Angad Singh, Stepping out of the Vehicle: The Potential of Arizona v. Gant to End Automatic Searches Incident to Arrest Beyond the Vehicular Context, 59 Am. U. L. Rev. 1759 (2010). Interesting reading, and this is the third paragraph:

This Comment argues that Gant not only enhances Fourth Amendment protections overall by limiting authority to search an automobile upon arrest, but that its first holding also undermines other cases permitting automatic searches incident to arrest in nonvehicular situations. Gant's affirmation of two specific rationales that permit a search incident to arrest, officer safety and the preservation of evidence, directly conflicts with nonvehicular cases allowing automatic searches irrespective of these rationales. Since Gant undermines such cases by reconnecting the search incident to arrest exception with its justifications, applying Gant to cases that permit automatic searches of containers on the person, and certain automatic home searches incident to arrest, serves to enhance privacy protections against these nonvehicular searches that have become police entitlements.

Quarterly in-home maintenance of electronic monitoring system and thus checking on registered sex offenders does not violate the Fourth Amendment. State v. Bowditch, 364 N.C. 335, 700 S.E.2d 1 (2010):

Noting the maintenance that must be performed by DCC personnel every ninety days, typically within an offender's residence, the dissenting opinion argues that the SBM program unnecessarily burdens the Fourth Amendment rights of those convicted felons subject to SBM. However, it is beyond dispute that convicted felons do not enjoy the same measure of constitutional protections, including the expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, as do citizens who have not been convicted of a felony. See, e.g., Velasquez v. Woods, 329 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (holding that collecting blood samples from felons for registration in a DNA databank does not violate the Fourth Amendment); Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that convicted sex offenders have no right of privacy preventing a state from requiring them to register as such and be subject to community notification of their residences), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1007, 118 S. Ct. 1191, 140 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1998); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir. 1992) ("Even probationers lose the protection of the Fourth Amendment with respect to their right to privacy against searches of their homes pursuant to an established program to ensure rehabilitation and security." (citing Griffin, 483 U.S. at 868)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977, 113 S. Ct. 472, 121 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1992); Standley, 362 N.C. at 329-33, 661 S.E.2d at 730-32 (holding that a convicted sex offender's constitutional rights were not violated by a municipal ordinance that prohibited him from access to public parks); Bryant, 359 N.C. at 557-70, 614 S.E.2d at 481-89 (holding that no due process violation occurred when a convicted sex offender who was required to register in South Carolina failed to register in North Carolina, even though he received no actual notice of registration requirement). Here felons convicted of multiple counts of indecent liberties with children are not visited by DCC personnel for random searches, but simply to ensure the SBM system is working properly.

Interestingly, the Wisconsin electronic monitoring system went down recently requiring officers to go looking for their charges. Hat tip to Stockycat, http://stockycat.blogspot.com/, which I discovered only today because the author communicated about something else. Great new blog "focused non-exclusively on the intersection between criminal law and emerging technology. Dedicated to the idea that effective law enforcement is not incompatible with a vigorous interpretation of the Fourth Amendment." More about that later. [Embedding a link isn't working, and that's my software.]

The Supreme Court granted cert yesterday and consolidated Camreta v. Greene (09-1454) and Alford v. Greene (09-1478) both from the Ninth Circuit. ScotusBlog's summary is here. The Ninth Circuit held in Greene (posted here) that interviewing a potential child abuse victim at school violated family privacy. Greene's question presented from the cert petition:

Does the Fourth Amendment require a warrant, a court order, parental consent, or exigent circumstances before law enforcement and child welfare officials may conduct a temporary seizure and interview at a public school of a child whom they reasonably suspect was being sexually abused by her father.

See Youthtoday here.

Defendant’s truck and fifth wheel camper were stopped for a missing front license plate required in the state the truck was from. After the paperwork was completed, the officer told the defendant that he was not free to leave until the drug dog completed his work, and the dog arrived just as he said that. The stop was not extended more than a minute or so by sniff, and that was not unreasonable. State v. Overbey, 2010 SD 78, 790 N.W.2d 35 (2010)*:

[*P24] Defendant's final argument is that the detention exceeded the scope of the stop because it went beyond the time required to conduct a computer check, verify documents, examine vehicle equipment, and issue a citation. Without indicating what Officer Langenfeld should or should not have done during the stop, it is difficult to ascertain the essence of Defendant's argument. Defendant appears to be arguing that Officer Langenfeld should not have called for the drug dog because it impermissibly extended the time it took to conduct the necessary steps for the traffic stop. However, the trial court found that when Officer Langenfeld told Jason that only a warning ticket would be issued, Langenfeld also told Jason he would not be free to leave until after the drug dog conducted a sniff of the vehicle’s exterior. At that exact moment, Trooper Severyn and Cas arrived and the drug sniff was conducted immediately. Within three minutes the drug sniff was completed and the law enforcement officers called dispatch to report that they would be conducting a vehicle search.

A baggie of drugs protruding from the defendant’s waistband during a traffic stop was in plain view. State v. Prude, 2010 Ohio 4892, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 4138 (8th Dist. October 7, 2010).*

Everybody was ordered out of the car and they were handcuffed. A search incident at that point was not lawful because nobody could get to the car to conceal or destroy evidence. State v. Chesley, 158 Wn. App. 36, 239 P.3d 1160 (2010).*

An officer saw members of a gang chasing after others, the defendant with a brick in his hand apparently planning on using it on somebody. Based on what he saw and heard, he had probable cause to arrest the defendant for possession of a deadly weapon. In re J.G., 188 Cal. App. 4th 1501, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 912 (4th Dist. 2010).*

Defendant sought a supervisory writ over pretrial suppression issues, and the denial of the writ precludes appellate review of the same issue. State v. Marinello, 49 So. 3d 488 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2010).*

The Mississippi DOC’s legal mail rules for signing and sealing outgoing legal mail is reasonable and serves legitimate penological interests. Returning mail to him that was noncompliant was not a seizure of the mail in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Weatherspoon v. Ferguson, 398 Fed. Appx. 7 (5th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

A probationer was detained for investigation of theft from her employer and returned to prison. After a few days it was determined that she was not a thief and she was released. She sued the Alaska DOC for her seizure, and the court found that her “seizure” did not violate the Fourth Amendment because she was actually still in their custody. Diaz v. State, Department of Corrections, 239 P.3d 723 (Alas. 2010)*:

We affirm the superior court’s decision because: (1) Diaz’s officer-escorted trip to and interrogation at the travel agency did not implicate her Fourth Amendment rights as she was already in DOC custody when the DOC officers “seized” her; (2) the DOC officers’ actions, although disturbing, did not “shock the conscience” as required for a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) Diaz’s return to prison, her day of segregation from the general population, and the two days of telephone restrictions did not deprive her of a liberty interest in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because her freedom was not restrained in excess of her sentence and she did not experience an atypical or significant hardship in comparison to ordinary prison life; and (4) the private detective and his agency are not liable for conspiring with state officials to violate Diaz's constitutional rights because no such violation occurred.

The officer’s mistake of law as to defendant’s use of the turn signal made the stop without reasonable suspicion, so the trial court suppression order is affirmed. State v. Ruelas, 327 S.W.3d 321 (Tex. App. – El Paso 2010).*

Defendant tried to enter a club with a cocked loaded gun that club security relieved him of. Police were called. When defendant did not identify himself, it was permissible for the police to frisk him for his ID. State v. Hollins, 789 N.W.2d 244 (Minn. App. 2010).

“In sum, we conclude that Allen had a subjective expectation of privacy in his cell-phone conversation with Golie and that our society is willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable. Accordingly, Golie's recording of the conversation at the behest of law enforcement constituted a search under Article II, Sections 10 and 11 of the Montana Constitution.” Thus, two party consent is required under the state constitution. State v. Allen, 2010 MT 214, 357 Mont. 495, 241 P.3d 1045 (2010).*