The threat to get a search warrant if defendant did not consent was not an "empty threat" because the officers had probable cause. Therefore, it was not unlawful coercion. United States v. Jones, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 15754 (7th Cir. July 30, 2010):

In addition, Jones argues that Joseph was coerced into consenting based on Arnold's "empty threat" that a search warrant would eventually be obtained. Jones is correct in asserting that baseless threats to obtain a search warrant may indeed render a consent to search involuntary. United States v. Hicks, 539 F.3d 566, 571 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. White, 979 F.2d 539, 542 (7th Cir. 1992). The appropriate focus, then, is on whether the police had a genuine intention to seek such a warrant, and more specifically, whether they had a reasonable factual basis to believe they had probable cause to obtain a warrant. Hicks, 539 F.3d at 572. [¶] The officers in this case had a reasonable factual basis to believe that there was sufficient probable cause to obtain a warrant.

Although defendant was in custody, he consented to letting a police officer search his cell phone for child pornography. His “low mental functioning” defense to consent is rejected because his actions showed he knew what he was doing when he was trying to hide the cell phone and his responses to questions about what was on the phone. The erect penis in the photograph, in context of other pictures on the phone, was probable cause to believe it was of a minor, although it could not be discerned with certainty. United States v. McGlothlin, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 15596 (7th Cir. July 28, 2010) (unpublished)* (Anders brief, but the issue is fully discussed.)

Defendant was riding an interstate bus which stopped at the MSP airport, and officers boarded the bus to talk to passengers. Defendant talked with the officers and refused to consent to a search of his bag. The officer asked: “May I see your driver's license or your ID?” This was a request in a friendly tone and not a command, and a reasonable person would have felt free to not provide it. United States v. Richards, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 15650 (8th Cir. July 29, 2010):

This was not a case of multiple officers coercing a bus passenger into submission by assailing him with multiple requests for the same thing until he complied. Nor was it a case in which police crafted an environment so coercive that Richards' will was overborne and he had no choice but to produce his identification. Richards was free to decline to present identification at the time that he was asked for it, regardless of Askerooth's hindsight reflection that, in light of his suspicious behavior, she would have likely detained Richards had he refused to cooperate. We conclude that, when viewed in the light of the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt at liberty to decline Askerooth's request for identification, and thus it did not constitute a seizure for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.

[I don't agree that any person feels free to refuse a request for ID when multiple police officers are on an interstate bus asking questions.]

Defendant ATF agent had qualified immunity for a search of plaintiff’s gun store at the request of local police. Having an FFL means you are in a highly regulated industry and have a reduced expectation of privacy in your records. Giragosian v. Bettencourt, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 15670 (1st Cir. July 29, 2010):

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(1)(B)(ii), the government may conduct compliance inspections of gun shop premises without either a warrant or reasonable cause, as long as it does not do so more than once in any twelve-month period. The Supreme Court has explicitly upheld the constitutionality of this provision under the Fourth Amendment. Biswell, 406 U.S. at 317 (holding that the “urgent federal interest” in regulating firearms traffic outweighs any threat to gun dealers' privacy). Bettencourt's 2007 compliance inspection of Giragosian's gun shop was the first in twelve months -- indeed, in ten years. It thus met all of the requirements of § 923(g)(1)(B)(ii).

The stop and subsequent search were valid, and any appeal would be frivolous (Anders brief). United States v. Pedraza-Bucio, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 15725 (10th Cir. July 28, 2010) (unpublished).*

Defendant was found to have consented to seizure of the portable hard drive to his computer after police asked him about child pornography on it, based on reports from another having seen it when he showed him. The “preview search” of the computer without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment, but the search was permissible by inevitable discovery because of defendant’s admissions there was child pornography on the hard drive. The full forensic examination of the computer was with a warrant, and, excluding the preview search from the affidavit, the warrant would have been granted anyway. State v. Nadeau, 2010 ME 71, 2010 Me. LEXIS 74 (July 29, 2010).* (This case has a helpful analysis of applying the exclusionary rule or not under inevitable discovery, and the court finds that applying the exclusionary rule here would not advance Fourth Amendment interests.)

The search of defendant’s briefcase at the time of his arrest would have violated Gant, but it was valid as inevitable discovery because it would have been searched at book-in. United States v. Miles, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76725 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 2010).*

One defendant consented to the officers entering the house to look for an alleged runaway, and the court of appeals did not properly consider the audio of the occurrence from one officer’s body recorder where he asked “may I.” Valtierra v. State, 2010 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 828 (May 5, 2010), revg Eduardo Valtierra v. State, 293 S.W.3d 725 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2009); Heriberto Valtierra v. State, 293 S.W.3d 697 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2009).

Defendant’s stop led to questions simultaneous with the paperwork which led to consent. “Although the results of the questioning led to a police-citizen encounter that was longer than it would have been without the questioning, that fact is not relevant.” State v. Gomes, 2010 Ore. App. LEXIS 890 (July 28, 2010).*