When a dog alerts on a car, and the defendant is in the car, the defendant’s pockets are not “containers” subject to search under the automobile exception because of the heightened privacy interest in one’s person. State v. Gefroh, 2011 ND 153, 801 N.W.2d 429 (2011):

[*P13] We hold the automobile exception did not justify the warrantless search of Gefroh’s person. The dog-sniff of the vehicle established probable cause the vehicle contained a controlled substance, but the pockets of the clothes Gefroh was wearing were not “containers.” The State also argued that Gefroh, as the driver of the vehicle, was part of the contents of the vehicle. The State offers no support for its arguments that would render Gefroh a container or contents of the vehicle, rather than a person entitled to “heightened protection” against searches of his person. The district court correctly decided the automobile exception justified the search of the vehicle, but not Gefroh’s person. The district court correctly ordered the cocaine evidence suppressed.

Defendant has no standing on the face of his motion: He was a passenger and his consent was not required. United States v. Lopez, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91349 (S.D. N.Y. August 16, 2011).*

Officers are not required to schedule a search at a time when defendant is not home or excuse him while they search. United States v. Fautz, 812 F. Supp. 2d 570 (D. N.J. 2011).*

While Eighth Circuit case law suggests that one driving a rental car with the permission of the renter might have standing, in this case he wouldn’t. The car was overdue, and the rental car company was trying to get it back and told the renter she was no longer authorized to have it. United States v. Lumpkins, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91357 (W.D. Mo. July 6, 2011).*

The search warrant for plaintiff’s computer for child pornography based solely on allegations of child molestation was without probable cause where there was not even a suggestion a computer was used by plaintiff. However, because of a circuit split of authority, qualified immunity applies. Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2011).*

Defendant was stopped and struggled with officers dropping packages of heroin. He was able to lunge for the heroin and swallow it. The search of his car was valid under the automobile exception. State v. Winfrey, 302 Conn. 195, 24 A.3d 1218 (2011).*

Claimant’s action for return of property filed ten years after seizure was barred is an equitable action under (now) Rule 41(g) when the government said it didn’t have the property. Van Jackson v. United States, 427 Fed. Appx. 524 (7th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

Just raising a Franks issue gets you no hearing; a substantial preliminary showing is required, and here there wasn’t one. United States v. Clark, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90776 (D. S.D. August 15, 2011).*

While the Fourth Amendment applies to an arrestee’s medical needs at the time of arrest, here the officers had qualified immunity for denying baby aspirin to a suspect who had a heart attack when they battered in his door. They also had no notice at the time of the raid that the plaintiff was a potential heart attack victim. Florek v. Mundelein, 649 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2011):

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ....” U.S. Const. amend. IV. We have held that an officer violates the prohibition on unreasonable seizures when, in the course of making an otherwise lawful arrest, he does not respond reasonably to an arrestee’s medical needs. Sides v. City of Champaign, 496 F.3d 820, 828 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989), and holding that the Fourth Amendment’s ban on unreasonable seizures applies to claims of unreasonable inattention to medical needs at the time of arrest). Not every constitutional violation will furnish a plaintiff with a basis for recovery, however. Qualified immunity will shield an officer from money damages unless a plaintiff establishes that the officer violated a right that was clearly established. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S. Ct. 808, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009). And because “[l]evel of generality is destiny” in law, see Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, __ F.3d ___, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13265, 2011 WL 2556039, at *27 (6th Cir. June 29, 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring), it bears emphasizing that courts should not decide that a right is clearly established at a high level of abstraction: we look to “whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2084, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (2011) (emphasis added).

[Sounds a bit like the taser cases where the police taser an older person who has a heart attack. Aren't they on notice that the age of the target might be a health problem when the batter down a door in a surprise “dynamic” entry?]

OzarksFirst.com: Former Missouri Sheriff Admits to Exploiting Women:

The now-former sheriff of Worth County, Missouri could find himself spending time behind bars after pleading guilty to federal charges he used his position to exploit women.

The Justice Department said today Neal Wayne "Bear" Groom has admitted to having violated the Fourth Amendment rule against unreasonable seizures when he coerced eight women to expose parts of their bodies to him.

[I couldn't find the press release on the DoJ website.]