Taking DNA from an arrestee still entitled to the presumption of innocence without judicial authorization violated the Fourth Amendment. People v. Buza, 197 Cal. App. 4th 1424, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 (1st Dist. 2011), Modified by, 2011 Cal. App. LEXIS 1149 (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Aug. 31, 2011):

The sole issue in this case is the constitutionality of a provision of the DNA and Forensic Identification Data Base and Data Bank Act of 1998, as amended (Pen. Code, § 295 et seq.) (the DNA Act), which requires that a DNA sample be taken from all adults arrested for or charged with any felony offense ―immediately following arrest, or during the booking ... process or as soon as administratively practicable after arrest ... (§§ 296.1, subd. (a)(1)(A), 296, subd. (a)(2)(C).) Appellant claims that the seizure of his DNA at a time when he was entitled to the presumption of innocence, and there had been no judicial determination of probable cause to believe he committed the offense for which he was arrested, violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. We agree, and therefore reverse the judgment.

This is a detailed and scholarly opinion. I highly recommend it because it rejects the DNA as mere fingerprint analogy which was adopted by the Third Circuit just two weeks ago.

Refusal to identify the person driving the car plaintiff was in was sufficient PC to arrest for obstruction of a law enforcement officer for qualified immunity. Kaufman v. Higgs, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83609 (D. Colo. July 29, 2011):

More importantly, in determining whether Defendants violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights by his arrest, the question is not whether Plaintiff committed the crime of obstructing a peace officer but whether Defendants had probable cause to believe that he did. Cortez, supra. See also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 245 n.13, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983) (“[P]robable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.”). Here, based on the plain language of the obstruction statute itself, I conclude that Defendants could reasonably believe that Plaintiff's assertion of “privilege” and refusal to identify the driver of his vehicle constituted an “obstacle” that obstructed, hindered, or impaired their investigation of the hit and run accident involving Plaintiff's vehicle. Plaintiff has therefore failed to meet his burden of establishing that Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him without probable cause.

Defendant who was told to put his hands on the patrol car so he could be searched, denied him the ability to talk to a friend, and prolonged the detention for a frisk on reasonable suspicion make stop into a de facto arrest. United States v. Lara-Pantoja, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85030 (N.D. Iowa August 2, 2011):

The defendant maintains that the stop became a de facto arrest when Officer Dennler (1) requested the defendant to place his hands on the patrol car so he could search the defendant; (2) denied the defendant’s request to speak with his friend at the nearby grocery store; and (3) prolonged the detention on the basis of a subjective motive to investigate other matters. The defendant contends that Officer Dennler continued to question him without probable cause, without a warrant, and without advising him of his Miranda rights. The court disagrees. These minor restraints on the defendant’s activities did not constitute an arrest. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6, 98 S. Ct. 330, 333 n.6, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1977) (“[O]nce a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures.”). “[T]he officer does not need to be certain that the suspect was armed. ...

Search of defendant’s person before he was placed in an ambulance at best could be for weapons. Removing a smoking pipe from his pocket was an unreasonable search. People v. Kowalski, 2011 IL App (2nd) 100237, 352 Ill. Dec. 582, 954 N.E.2d 442 (2011):

[P14] The State argues, as the trial court found, that this warrant exception should be extended to a situation where a citizen is to be transported in an ambulance. Even assuming that this exception may be properly extended in such a manner, we believe that the search conducted by Gaw exceeded the scope permitted under this exception. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Terry, a search for weapons without probable cause must, like any other search, be “strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 25-26. Accordingly, if the purpose of searching a citizen prior to providing him with a courtesy transport in a squad car or transporting him in an ambulance is to ensure the safety of the transporting officers or paramedics, then such a search, like the protective pat-down search permitted by Terry, should be limited to “an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer” or paramedic. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 29. As previously discussed, the State did not present any evidence that indicated that Gaw initially limited his search of defendant to a pat-down search for weapons or that the pipe felt like a weapon or other contraband. Accordingly, the State failed to counter defendant's prima facie case that the search conducted by Gaw was illegal.

A 911 call was an invitation to the police to come and enter: “At 4:15 p.m. on the day of the murders, Movant called 911. He reported that someone was hurt and not breathing, and said ‘[y]ou just need to send somebody over here.’ When police arrived, Movant was in the front drive. Officers briefly spoke with Movant, then entered the home. Movant never subsequently objected to police being in or about his home. Within two hours, officers had discovered the bodies, secured the crime scene, arrested Movant, and taken him to the police station.” Mayes v. State, 349 S.W.3d 413 (Mo. App. 2011).

Defendant was stopped without probable cause he was impaired, and he was told that blood would be taken from him if he didn’t consent, and he did not. The forced blood draw was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment and Texas Constitution. State v. Mosely, 348 S.W.3d 435 (Tex. App.—Austin July 28, 2011).

Defendant’s argument in the trial court for suppression of evidence was not the same one he made on appeal, so the argument on appeal would not be considered. Brown v. State, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 5432 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 14, 2010), Released for Publication January 27, 2011.*

Defective taillight led to stop to “I’ve only had two beers,” and a finding of RS to detain him. Urdiales v. State, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 4349 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 9, 2010), Released for Publication January 24, 2011.*