“Defendant consented to the search at his residence by calling 911, reporting the crime, and seeking assistance.” State v. Arvie, 73 So. 3d 516 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2011).*

“In this case, we adhere to prior decisions of this court and decide that the ‘automobile exception’ to the warrant requirement of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, does not permit a warrantless search of a defendant’s vehicle when the vehicle is parked, immobile, and unoccupied at the time that the police encounter it in connection with a crime.” State v. Kurokawa-Lasciak, 351 Ore. 179, 263 P.3d 336 (2011).*

The defendant shopping center operator had no reasonable expectation of privacy in its parking garages where there was a dumping of industrial waste. State v. Millard Mall Servs., 352 S.W.3d 251 (Tex. App.—Houston (14th Dist.) 2011).*

Opening defendant’s car door to talk to him constituted a seizure because the defendant objectively would not feel free to terminate the encounter and leave. The motion to suppress was properly granted. State v. Liechty, 152 Idaho 163, 267 P.3d 1278 (App. 2011):

We first note that the instant case is unlike other cases where a driver rolls down his or her car window in response to an officer's approach. In such cases, the encounter is consensual in nature because the level of coercion between the officer and the citizen is minimal. See Zubizareta, 122 Idaho at 827-28, 839 P.2d at 1241-42; Osborne, 121 Idaho at 524, 826 P.2d at 485. At that time, the driver has the option to decline to open the window to speak to the officer. However, when an officer approaches a vehicle and initiates questioning of a driver by opening the vehicle's door without consent, instead of asking to speak to the person through the vehicle's window, the level of coercion between the officer and the citizen is enhanced.

We also note that, in determining whether a seizure occurred, the district court found, similar to Fry, the officer here placed himself in a position relative to the car that prevented Liechty from driving away. As explained above, this finding was supported by substantial evidence, and whether the officer took action to block a vehicle's exit route is an appropriate circumstance to take into account when determining whether a seizure occurred. ...

The officer had reasonable suspicion for a stop, but his opening defendant’s car door and seeing heroin was an illegal search. There was no safety justification offered for opening the door. State v. Cure, 84 So. 3d 592 (4th Cir. 2011).

A constable came to defendant’s house with a writ of execution to remove him from the premises, and he smelled marijuana. He observed defendant packing in a hurry and saw a lot of cash in the house. He called the local police, and they saw some expensive stuff in his SUV allegedly illegally parked in front of the house. The police decision to impound his car was clearly pretextual, because impoundment was done to search, not to protect the property inside. A gun found in the car was suppressed. United States v. Scott, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115356 (D. Nev. August 23, 2011)*:

Because of these discrepancies regarding what exactly constitutes NLVPD policy, the Court's task of determining whether the officers involved complied with that policy when conducting the inventory search becomes somewhat perplexing. In any case, the Court need not attempt to divine the exact nature of NLVPD's impound and inventory search policies because the Court finds that the inventory search was a ruse for general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence, rather than a search conducted to protect Scott's property or to protect NLVPD from liability.

An Arby’s store clerk called 911 to report that a man who matched the description of somebody who robbed the place once before was in the store pacing around the counter, and there was a person in a car waiting outside. This was reasonable suspicion when the police arrived. United States v. Ussery, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115184 (W.D. N.C. September 9, 2011)* [Indeed, it sounds a lot like Terry.]

Defendant participated in the decision to waive a particular Fourth Amendment argument, and his defense counsel was not ineffective. United States v. Young, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115336 (D. Alaska September 4, 2011).*

The Federal Defender was not ineffective for not appealing defendant suppression hearing. “Simply put, the suppression argument was a clear loser.” United States v. Forrest, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115227 (D. Neb. October 5, 2011):

Moreover, defense counsel like Vanderslice do not have a constitutional duty to raise on appeal every nonfrivolous issue requested by the defendant. See, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 77 L. Ed. 2d 987 (1983) (“Experienced advocates since time beyond memory have emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on one central issue if possible ....”) Because the suppression argument was weaker than the critically important sentencing issue, Vanderslice cannot be faulted for failing to raise it even though Vanderslice prudently preserved the search issue in the plea agreement. Vanderslice did what all good appellate advocates do; that is, he focused on what was most likely to attract careful appellate attention.

Defense counsel was not ineffective in handling defendant’s suppression motion. It was appealed on the merits, and arguing it a different way would not have helped him. United States v. Chester, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114740 (D. Nev. October 4, 2011).*

Defendant was not just a mere bystander like in Ybarra; there was specific information about others involved in the crime, and the defendant matched the description. United States v. McCauley, 659 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2011).*