Fla. state legislator introduces repeal of mandatory drug tests for welfare recipients by Ashley Lopez in the Florida Independent:

State Sen. Arthenia Joyner, D-Tampa, has filed legislation repealing a new law requiring all welfare applicants to first pass a drug test.

Joyner filed Senate Bill 284 shortly after a lawsuit was filed by a Navy veteran who refused to waive his Fourth Amendment rights and submit to a drug test before receiving temporary assistance benefits he was otherwise qualified for. The American Civil Liberties is representing 35-year-old Orlando resident Luis Lebron — who is also a full-time student and single father.

Gov. Rick Scott, a proponent of the law, has said that the law was passed for “for the benefit of children.”

VT adopts independent appellate review of consent following Ornelas. State v. Weisler, 2011 VT 96, 190 Vt. 344, 35 A.3d 970 (2011):

[*P26] At the same time, as the Supreme Court stressed in Ornelas, the “multi-faceted” nature of the voluntariness inquiry underscores the need for a body of binding case-law applying the consent-standard in a variety of individual cases, thereby providing “content ... through application” and guidance to the police and the trial courts. 517 U.S. at 697; see also Miller, 474 U.S. at 114 (citing the imperative for independent review where “the relevant legal principle can be given meaning only through its application to the particular circumstances of a case”). Finally, we recognize that the voluntariness-of-consent issue implicates a “complex of values,” Miller, 474 U.S. at 116 (quotation omitted); it requires a balancing of the need for effective law enforcement against the imperative to restrain unfair police tactics and maintain individual dignity—a declaration of constitutional norms and values that demands statewide force and application. These are functions that only a reviewing court with broad jurisdiction and authority can perform. Accordingly, we hold that a trial court's decision on the question of the voluntariness of a consent to search, and thus the ultimate constitutional validity of the search, must be reviewed independently by this Court on appeal.

. . .

[*P34] Ultimately, it is not the purported distinctions from Ornelas, Thompson, and Miller that appear to drive the dissent but rather a fundamental disagreement with their holdings, a disagreement grounded on a suspicion that de novo review somehow represents a “negative assessment of the quality of fact-finding by trial courts with respect to federal constitutional questions.” Post, ¶ 76. This inference is unfounded and can not be reached by anything stated or implied in the majority opinion. Like the U.S. Supreme Court, we continue to accord substantial deference to the trial court's findings of historical fact. Nothing in our opinion can or should be construed to undermine this fundamental principle of appellate review.

Defendant consented to an entry for ICE officers to look for her illegal alien husband. They saw ammunition and asked about guns, and she showed them the guns in a gun cabinet owned by her husband she had access to. She was arrested for admitting to buying guns for him and aiding his possession which she said she did not know was against the law[; thereby implying voluntariness because she didn’t think she did anything wrong]. United States v. Valencia, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104766 (W.D. Ark. August 22, 2011).*

Defendant’s stop was justified by following too close, which the officer suspected was a tandem drug run. Once the car was stopped, reasonable suspicion developed from extreme nervousness, a rented car, the appearance of stuff in the car indicating “hard travel” that they were driving long distances without stopping, inconsistent stories, and signs of tampering with the cowl as a place to hide drugs. Then there came consent. Motion to suppress denied. United States v. Bryant, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104507 (N.D. Tex. September 9, 2011).*

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not forecasting Gant which came later, but that is moot anyway because of Davis v. United States finding pre-Gant searches valid. Jeter v. United States, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104943 (D. S.C. September 15, 2011).*

Defendant got off a Greyhound bus and was somehow noticed by drug interdiction police who started to walk up to him and show a badge to talk to him. He fled and was taken down after an “extended chase.” This was just a Terry stop. United States v. Wallace, 811 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (S.D. W.Va. 2011):

Following the extended chase, Det. Carper and Lt. Napier forced defendant to the ground. At this precise point, defendant was unquestionably seized within the contemplation of the Fourth Amendment. Compare United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002) (“If a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter, then he or she has not been seized.”); Brown, 401 F.3d at 594 (noting “[A] seizure 'requires either physical force ... or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion of authority.'”) (citation omitted).

The court does not deem the stop, at least at this point, to have constituted an arrest. It is best treated as a Terry stop. The question thus arises whether a Terry stop was justified under the circumstances. The Supreme Court has articulated factors to be weighed in considering the totality of the circumstances that might support the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a Terry stop. These factors include: (1) whether a high crime area is involved, Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972), (2) whether an individual exhibits evasive behavior, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975), and (3) whether there is unprovoked flight, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000) (“Headlong flight — wherever it occurs — is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.”).

The judge signing the search warrant was in New Jersey at the time. State law requires that all reasonable efforts to contact a nearby judge be exhausted before turning to telephone or fax warrants. On remand, the state will have to show that all reasonable efforts were exhausted. If so, defendant will not have suffered prejudice. Commonwealth v. Nelson, 460 Mass. 564, 953 N.E.2d 164 (2011).*

Defendant’s Alford plea got him sentencing considerations in a child pornography case, and that included him waiving his motion to suppress. He knew what he was doing, and the denial of the motion to withdraw the plea is affirmed, and his client. State v. Stocking, 131 Conn. App. 81, 26 A.3d 117 (2011).*

Officer’s mistake of law as to where temporary paper tag should be located in the back window did not justify extending the stop. Once it could be read, the driver should have been allowed to go on his way. United States v. Estrada-Ayala, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104411 (D. Kan. September 14, 2011).*