The operator of a shopping mall was charged along with others with unlawful discharge of industrial waste after a pressure wash cleaning of a parking garage. An environmental crimes investigator took samples after a whistleblower called them. The trial court granted the suppression motion, but the appellate court held that standing could be raised by the state for the first time on appeal, and the mall operator had no standing in the public garage. State v. Simon Property Group, 357 S.W.3d 687 (Tex. App.—Houston (14th Dist.) 2011);* State v. Bell, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 6458 (Tex. App.—Houston (14th Dist.) August 16, 2011);* State v. Sepeda, 349 S.W.3d 713 (Tex. App.—Houston (14th Dist.) 2011).*

Turning on emergency lights to effect a stop of a man on the street was a seizure, here without reasonable suspicion. State v. Gantt, 163 Wn. App. 133, 257 P.3d 682 (2011).*

Defendant’s pat down was unjustified by reasonable suspicion. An officer was cruising an area of a “vague report” of shots fired a couple of blocks away and asked to talk to some young men who came up to him to talk. Two were more gregarious than defendant, who did not lean in to talk to the officer. Defendant declined to submit to a patdown after the other two did. “On the facts of this case, there is precious little to sustain the district court's holding that Officer Gaines had reasonable, particularized suspicion of Massenburg such that a nonconsensual frisk was lawful under the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Massenburg, 654 F.3d 480 (4th Cir. 2011).* Update: Noted in Federal Criminal Appeals Blog: The Fourth Circuit and the Fourth Amendment: If You Search Like a Redcoat You Can't Use What You Find In Court.

Officers asked for consent of defendant’s hotel room which defendant initially refused. They said that they’d attempt to get a search warrant. “At that point, Bond exclaimed, ‘F-ck it!,’ grabbed the key card, and unlocked the door.” That was consent. United States v. Bond, 433 Fed. Appx. 441 (6th Cir. 2011)*.

Omissions from the affidavit were so minor that it did not undermine probable cause; nor did it suggest that the officer was trying to mislead the magistrate. Franks hearing denied. United States v. Robertson, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90598 (E.D. Va. August 15, 2011).*

In an IRS and mail fraud case, the warrants were necessarily broad, but they were not constitutionally overbroad. United States v. Cooper, 654 F.3d 1104 (10th Cir. 2011):

However, despite the generality of the warrants themselves, the supporting affidavits fill in many of the necessary details. In particular, the affidavits flesh out how the conduct being investigated is related to the statutes listed on the warrants. For example, the affidavits indicate that “[t]he use of the United States mail and commercial interstate carriers to transport Renaissance promotional materials or other matters in furtherance of this scheme or artifice to defraud United States consumers is in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, which is mail fraud.” ... Furthermore, they describe various “mailings [that] contained Renaissance promotional material such as videotapes, brochures, tax forms, and other material containing some false and misleading information,” ... and various bank and brokerage accounts held by Mr. Cooper, Renaissance, or associated entities, .... Importantly, the affidavits also include a list of “[i]tems to be seized,” ..., which—when read in conjunction with the warrant and the remainder of each affidavit—would “enable[] the [executing officers] to reasonably ascertain and identify the things authorized to be seized,” Riccardi, 405 F.3d at 862 (quoting Leary, 846 F.2d at 600). Contrary to Mr. Cooper’s assertions, the warrants and affidavits do much more than “merely recit[e] the mail fraud and money laundering statutes.” ....

Furthermore, as noted above, “[e]ven a warrant that describes the items to be seized in broad or generic terms may be valid when the description is as specific as the circumstances and the nature of the activity under investigation permit.” Riccardi, 405 F.3d at 862 (quoting Leary, 846 F.2d at 600). In other words, whether a search warrant is sufficiently particular depends in part on the nature of the crimes being investigated. Warrants relating to more complex and far-reaching criminal schemes may be deemed legally sufficient even though they are less particular than warrants pertaining to more straightforward criminal matters. See United States v. Hargus, 128 F.3d 1358, 1362 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[W]e are satisfied that [the warrant] is sufficiently limited and specific, in view of the nature of this extended conspiracy and other crimes for which he was being investigated ....”); ... Indeed, the complex and comprehensive nature of the broad scheme of financial criminal activity implicated in this case “makes it difficult to list with great particularity the precise items desired to be seized which evidence such activity.” Janus Indus., 48 F.3d at 1554. In the face of this difficulty, the affiants provided a meaningful and sufficient amount of detail.

Every complex white collar case with a search warrant seems to include a claim that the warrant was overbroad, yet they seldom succeed. The more complicated and paper heavy the crime under investigation, the more is allowed in the breadth of the warrant. Few of these challenges seem to succeed because the government is allowed significant leeway in expressing what needs to be searched for just as a matter of practicality.

It was reasonable to put defendant in the back of a police car for the time being while the officer investigated further. Defendant and his car matched the description from a bank robbery that happened within the hour. United States v. Rush, 651 F.3d 871 (8th Cir. 2011).*

Defendant was stopped for following too close, and he had two rifles in the back seat. He invited the officer to “run” them, which prolonged the stop. Then he consented to a search. The officer noticed the console didn’t fit right and removed part of it, and that was not a “dismantling” of the car. United States v. McCall, 433 Fed. Appx. 432 (6th Cir. 2011).*

Driver and passenger were unable to provide basic information about their trip and that provided reasonable suspicion. United States v. Olvera, 437 Fed. Appx. 305 (5th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

The officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant walking away from the area of a recent car break-in when he was the only person around, and he matched the description of one of the two involved. State v. Kessler, 151 Idaho 653, 262 P.3d 682 (2011).*