Officers finally arrested defendant for violating the “no alcohol” provision of his parole because they could smell it on his breath. He got them to leave the car parked where it was–in the driveway of a friend. Nevertheless, the car was mobile enough for the automobile exception to apply because somebody else wanted access to it, ostensibly to drive off. State v. Wiggins, 245 Ore. App. 119, 260 P.3d 826 (2011), on rehearing State v. Wiggins, 2011 Ore. App. LEXIS 1798 (December 29, 2011) (reaching same result):

Here, there is no dispute that the police had probable cause that defendant’s car contained evidence of a crime—a gun—at the time of the search. The only remaining question, then, is whether defendant's vehicle was “mobile” at the time the officers first encountered it. Compare State v. Coleman, 167 Ore. App. 86, 94, 2 P3d 399 (2000) (“The inquiry is centered on the circumstances surrounding the moment when the police first notice or focus their attention on an automobile.” (Emphasis added.)), with Meharry, 342 Ore. at 178 (“[A] vehicle is mobile for the purposes of the automobile exception because it was moving when the officer stopped it and nothing demonstrated that the vehicle would not be mobile once the officer relinquished control over it.” (Emphasis added.)). We conclude that defendant’s car was mobile, whether we define the initial point of the encounter as the moment when Brewster first observed defendant’s car in the parking lot of the convenience store or the moment when Brewster subsequently stopped defendant's moving vehicle. In either case, the car was occupied and operable, and nothing subsequent to the stop rendered the car incapable of mobility.

We reject defendant's argument that the vehicle was stripped of its mobility because the officers broke contact with it. ...

The officers had cause for the stop when the CI gave the sign that a drug deal had gone down, and the vehicle involved was leaving the scene. State v. Williams, 2011 Ohio 4126, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 3438 (8th Dist. August 18, 2011).*

Defendant was stopped for a traffic violation, and he did not have his driver’s license on him. He was asked for consent which he refused. The officer said he was getting a drug dog but didn’t. Finally, he conducted a field sobriety test, and defendant passed. Then he arrested the defendant for no DL. A search incident after defendant was locked in the police car was invalid under Gant. Turner v. Commonwealth, 2011 Ky. App. LEXIS 138 (August 12, 2011). [Caution: If the vehicle would be towed, could the state argue inventory as an alternative?]

Just because defendant had one brake light out did not mean that his vehicle did not comply with the state vehicle code. The taillights otherwise worked, and the statute only referred to “stop lamp.” Therefore, the stop was invalid. State v. Heien, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1750 (August 16, 2011).*

A university police officer was fired after making a complaint that other officers had violated the Fourth Amendment in conducting a search on campus. The ALJ upheld the firing. On appeal, the court held that the officer was a whistle blower, and his motive for complaining was pretty much irrelevant. Lawson v. Bowie State Univ., 26 A.3d 866, 32 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1252, 161 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P61,177 (Md. 2011).* [Which only goes to show that police departments usually protect their cops; one complains about another and he’s gone as a troublemaker.]

This juvenile was subjected to a patdown for weapons and none were found. He refused to identify himself, so the officer searched for ID, finding instead a credit card that belonged to someone else. The frisk for the ID was unreasonable. In re D.B., 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1745 (August 16, 2011):

Although the State relies upon Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 159 L. Ed. 2d 292, 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004), for the proposition that “the identity of a suspect can significantly impact the safety of an officer,” Hiibel does not address an officer's using a pat-down to uncover evidence of identification. At issue in Hiibel was whether a Nevada statute requiring a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a valid Terry stop was consistent with Fourth Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 187-88, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 303-04, 124 S. Ct. at 2459. The Court determined that because the defendant's obligation to identify himself arose from a state statute, and because the statute satisfied the Fourth Amendment constitutional standards, “[t]he principles of Terry permit[ted] a State to require a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a Terry stop.” Id. at 187, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 304, 124 S. Ct. at 2459 (emphasis added).

While many states have enacted “stop and identify” statutes such as the one in Hiibel, North Carolina has not. The State overlooks this crucial distinction. We further note that in Hiibel, the Supreme Court did not hold that an officer could, during the Terry frisk, search for proof of identification as well as weapons. Although the Court did note in passing that officers called to investigate domestic disputes need to know whom they are dealing with in order to assess the situation and the threat to their own safety, the Court did not suggest that an officer can use a pat-down to locate an identification card. Id. at 186, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 303, 124 S. Ct. at 2458.

Officer’s testimony that he routinely pats down the passenger after getting the driver out of the car was not reasonable suspicion. Here, however, defendant later consented to a search of his wallet after the patdown, and that was independent. Rogue v. State, 311 Ga. App. 421, 715 S.E.2d 814 (2011).

Defendant was prosecuted for a Mann Act violation involving underage prostitution. He was kicked out of a hotel room with the police in tow. The officers questioned the girls in the rooms and looked at their cell phones. He had no standing to question the alleged violation of the rights of the girls. United States v. Collins, 437 Fed. Appx. 760 (11th Cir. 2011).*

SVPA prisoner strip searches were shown by defense affidavit to be for legitimate penological security interests, and plaintiff has not countered that proof. Jones v. Baca, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143589 (C.D. Cal. March 31, 2010).*