It is reasonable to assume that the subject of an arrest warrant was home at 7 a.m., absent evidence to the contrary. United States v. Felder, 457 Fed. Appx. 316 (4th Cir. 2011) (unpublished):

Courts routinely rely on the time of day as a key factor in determining whether officers could reasonably believe the subject of an arrest warrant was home. E.g., United States v. Edmonds, 52 F.3d 1236, 1248 (3d Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 80 F.3d 810 (3d Cir. 1996) (reasoning that 6:45 a.m. was “early enough that it was unlikely someone living in the apartment would have already departed for the day”). The Eleventh Circuit has noted that “officers may presume that a person is home at certain times of the day—a presumption which can be rebutted by contrary evidence regarding the suspect’s known schedule.” United States v. Magluta, 44 F.3d 1530, 1535 (11th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256, 1267 (11th Cir. 2000) (“It was reasonable to believe, in the absence of contrary evidence, that [the suspect] would be at his residence at 6:00 in the morning.”). Similarly, the D.C. Circuit has concluded, without citing any other factors, that “the early morning hour was reason enough” for officers to believe a defendant was home when they attempted to execute an arrest warrant between 6:00 and 6:30 a.m. Thomas, 429 F.3d at 284, 286.

An inventory policy does not have to be detailed if it otherwise complies with Bertine. United States v. Davis, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142923 (N.D. W.Va. December 12, 2011)*:

While it is true that there is not a written precise step-by-step process as to how to perform an inventory of a seized vehicle outlined in the Department’s policy, it does require the following:

1. the officer must have “lawful custody” of the vehicle; and

2. “[t]he scope of the inventory shall be limited to those parts of a vehicle likely to conceal important, hazardous, or valuable items including, but not limited to, the passenger compartment, the trunk, and glove compartment.”

The undersigned concludes the above quoted limitations in totality constitute the type of “standardized criteria” referred to in Bertine, Id., and certainly acts to “‘curtail the discretion of the searching officer so as to prevent searches from becoming a “ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.’” Banks, supra at 738, 739.

Defendant was accused of domestic battery while on a diplomatic mission in Africa. Defendant’s wife consented to a search of the house, and the seizure of a doll house that was used as a weapon was by her consent. United States v. Makalou, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142538 (E.D. Va. December 12, 2011).*

Defendant’s traffic stop was based on PC an offense occurred, and the defendant consented to a search of the vehicle thereafter. United States v. Crump, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142363 (N.D. Ga. December 12, 2011), R&R 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142778 (N.D. Ga. November 21, 2011).*

While the state trooper was going to issue a warning ticket, he still went though the criminal history checks, and that was not unreasonable. In the course of that, the occupant's travel plans became inconsistent, and that led to a valid request for consent. United States v. Buenrostro, 454 Fed. Appx. 523 (8th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

Defendant had no paperwork on him after a stop of his car, and he assented to a patdown. The officer felt two long hard objects in the pockets but couldn’t determine what they were. After defendant refused to explain, the officer removed them finding glass pipes with drug residue. Removal of the pipes was valid. United States v. Rochin, 662 F.3d 1272 (10th Cir. 2011):

And we don’t hesitate to hold that test satisfied here. A reasonable officer could have concluded that the long and hard objects detected in Mr. Rochin’s pockets might be used as instruments of assault, particularly given that an effort to ask Mr. Rochin about the identity of the objects had proved fruitless. To be sure, the pipes Mr. Rochin turned out to have aren’t conventionally considered weapons. But a reasonable officer isn’t credited with x-ray vision and can’t be faulted for having failed to divine the true identity of the objects. And neither is “the scope of a Terry frisk ... limited to [traditional] weapons.” Holmes, 385 F.3d at 791. During a lawful pat down an officer may remove not just objects that seem to be guns, knives and the like, but also any other objects that he reasonably thinks “might be used as instruments of assault” against him or others who may be in the area. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 65. And two hard and long objects filling a suspect’s trouser pockets “fit that description well,” better than the “hard, square object” at issue in Holmes, 385 F.3d at 791, and better than many other objects courts have held officers may lawfully remove during Terry stops, see, e.g., United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 120 (2d Cir. 1999) (envelope); United States ex rel. McNeil v. Rundle, 325 F. Supp. 672, 677 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (watch). None of this is to say we necessarily endorse (or reject) the conclusions reached about the objects at issue in these other cases. It is instead only to emphasize by comparison how much more (objectively reasonable) reason there was for an officer to worry about the objects in the case at hand.

The 220th anniversary of the ratification of the Bill of Rights. Bill of Rights Day was designated in 1941, seven days after the declaration of war in WWII. They weren't adopted overnight--they were referred to the thirteen states 27 months earlier. [Update: see Cato.org, too.]

Still, too few people even recognize the Bill of Rights (1991 here and 1998 here). This is remarkable, except when one considers the United States is interested in spreading democracy abroad while most of its own citizens do not understand its fundamental documents.

Look at the members of state legislatures and Congress so willing to give up Fourth Amendment rights of all in the name of some expediency, be it fighting terrorism or drug testing recipients of government funds. This is the misguided belief that others losing Fourth Amendment rights doesn't mean anything as to the country as a whole. As to the recipients of government funds, there is no indication of a problem, but that doesn't stop legislators (see posts here, here, here). I remember one state legislator saying that his constituents "really wanted" this. Why don't we just get over it and drug test every recipient of government funds, starting with the Governor of Florida down to all state legislators, all government workers, welfare recipients, government contractors, CJA lawyers, judges, etc?

Because we can't under Skinner and Von Raab, that's why; and none of these clowns knows it because, while legislators are presumed to know what the courts have said on an issue, that only means that they are actively defying the Fourth Amendment, or just don't care about the Constitution when it is the rights of somebody else, notwithstanding that destroying the rights of one can quickly lead to destroying the rights of all.

Happy Bill of Rights Day. Enjoy it while you still can.

[On a related note: On FoxNews's "Fox and Friends" this morning, "Today in History" is the release of Michael Jackson's "Black or White" video. Sigh.]