, 2011).*

Police were called to a domestic dispute, and defendant held off the police for a while, finally surrendering. He was taken away, objecting to a search. After he left, his wife consented to a protective sweep for weapons which were found, along with a pipe bomb. Randolph condones this search because of the protective sweep. The trial court erred in suppressing. People v. Strimple, 2012 CO 1, 267 P.3d 1219 (2012):

Nevertheless, the circumstances of a domestic abuse incident can justify a warrantless search for weapons based upon a request of one co-tenant, despite the objection of one or more other co-tenants. The Randolph Court clarified two points applicable to the case now before us. First, a co-tenant's consent to a search can prevail over a defendant's refusal to consent when the defendant has left the scene, where there is "no evidence that the police have removed the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for the sake of avoiding a possible objection." Id. at 121. Second, a warrantless search for weapons can be justified under the totality of the circumstances involved in a domestic abuse incident:

[T]his case has no bearing on the capacity of the police to protect domestic victims .... [T]he question whether the police might lawfully enter over objection in order to provide any protection that might be reasonable is easily answered yes .... The undoubted right of the police to enter in order to protect a victim ... has nothing to do with the question in this case, whether a search with the consent of one co-tenant is good against another, standing at the door and expressly refusing consent.

Id. at 118-19 (citations omitted). Both of these clarifications are applicable in this case.