Consent given by a driver with passengers in the car lawfully resulted in detention of the passengers while the search occurred. The officer’s comment that he was arresting everybody unless somebody claimed it resulted in defendant’s admission that he would “take the rap” and was a Miranda violation. England v. State, 46 So. 3d 127 (Fla. App. 2d DCA 2010).*

Farmer was accused of sale of counterfeit goods, and a seizure of the goods led to a seizure of drugs. He pled to the latter, and the counterfeit goods charge was dismissed. He was entitled to return of the goods because the seizure was not supported by a post-deprivation hearing. Farmer v. Florence County Sheriff’s Office, 390 S.C. 358, 701 S.E.2d 48 (2010)*:

The Sheriff's Office has not provided any concrete reasons to justify its refusal to return Farmer's merchandise or any meaningful argument that its delay in instituting forfeiture proceedings was justified; indeed, it has even asserted that law enforcement need not provide any reason whatsoever to hold lawfully seized goods beyond the fact that a warrant had been issued for the seizure. In making these arguments, however, the Sheriff's Office appears to disregard the recognized purpose of a forfeiture hearing, which is “to confirm the state had probable cause to seize the property in question.”

Officers had probable cause to believe that defendant lived in a particular hotel room. The CI gave the hotel, and the police established that defendant was there, and that was corroboration. United States v. Oneal, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111744 (N.D. Cal. October 13, 2010).*

The fact a warning ticket was issued rather than a traffic ticket did not show that the stop was without probable cause. There was, however, probable cause for the stop for speeding. Defendant validly consented to the search of his car when the paperwork was returned. United States v. Peguero, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111670 (N.D. Fla. October 7, 2010).*

Officers on the premises with a search warrant who see things that they determine before they leave are criminal evidence are legally able to seize that evidence. Any further investigation into the nature of those items did not entail an additional and unjustified search of, or unduly prolonged police presence on, the premises, for the seizure of those items, and it was permissible under the Fourth Amendment. White v. State, 729 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) is disapproved. State v. Dobbs, 323 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), revg State v. Dobbs, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 1857 (Tex. App.--Dallas March 18, 2009) (unpublished):

The further investigation that the officers undertook in this cause did not involve any search of the premises that was not already authorized by the search warrant. So the appellee’s privacy interest was not compromised. Nor were the golf clubs and shirts actually seized until after the officers, still legitimately on the premises, developed probable cause to believe they were stolen, by conducting further investigation that did not involve an unjustifiedly incremental search of the actual premises. So the appellee’s possessory interest was compromised--but legitimately so, even without an additional warrant. It does not serve the interests of the Fourth Amendment to construe the “immediately apparent” aspect of the plain-view doctrine to prohibit this kind of further investigation because it does not impact either the privacy or the possessory rights of the defendant beyond the encroachment already legitimized by the warrant.

To appreciate the sensibleness of this understanding of the plain-view doctrine, suppose the facts were slightly altered. Suppose that at the instant the officers executing the search warrant had originally come across the golf clubs and shirts, they had thought nothing of it and conducted no further investigation of those items. Then suppose an officer in the burglary division had called one of the searching officers to inform him to be on the lookout for stolen golf clubs and shirts on the premises, describing them with particularity, because of probable cause the burglary division had just developed, independently of the officers executing the warrant, to believe these items were stolen. What was not “immediately” apparent to the searching officers would now be readily apparent, while the officers are still on the premises and legitimately conducting their search. They would now have probable cause to seize the stolen items. Under these circumstances, it makes no more sense to require an additional warrant to justify seizing the items than it would to require a warrant to seize apparent contraband that is found in a public place. Moreover, it should make no difference that the searching officers generated their own probable cause while still on the premises, so long as their investigation did not entail any greater intrusion on the premises (from which the defendant's privacy interest, after all, derives) than the intrusion already legitimately underway.

While a residential fire probably caused by a fuel burning appliance was being extinguished, the fire department called a building inspector to determine whether there was another such appliance in the building. Another locked apartment was found there, and they entered to look at it. [And, this court unconstitutionally put the burden of proof on the defendant as N.Y. courts chronically do: “Defendant, however, based on the testimony adduced at the hearing, failed to establish by a preponderance of evidence that the seizure was unlawful. Though the fire had been extinguished, the existence of an emergency had not been negated.” When are NY lawyers going to challenge this?] People v. Denis, 29 Misc. 3d 1150, 909 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Nassau Co. 2010).

Defendant’s motion to suppress the product of a protective sweep was reversed because the officers validly saw items in plain view and then put the observations in a search warrant application and came back for them. Commonwealth v. Matos, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 156, 935 N.E.2d 1285 (2010).*