Defendant’s stop was over when the officer handed the warning ticket back. Making the driver wait 20 minutes for the drug dog to show up was not by consent, and it was unreasonable. United States v. Grant, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132608 (D. Neb. November 15, 2011)*:

The statement by the Sergeant Wilcynski that he would release the defendant if nothing happened is bothersome to the court. Sergeant Wilcynski told the defendant that if the dog did not indicate, “then we’ll get you going.” Id. That language sounds more like a coerced consent and resulting detention than it does a consensual arrangement. It is hard to imagine that the defendant really felt free to leave after that statement. If a reasonable person does not believe he is free to leave, a seizure occurs. Garcia, 613 F.3d at 753, citing United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 925 (8th Cir. 2001).

The burden is on the government to show consent. Law enforcement officers must ask good questions. These questions must be clear and the responses must be clear and not the result of coercion or coercive language. Further, there is always the option of obtaining a written consent which was not done in this case. The question/statement by Sergeant Wilcynski telling the defendant that if the dog did not indicate, “then we’ll get you going” was clearly coercive. ...

Defendant was stopped for DUI by an off-duty narc. He conducted a search of the car finding MDMA. The stop and search were valid as a private search. In addition, if an on-duty LEO had stopped the car, that officer could have searched the passenger compartment incident to the arrest for the cause of the DUI. State v. Common, 78 So. 3d 237 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2011).*

An anonymous CI provided sufficient predictive detail to justify the stop of defendant’s car with reasonable suspicion when defendant showed up in the car described at the time given. State v. Leonard, 80 So. 3d 535 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2011)*:

Further, the source correctly predicted the specific place and time, within ten minutes, that the suspect would arrive with contraband. The source was able to describe the vehicle defendant would be driving – a black, four-door vehicle. As the detectives surveyed the situation, they corroborated the source's information when they observed a man, fitting the description of the suspect, drive up to the expected location in a vehicle that matched the description of the suspect's vehicle within the specified time frame. As such, we find that the trial judge did not err in implicitly finding that the detectives possessed reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop.

Officers were in the house of another to conduct a parole arrest, and they encountered the defendant who was there. He was handcuffed for safety reasons and told that and that he was not under arrest. Then defendant admitted to possessing contraband. State v. Jones, 78 So. 3d 274 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2011).*

Defendant worked on a ranch, and he did not show that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the curtilage to the house on the property. As commercial property as to him, there was a lesser expectation of privacy in it. United States v. Quesada-Garcia, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131544 (E.D. Cal. November 14, 2011).*

Officer responding to shots fired call found defendant matching the description. Considering the totality, the officer encountered defendant and defendant did not comply with commands to show his hands and put them up. That all added up to reasonable suspicion. United States v. McCullough, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132108 (M.D. Pa. November 16, 2011).*

While a social guest in a motel room may have a reasonable expectation of privacy, vis-a-vis an overnight guest, the defendant still carries the burden on that, and he failed to establish it here. About all he showed here was that he was there for commercial purposes. United States v. Sherrill, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132547 (D. Kan. November 16, 2011).*

Huffington Post: TSA: 10 Years Old & None The Wiser:

In the 10 years that the TSA has existed, there have been countless public blunders by the agency that just can't seem to get it right.

From John "Don't Touch My Junk" Tyner to the TSA's "Get Your Freak On Girl" note the American public seems to simply not be able to get enough of the Transportation Security Administration, for better or worse.

The TSA is a "cumbersome organization", Kate Hanni, Executive Director of FlyersRights.org (a non-profit organization with 50,000 members dedicated to bettering the conversation between travelers, the airlines and the Government), and blogger for The Huffington Post, said in a phone conversation, "There are some 67,000 employees at the TSA. It's security theater," she added.

I referred to TSA as "security theater" here in July 2007.

Ordering a child who gave birth to submit to intimate photographing years after the sexual abuse served no reasonable government interest and violated the Fourth Amendment and state constitutional rights of the child in her bodily integrity. In the Matter of Shernise C., 2011 NY Slip Op 08355, 91 A.D.3d 26, 934 N.Y.S.2d 171 (2d Dept. 2011):

“There is no more worthy object of the public’s concern” than the welfare of children (Wyman v James, 400 US 309, 318). However, in our societal zeal to protect them, our most vulnerable and most valuable asset, we must be careful not to trample upon their constitutional rights. An innocent child should certainly have as much right to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure as someone suspected of committing a crime. Thus, while harmonizing the state’s extraordinary interest in protecting a child’s welfare from the potential for the invasion of a child’s constitutional rights may be at times difficult, a proper balance must be struck since even the most heinous crime of child sexual abuse does not automatically provide cause to ignore the rights of the victim.

. . .

Where a bodily intrusion is concerned, the court must give careful consideration to “not only the probable worth of the evidence to the investigation, but the nature of alternative means, if any, for obtaining the evidence” (Matter of Abe A., 56 NY2d 288, 298; see Winston v Lee, 470 US 753). When making our Fourth Amendment inquiry, we must consider whether there is a “ clear indication’ that the intrusion will supply substantial probative evidence” (Matter of Abe A., 56 NY2d at 297, quoting Schmerber v California, 384 US 757, 770; see Cupp v Murphy, 412 US 291, 295).

In the instant matter, given the conclusive evidence of abuse provided by the DNA test results, the State’s need to subject Shernise to a highly intrusive physical examination is so diminished as to render the search unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the mandated application of Family Court Act § 1027(g) to Shernise under the particular facts of this case is unreasonable and violates her Fourth Amendment rights.